Porque não somos plankton... (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

Lembram-se do conglomerado Espírito Santo?

"Since the mid-1990s, the source of competitive advantage has been shifting. Leading companies used to be diverse conglomerates that based their competitive strategy on assets, positions, and economies of scale. Today’s market leaders, by contrast, are more focused enterprises. They do not follow the traditional portfolio strategies of seeking short-term profitability or growth wherever they can find it. Rather, they recognize that value is created by their distinctive capabilities: what they can do consistently well. Their strategic approach, which is based on a single powerful value proposition backed up by a few mutually reinforcing capabilities, gives them a continuing advantage over their rivals. As they consolidate their efforts around this approach, they fundamentally reshape their industries."

É natural que as consultoras grandes escrevam para os seus clientes-alvo, as empresas grandes. Por isso, o artigo está escrito para essa audiência. No entanto, mesmo para PMEs a caminho de Mongo, pode ser interessante ler o artigo:

"Supercompetitors [Moi ici: É a designação que os autores dão a estas empresas grandes e focadas, um pouco o que a P&G começou a fazer há mais de uma década e continua a fazê-lo ainda hoje] are emerging today because, in industry after industry, their few distinctive capabilities are both scalable and relevant, while other forms of competitive advantage, like sheer size, have decreased in importance.
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The uncertainty and hypercompetitive nature of today’s business world, thanks to outside forces such as technological change, globalization, and the ease of reverse-engineering many products and services, has shifted advantage to companies with distinctive capabilities. Since competitive advantage is increasingly short-lived, winning companies cannot rely on scale—the leverage that comes from being bigger than other companies. Nor can they rely on one or two assets, products, or services. They need a steady stream of offerings that only capabilities can deliver. Capabilities like these are not easy to build. [Moi ici: Mas não impossível para PMEs onde haja paixão e hábito de trabalhar sem rede, testando coisas novas e "always pushing the envelope"]"

Interessante como a P&G anda há 15 anos neste esforço de desinvestimento e ainda não deu sinais de parar.
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Trechos retirados de "The New Supercompetitors"

Bem vindo ao Estranhistão

"There is no more everyone. Instead, there are many pockets of someones."

Em linha com aquela tendência da fragmentação.

Trecho retirado de "The end of everyone"

Acerca do caminho para Mongo (parte I)

Ao longo de um trajecto de 5 km numa estrada rural, durante vários finais de tarde, no princípio de Agosto, fui caminhando e lendo, deliciado este relatório "The hero’s journey through the landscape of the future".
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Enquanto lia, reflectia sobre o quanto do que via tinha sido descrito ao longo dos anos no blogue. Por exemplo:

"shaped a world in which large companies face increasing performance pressure amidst sinking return on assets, intense competition, and changing workforce dynamics. Individuals are taking advantage of lowered barriers to market entry and commercialization to become creators in their own right. As a result, a new economic landscape is beginning to emerge in which a relatively few large, concentrated players will provide infrastructure, platforms, and services that support many fragmented, niche players.
In this way, both large players and small will coexist and reinforce each other. Some parts of the economy will be more affected by fragmentation than others, and more quickly, but the fragmentation will be enduring rather than transitory. In this new landscape, much of the world’s economic value will be created by the relationships among participants"

Continua.

Acerca de Mongo e os makers

Um excelente artigo, "A movement in the making", bem sintonizado com o que se escreve há anos e anos, neste blogue, sobre Mongo:

"The scales haven’t tipped yet. While alternatives exist to almost any mass-produced item, most US consumers haven’t yet explored the full range of possibilities. However, it is only a matter of time before large firms begin to feel the impact of this changing landscape.
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the impact of the maker movement will eventually permeate society, shifting identity and meaning from consumption to creation and blurring the boundaries between consumers and creators. These makers are the consumers of the future and likely the future of consuming.
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This future calls for companies to imagine ways to serve as a platform to connect far-flung consumers with the products they desire. [Moi ici: Conseguem encaixar nestas tendências a recente decisão da P&G? Parece claramente uma resposta a isto antes que seja tarde demais] It means designing new products and services with the help of the people who will ultimately benefit from them.
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the increasing number of niche providers that are competing with large companies for share of wallet. Now that building new products and reaching new customers is easier than ever, competition can and will come from everywhere, not just your biggest competitors.
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The sellers of these unique products are building not just on new production and distribution platforms but also riding the trend of consumers demanding more customized products and services.
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The scales haven’t tipped yet. While alternatives exist to almost any mass-produced item, most US consumers haven’t yet explored the full range of possibilities. However, it is only a matter of time before large firms begin to feel the impact as multitudes of niche products collectively take market share away from generic incumbent products. Ignoring niche products won’t reverse the trend."

Porque não somos plankton... (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.
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Uma narrativa muito mais de acordo com o que penso que está a acontecer, em "Disrupting Procter & Gamble":

"P&G’s development process actually reminds me of how we used to develop on-premise enterprise software: long 18- to 24-month cycles, a handful of beta testers—almost like a focus group—and then a big launch to manufacturing and worldwide sales channels. The hit products were huge, but there were also many high-profile flops—for example, Groove Networks.
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That’s exactly what Quirky has figured out and why they have the potential to disrupt the entire P&G business model. Ben Kaufman, Quirky’s founder and CEO, had the vision to democratize product development. He assembled a team of professionals across design, merchandising, legal, manufacturing and marketing to work with a worldwide community of participants who collaborate on every aspect of product development. The community contributes ideas, names and slogans, pricing input, marketing tips, manufacturability suggestions and will soon be able to offer in-store merchandising help.
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Is it possible that the collective brainpower of thousands of people can be more successful than the experts at P&G?"

E não esquecer a última citação de "A crise tem as costas largas"

Porque não somos plankton (parte II)

Provavelmente o melhor artigo deste Verão em defesa de Mongo, "P&G’s Problem Isn't Too Many Brands; It’s a Dated Business Model".

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Em sintonia com "Porque não somos plankton..."

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Mongo não é propriamente a melhor praia para os Golias deste mundo com modelos de negócio baseados no volume do século XX.

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Interessante perceber que:

"But over the past 15 years, P&G has sold more than 30 iconic brands that were supposedly hindering growth, and none of those divestitures fixed its sales problem. The strategy did create a slew of new, more successful rivals,
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J.M. Smucker (SJM), buyer of P&G’s Jif peanut butter, Crisco shortening, and Folgers coffee, has had nearly 50 percent sales growth since 2009. Other companies, such as Innovative Brands (Pert Plus shampoo and Sure deodorant), Pinnacle Foods (PF) (Duncan Hines), and Prestige Brands (PBH) (Chloraseptic) also have done well with P&G’s orphaned products. (Moi ici: As tribos não se dão bem com gigantes. Gigantes apontam para relacionamentos de transacção, tribos apontam para relacionamentos de interacção, de co-criação, de cumplicidade)
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Once, it seemed as if P&G could build successful brands in any category. For decades the company successfully expanded into beauty, health care, batteries, razors, and several other consumer goods categories. As P&G increased its brand portfolio and its global footprint, the company’s revenue multiplied from $11 billion in 1980 to nearly $40 billion in 2000.
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That success was a result of a centralized structure that allowed P&G, an enormous company, to outresearch, outmarket, and outspend smaller competitors. But the world has changed in the past 15 years, and P&G’s model doesn’t work as well.
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The most successful consumer products companies are small and nimble. Annie’s Homegrown (BNNY), Boulder Brands (BDBD), and Keurig Green Mountain (GMCR) have more than doubled revenue in the past five years.
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P&G’s biggest obstacle to growth is its centralized planning and decision-making. In today’s faster-paced environment, this structure slows innovation and turns every project into a big investment. Companies with more decentralized models are winning in the marketplace because their innovations come more quickly and are less costly, which translates into lower risk."

Um outro artigo da mesma revista sobre o mesmo tema "P&G's Plan to Ditch Half Its Brands Is Not as Strange as You Think", termina com uma frase com a qual discordamos completamente:

"The takeaway: Brands are not losing power, but building powerful brands these days takes greater resources."

O ponto não são os recursos, o ponto é a proximidade, a interacção, a flexibilidade, a cumplicidade, a relação com os consumidores.

Leu aqui há vários anos...

Leu aqui há vários anos... e só agora está a chegar ao mainstream.
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As implicações assimétricas de Mongo, do Estranhistão, para as empresas grandes e para as PMEs e artesãos, em "Is This the Death of the Mass Brand?":

"Brands were created to convey information about products at a time when it was hard for consumers to get information. But our hyper-networked and data-engorged era is killing the very reason for mass-market branding. This leaves big brands vulnerable to hordes of quirky little unbrands. Today’s technology gives the advantage to companies that have deep relationships with consumers, and there are two key ways to get those relationships.
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to be small and intimate enough to connect with customers on a personal level, like craft brands on Etsy or apartment owners who rent their places through Airbnb. Coke, McDonald’s, Ford and the like can’t easily go in either direction. They’re kind of screwed.
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In fact, in this age of consumer information and relationships, a big brand can be a negative. A brand conveys consistency and safety; it says a can of Coke will taste the same whether in Syracuse or Strasbourg.
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As we get better information about small-scale competing products, people feel safe seeking out the unique, the undiscovered, the unbrands. [Moi ici: We are all weird!!!] Hilton becomes vulnerable to Airbnb’s one-of-a-kind dwellings. Tiffany becomes vulnerable to jewellery makers on Etsy.
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The result is a developing societal shift, as authors Itamar Simonson and Emanuel Rosen describe in their book, Absolute Value: What Really Influences Customers in the Age of (Nearly) Perfect Information. We used to want the brands everybody else had. We’re moving toward mass individualism, wanting stuff nobody else has."

BTW, Itamar Simondson e Emanuel Rosen não me convencem, não creio que o problema seja das marcas por serem marcas, o problema está no que o marcador "hollowing" conta, marcas que para chegarem ao maior número possível de pessoas se tornaram tão ocas, tão vazias, tão medianas que já só vivem da fama de outros tempos.

BTW2, há dias no Twitter favoritei a mensagem de Saul Kaplan:

"Turns out the mass market was an industrial era illusion."

O meio pode albergar posições intermédias viáveis

Ontem, terminei o postal "Um cardume de estratégias?" com a citação:

"Por um lado, produzir com qualidade premium e, por outro, ter produtos a preço baixo, para competir com os restantes mercados. Tudo o que está a meio é perigoso."

Vou pisar gelo fino, gelo muito, muito fino... a ver se não me expresso mal.
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Aquela afirmação parece retirada deste blogue. Faz lembrar o esquema:

E há muitas empresas que falham, quando o mercado fica menos complacente porque não se definem e ficam no meio-termo:

é o que relatamos aqui como sendo (ver marcadores):

• o efeito da polarização do mercado;
• o stuck-in-the-middle.

Quando comecei a ter a possibilidade de trabalhar em estratégia com as empresas, eu era um porteriano, todo racional. E postulava, existirem três tipos de clientes:

• os que querem o melhor preço ou custo;
• os que querem o melhor serviço; e
• os que querem o melhor produto ou serviço.

Isto levava ao extremo de podermos formular uma estratégia sem olhar para os clientes efectivamente. Os clientes eram miudagem (ver marcador) que se distribuía por três gavetas. Formular uma estratégia era escolher a gaveta adequada e alinhar a empresa para isso.

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Algures no tempo, na evolução do meu pensamento comecei a perceber que a realidade era muito mais complexa... aí, como químico que fui, nasceu o diagrama ternário.

Não podia conciliar Mongo com as suas tribos fora da caixa com uma visão tão arrumada.

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Depois, o ró (ver estes postais aqui e aqui) veio ajudar a perceber que:

"A explosão dos atributos e a redução progressiva do ró, ao aumentarem o número de posições intermédias viáveis, significa um afastamento dos extremos no diagrama ternário... há cada vez mais posições híbridas viáveis."

Ou seja, os clientes-alvo deixam de ser os que pertencem a uma de três gavetas e passam a ser qualquer tribo com dimensão atraente e que possa ser servida com vantagem competitiva. Assim, vemos empresas que não têm nem o melhor preço, nem são as mais flexíveis, a servir com vantagem competitiva uma qualquer tribo eleita.
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Por que os clientes não querem o fornecedor mais eficiente... querem o melhor fornecedor para si.
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Assim, o meio pode albergar posições intermédias viáveis se os clientes-alvo estiverem no centro da atenção.

Em Mongo pode dizer-se "We're not in Kansas anymore!"

Ontem, o @pauloperes chamou-me a atenção para este texto "The Growth Share Matrix Revisited".
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Fiquei logo apanhado por um dos gráficos apresentados:

Um gráfico tão ao jeito de Mongo, um gráfico tão em sintonia com o que se escreve neste blogue há vários anos e que destoa do mainstream. Um gráfico tão ao jeito da economia como uma continuação da biologia e, que se traduz em "as estratégias não são eternas".
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Em Mongo, no Estranhistão, em que somos todos weirdos e orgulhosos disso, há mais gente fora do que dentro da caixa:

Quantos decisores, porque foram formados por quem aprendeu nos anos 60 e 70, continuam a acreditar que market share e lucro são sinónimos?
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Continua.

Implicações de Mongo

Em "The Great Fragmentation: We Are All Weirdos Now" pode ler-se:

"Once upon a time, only a couple of decades ago, there really was such a thing as mainstream culture. Its gatekeepers — a handful of TV channels, an incestuous music business, a clutch of radio mavens, a few movie studios, and the jealously guarded print industry — controlled 95% of the media. There was an independent counterculture, sure, but you had to go out of your way for it, and you really had to go out of your way to communicate with others who shared your interests, unless they happened to live nearby.
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Nowadays, though, wherever you are, whatever your interests, however baroque and obscure, you can find and join groups and mini-communities of people who share them. Indeed, you can and likely do find yourself part of several or even many distributed communities, one or more for each subject or context that really interests you.
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A society in which people accept that their personal views generally are and will remain minority perspectives, rather than seeking to impose “normal” beliefs and tastes on any who don’t fit in, is enormously healthier, both culturally and politically."

Esta fragmentação, uma descrição de Mongo, tem esta implicação para marketeiros e empresas:

"This is excellent news. Well, maybe not for marketers and advertisers, who no longer have a single barrel full of all the fish to fire their weapons into, but now have to catch us as we all swim through the new online oceans." 

Cada vez é mais importante perceber quem são os clientes-alvo, qual é a tribo que se pode servir com vantagem, qual é o ecossistema de que se pode fazer parte.
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Cada vez mais as empresas grandes vão ter dificuldades em manter a receita do passado.

"mass is dead in more ways than we can count"

"Since we can share resources, expanding to use all of something (a car, a boat, a vacation home) isn't just inefficient, it's wasteful.
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Now that it's cheaper and faster to share, an enormous number of new opportunities exist. Short runs, focused projects, marketing to the weird - mass is dead in more ways than we can count."

E quantas empresas não acompanham a mudança do espaço competitivo onde operam, com uma mudança no seu modelo de negócio?

Trecho retirado de "LTL as a strategy"

"Think Differently About Scale"

Outra nota retirada de "The Disappearing Middle Is a Real Market Threat — Here’s What Firms Can Do" que muito nos apraz é esta:

"Think Differently About Scale.
Historically, we have thought about the benefits of scale as being cost or supply based — with more scale comes the ability to offer the same set of benefits at lower cost. But this is no longer the case. Indeed, in category after category, technology and the globalization of production has made smaller offerings more economically viable. An offering that is tailored to appeal to a small segment of people — who are willing to pay a lot for it — is far more likely to be successful in today’s global, digitally-connected business environment. [Moi ici: I rest my case. O que é isto senão a base para Mongo, para o Estranhistão onde "we are all weird"]
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As a result, aiming for the “middle of the market” is no longer necessary to drive business success. For large companies, the advantage of scale will no longer come from applying it just to the supply side of the business, but also the demand side. With scale comes the ability to generate superior consumer understanding, something most companies spend relatively little to understand."

Por trás disto, Mongo

O século XX, o século de Metropolis, o século daquele começo de "Mãe Coragem" de Gorki numa qualquer Magnitogrado, foi o século das linhas de montagem e das produções massivas que permitiam.
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O século XXI, o século de Mongo, abomina a massificação, afinal, "We are all weird". Em Mongo as eficiências e os ritmos de produção das linhas de montagem não são a melhor opção quando a procura está fragmentada e segmentada.
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Assim, fábrica atrás de fábrica remetem para o caixote do lixo da história a sua linha de montagem, não é nada de pessoal... todas as estratégias são transitórias.
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Ainda me recordo de ler:

"Canon is also looking to boost productivity. Already, the company has seen great gains from "cell assembly," where small teams build products from start to finish rather than each worker repeatedly performing a single task on a long assembly line. Canon now has no assembly lines; it ditched the last of its 20 kilometers of conveyor belts in 2002, when a line making ink-jet printers in Thailand was shut down."

Em 2006, e ter ficado impressionado com as implicações que via à minha frente... são estas coisas que me ajudaram a ver o caminho...
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Escrevo isto a propósito de "Japanese Firm Uses a Single-Worker System to Make Its Products":

"Under this method, workers in single-person stalls assemble products from start to finish, guided by a 3-D graphic and using parts delivered automatically from a rotating rack. Every worker is capable of assembling any variation of the company's 50 or so products.
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The evolution of Roland DG, which is 40%-owned by digital piano maker Roland Corp., started in 1998, when it became one of the first companies in Japan to abandon the assembly line in favor of one-person work stalls modeled after Japanese noodle stands. With orders coming in smaller and smaller lots, Roland DG decided it needed a manufacturing system in which a single worker could build any one of its diverse products.
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 "We can move people instantly to make products that are in demand. There's a great deal of flexibility," says Masaki Hanajima, general manager of production manufacturing.
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Veterans, meanwhile, are able to assemble two machines simultaneously, or run one finished product through tests while assembling the next."

We will be weird (parte II)

Via Twitter, o @jcangaia chamou-me a atenção para "Largest vinyl record pressing plant in the US is expanding" onde se pode ler:

"America's largest vinyl record pressing plant in Nashville, Tennessee, will be expanding its operations to include a second warehouse full of record-making machinery. United Record Pressing LLC told The Tennessean on Monday that it plans to add 16 presses to its present 30, and it will use the remaining space in the new warehouse as storage to meet a robustly growing demand for its product.
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the company is currently working its 30 presses 24 hours a day, six days a week."

Um fenómeno já aqui referido em "We will be weird"
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A mensagem a retirar deste sintoma?
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Tribos. tribos, tribos!

Esquecem-se que Magnitogorsk foi no século XX...

Isto está tudo relacionado!
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Isto (daqui):

"Treat your product like a commodity, and people will buy it like a commodity. Treat it as something special, and you may be able to raise prices by multiples."

Com isto:

• "Here’s Why J.Crew’s New Budget Store Will Ruin Everything"
• "How to use discounting without harming your business"
• "Sainsbury's faces £100m profit blow in price war as opening salvo is fired against discount Germans"
• "California Dad Says He's Cracked the Code to Smart Shopping"

Enquanto uns trabalham para tribos, cada vez existem mais tribos e são mais diversificadas, outros continuam a sonhar com o vómito industrial para satisfazer o mercado de massas...

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Esquecem-se que Magnitogorsk foi no século XX...

um sintoma de que doença(s)?

Durante mais uma caminhada, tive oportunidade de ler este relatório da consultora Roland Berger "Escaping the commodity trap – How to regain a competitive edge in commodity markets". Um tema e um desafio que tratamos, há vários anos, quer neste blogue quer no dia-a-dia profissional.

"A "commodity trap" describes a situation where even complex products and services are downgraded to "commodities", with limited differentiation and where competition is primarily price-based – this is due to a combination of developments experienced by customers, competitors and in products/technologies
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The commodity trap is a phenomenon found in all industries – over 60% of the study participants have been affected, 54% have yet to take sufficient action to escape (and among affected companies even 65%). At many companies, there is a significant gap between recognizing the commodity trap and reacting accordingly [Moi ici: Quem são os clientes de uma consultora como a Roland Berger? Qual será a tipologia das empresas que fazem parte do universo questionado?].
In most industries, commoditization already started some 5 years ago – almost all industries report their low-end market segments as being affected, [Moi ici: Algo perfeitamente expectável, já o que se segue começou por me chocar...] more than half of the participants also see their middle segments being hit and about 20% face commoditization even in their premium segments." [Moi ici: O que significa isto? Isto é um sintoma de que doença(s)? Como não fazer a ponte para esta interrogação do Paulo Peres "Marcas serão mais vulneráveis no futuro?" ou para aquela que parece ser a ideia-base do livro que tenho na lista para ler "Absolute Value: What Really Influences Customers in the Age of (Nearly) Perfect Information" de Itamar Simonsen and e Emanual Rosen. Faz algum sentido uma oferta premium estar comoditizada? Não é um sintoma de um profundo distanciamento entre clientes e marcas?]

No final a consultora apresenta 5 factores-chave para o sucesso no combate à armadilha da comoditização:

"1 Core competencies – Leverage core competencies to develop new know-how or business opportunities
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2 Thinking outside the box – Look beyond the current business model for ways out of the commodity trap
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3 Change management – Be aware that successful implementation, especially for business model innovations, requires comprehensive change management actions
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4 Value chain & market segments – Analyze all directions along the value chain and potential market segments in order to find the "white spot" for your future business
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5 Sustainability – Think of long-term, sustainable ways to escape a commodity trap – short-term actions usually only postpone the problem"

 Porque acredito no Estranhistão, porque acredito que cada vez mais "We are all weird" [and proud of it], porque acredito no mundo de tribos apaixonadas, fico surpreendido pela pouca ênfase colocada na cada vez maior importância da escolha dos clientes-alvo, na cada vez maior importância da interacção.
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Caricaturando, posso pensar que os clientes-tipo da consultora ou são Golias ou aspiram a ser Golias, por isso, dão muita ênfase ao que podem controlar e crescer é o fim e não uma consequência. Por isso, estão cada vez mais afastados dos clientes e pensam que o logotipo da marca aguenta tudo... não aguenta, porque num mundo onde a assimetria de informação a favor da empresa está cada vez mais ameaçada, o valor durante o uso é cada vez mais fácil de percepcionar antes da compra.

"Treat different people differently. Anything else is a compromise"

Em sintonia com "efficiency without effectiveness is inherently inefficient" este delicioso trecho de hoje de Seth Godin:

"It's easy to lump people together into categories, easier still to say, "I know how you feel." But we don't, we can't, and given the choice, people will choose to be the people they wish to be.

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Mass markets were a shorthand forced on marketers who had too little time or information or leverage to treat different people differently. They are the result of the mass merchant, the mass media and mass production. But humans aren't a homogeneous mass, we are individuals, as individual as we dare to be.

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Marketing and governance and teaching and coaching and writing are built on a foundation of 'everyone', but in fact, we'd rather be someone.

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Treat different people differently. Anything else is a compromise."

Daí Mongo, daí o Estranhistão, daí o terreno adequado à concorrência imperfeita, daí a vantagem de David e das PMEs.

Trecho retirado de "All the same"

Outro sintoma de Mongo

Ontem, já noite, tive a boa surpresa de um e-mail do André Cruz com um presente. Um e-mail com o "recorte" da notícia "Empresa especializada em personalização de motas abriu em Coimbra" retirada do Diário das Beiras.
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Outro sintoma de Mongo, de um mundo customizado e personalizado:

"Mais do que uma empresa, o que vai funcionar nestas instalações é um conceito: a "paixão" dos seus mentores "pelas motas, pelos carros e todos os movimentos inerentes a estes contextos, incluindo a transformação ou personalização de veículos e espaços".
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Por isso, existe um espaço próprio para os cerca de 25 membros do "Custom Club Coimbra", coletividade que já existe há vários anos, mas que só agora adquiriu personalidade jurídica como associação sem fins lucrativos.
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"A cerimónia de sábado serviu também para apresentar oficialmente à comunidade e aos canais oficiais, não só o movimento "custom", em expansão mas também para promover a festa anual, designada" 5° Tarrafal Custom Party" que terá lugar nos próximos dias 5 e 6 de julho, na Associação Cultural de Vilarinho, Brasfemes."

Como o André resumiu num tweet que trocámos depois, está cá tudo:

• o nicho - as pessoas que têm paixão pelas motas e carros e que valorizam a transformação ou personalização de veículos e espaços;
• a tribo - os membros do "Custom Club Coimbra;
• o engagement - a festa anual do movimento

Co-criar valor é isto!!!

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Mongo é isto, mais gente fora da caixa do que dentro da caixa, um mundo de 'weirdos' orgulhosos da sua especificidade.
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Conseguem apanhar as semelhanças entre as 'weirdos' que querem aprender a fiar e as 'weirdos' que querem personalizar a sua moto?

Um gera o outro, que gera o outro, que gera o outro...

Mais um sintoma da construção em curso de Mongo, o Estranhistão!
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Seth Godin acerca da evolução dos nomes próprios na sociedade americana:

"Recent data on naming released by the Social Security Administration puts this into sharp relief. The top 1000 baby names include go-to standards like Zylin, Zymari, Zyrin, Zyrus and Zytaevius. That's not surprising, because, after all, 1,000 names is a lot of names.
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What's surprising is that over the last ten years, the percentage of names that don't fall within the top 1,000 keep rising. That means that more and more people are opting out of the popular naming regime, forging their own path."

O que é que isto tem a ver com as empresas?

"If you're chasing the masses, you're almost certainly heading the wrong direction. The masses are ignoring you. It's the weird who are choosing to pay attention, to seek out what they care about." 

Cada vez mais nichos, cada vez mais segmentos, cada vez menos interesse em apostar no volume puro e duro. Diferenciação, diferenciação, diferenciação, customização, customização e ainda mais customização.
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Ainda ontem no Twitter, alguém (@mattwensing) escrevia:

"Our ideal customer has a willingness to pay at least 60x more than where we started in 2009."

Qual o truque?

"Segment, then segment again." (Moi ici: E eu acrescento mais, "and then, segment again and again")

 Agora conjuguem esta evolução para um mundo em que "we are all weird and proud of it"  com esta evolução tecnológica:

"Prototyping makes sense as an area in which 3D printing can make inroads. To some extent, 3D printing in its current state is characterized by a low set up cost but a relatively high variable cost. Those costs may be high in terms of time instead of dollars. The idea is that if you are going to produce millions and millions of something (like lids for milk jugs), 3D printing is not the way to go. However, that low set up cost makes it attractive for things that are not currently produced in volume."

E comecem a imaginar a escalada simultânea, a espiral de variedade criada com o jogo entre os gostos e a capacidade de os satisfazer: um gera o outro; que gera o outro; que gera o outro; ...
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A crise é também uma manifestação do atraso com que as mentes, as instituições, os poderes, os incumbentes, ainda não se adaptaram a Mongo, continuam a pensar à moda antiga, com as receitas antigas, com o fito na massa, no volume.
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Trecho final retirado de "How is additive manufacturing adding value?"

E os chás dos Açores?

Começo a ler "Cash brews robust U.S. craft coffee market":

"The new generation of upscale coffee shops and roasters includes dozens of operators around the country. They are in a race to find rare and distinctive beans and hope to elevate one of the world's oldest and most popular drinks in the same way that craft beer brewers, boutique wineries and olive oil makers won fans by focusing on high-quality ingredients and production."

E lembro-me logo do Estranhistão e da caixa com cada vez menos gente lá dentro.
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E, como apreciador de chá, faço logo o paralelismo para os chás dos Açores...