Activismo e cronyismo

“A market economy is never static. Products that are cutting-edge today will soon become commodified and easy to make. Industries that are on the technological frontier will become mainstream and, later, relics of the past. What is a good job today will inevitably become a bad job in the future. This dynamic was first recognized by Karl Marx, who thought that it was evidence of the inherent instability of the capitalist system. Eighty years later, however, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter pointed out that instead of being a flaw, this process of “creative destruction” is capitalism’s greatest strength and its engine of growth.
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The Princeton economist Alan Blinder recently noted that in the 1950s, companies making television sets were at the heart of America’s high-tech sector and generating tens of thousands of high-paying jobs. After a while TV sets became just another easy-to-make commodity, and today no TV set is made in America. The computer manufacturing industry picked up where the TV industry left off, and for a while it was responsible for 400,000 high-paying jobs. We saw earlier that most of these jobs have now moved elsewhere. But this is not a sign of failure. Indeed, it is a sign of success. To remain prosperous, a society needs to keep climbing the innovation ladder. As Schumpeter argued, it is the dynamic that has been ensuring our prosperity since the beginning of the industrial revolution.
The crucial question for America’s future is therefore whether our innovation clusters can adapt and reinvent themselves to maintain their edge. Clusters, unlike diamonds, are not forever. At some point the industry that supports them matures, stops bringing prosperity, and turns into a liability. The forces of attraction provide an important advantage, but once-mighty clusters have collapsed in spectacular ways.”

Recordo Nassim Taleb: "Stressors are information", são sinais para calibrarmos a quantidade relativa de exploration versus exploitation. Perante os stressors há os que os agarram e, como os ratos do livro "Quem mexeu no meu queijo", interagem com a nova realidade. E há os que, como o Pigarro do mesmo livro, resistem à mudança e solicitam o apoio e a protecção dos governos, gerando toda uma série de doenças por causa do veneno do activismo.

Como não recordar logo o exemplo do leite ou do vinho na Madeira? Entretanto, na semana passada vi várias reportagens em que uns coitadinhos pediam apoios porque o aquecimento global lhes queimou uvas e fruta. Admitamos que efectivamente há um aquecimento global em curso, antropogénico ou não. Então, o melhor é estes coitadinhos mudarem de culturas ASAP.

Outro exemplo da economia deficiente. Nos EUA, "Harvard Business School professor: Half of American colleges will be bankrupt in 10 to 15 years". Por cá, tudo será feito para atrasar a mudança, torrando dinheiro impostado/roubado aos contribuintes para manter o status-quo.


BTW: Os romanos tinham vinhas nos Alpes, sinal de que o clima era mais quente que o dos últimos séculos. Imaginem os produtores de vinho suíço a receberem apoios desde há 2000 anos. Que renda!

Excerto de: Enrico Moretti. “The New Geography of Jobs”

Para reflexão

"We might assume that the nature of democracy would mean the minority acquiesces to the whims of the majority. In reality, the majority’s passivity toward a policy or behavior is surpassed only by the minority’s rigidity toward it.
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Committed ideologues are unshakable in their beliefs, unlikely to move toward the middle. On the other hand, moderates, less encumbered by bias, are more open to new ideas. Moderates are more likely to move toward the extremes than partisans are to move toward the middle. Given their flexibility, moderates tend to adopt the preferences of the intransigent minority.
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For a viewpoint to become popular, a minimum number of group members must first adopt it. Once this threshold is reached, the viewpoint becomes self-sustaining with more and more adopting it. Thus, the preferences of an intransigent minority are mainstreamed once enough moderates adopt them."

Excelente texto, "Political Moderates Are Lying" e suportado em fontes interessantes.

Selecção e subsídios

Com Maliranta em 2007 aprendi aquela frase com que se inicia a coluna das citações:

"It is widely believed that restructuring has boosted productivity by displacing low-skilled workers and creating jobs for the high skilled."
Mas, e como isto é profundo:
"In essence, creative destruction means that low productivity plants are displaced by high productivity plants." Por favor voltar a trás e reler esta última afirmação.
E o grande finale:
"As creative destruction is shown to be an important element of economic growth, there is definitely a case for public policy to support this process, or at least avoid disturbing it without good reason. Competition in product markets is important. Subsidies, on the other hand, may insulate low productivity plants and firms from healthy market selection, and curb incentives for improving their productivity performance. Business failures, plant shutdowns and layoffs are the unavoidable byproducts of economic development."

Com Taleb em 2018 voltei ao tema:

"Systems don’t learn because people learn individually –that’s the myth of modernity. Systems learn at the collective level by the mechanism of selection: by eliminating those elements that reduce the fitness of the whole, provided these have skin in the game." 

E agora volto a encontrar mais tijolos para a estrutura em "Why Leaders Get Stuck at Average":

"We don’t automatically improve as time passes.  The longer we do something the more likely we are to do it like we’ve always done it.
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Leading doesn’t make you a better leader. Just like playing golf doesn’t make you a better golfer.
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The only way to improve performance – in any field – is purposeful practice. (Researchers and authors often use the expression ‘deliberate practice’.)"

E em "A basic theory of inheritance: How bad practice prevails":

"All organizations have “best practices”: habits that they have picked up in the past or mimicked from others. Managers often believe that these must be the best ways of doing things, because otherwise market forces would have eliminated them. The theory in the paper explains why this belief may be wrong. Some enduring practices may be harmful without managers realizing it because it is not necessarily the most optimal practices that survive (just like harmful viruses persist in nature)."

Ainda a suckiness e o caring

Ontem um empresário com quem trabalho e que faz o favor de seguir este blogue enviou-me um e-mail para mim e para o resto da equipa com esta imagem:

Ainda numa reunião recente tínhamos falado no "Too Big To Care".

Hoje de manhã li e registei:

"So why not rethink your strategy and embrace the idea of building a tiny company? You might want to consider it, especially since Rowe says 'tiny' doesn't refer to size--or profit potential. Instead, it's a mindset."

Ontem naquilo que formalmente é uma acção de formação para empresários, mas que tento que seja uma conversa orientada para a reflexão e partilha de experiências falou-se disto:

"Like a tiny house where there's limited space for 'stuff,' a tiny business requires that you examine, prioritize and work with what you value and eliminate what you don't,"

Como não voltar aos nabateus e a Taleb sobre os artesãos saberem trabalhar com limites:

"the artisan is someone like me: You cannot be a promiscuous entrepreneur if you're an artisan. And also, you know where to stop. The problem is Steve Jobs stopped at the product line. The typical artisan knows where to stop.
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Whereas if you hire someone [like] McKinsey, they'll end up making you keep going beyond and doing shit. They want you to expand until you end up in bankruptcy."

Trechos retirados de "Why More Businesses Should Embrace Being Small"

Acerca da suckiness, visitar isto e isto.

Curiosidade do dia - definição e exemplo de bullshitter

Há pessoas que me tiram do sério, pessoas que deviam ter vergonha de saírem de debaixo das pedras onde estavam em retiro:

• João Cravinho diz que auto-estradas SCUT são lucrativas (Novembro de 2005)
• Cravinho diz que scut se pagam a si próprias (Novembro de 2005)
• João Cravinho defende que TGV Lisboa-Porto é prioritário (Abril 2018)

Mais vintage Taleb:

"There’s nothing wrong with being wrong, so long as you pay the price. A used-car salesman speaks well, they’re convincing, but ultimately, they are benefiting even if someone else is harmed by their advice. A bullshitter is not someone who’s wrong, it’s someone who’s insulated from their mistakes. There is less “skin in the game” today than there was fifty years ago, or even twenty years ago. More people determine the fates of others without having to pay the consequences. Skin in the game means you own your own risk. It means people who make decisions in any walk of life should never be insulated from the consequences of those decisions, period. If you’re a helicopter repairman, you should be a helicopter rider. If you decide to invade Iraq, the people who vote for it should have children in the military. And if you’re making economic decisions, you should bear the cost if you’re wrong.
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Ninety-eight percent of Americans—plumbers, dentists, bus drivers—have skin in the game. We have to worry about the 2 percent—the intellectuals and politicians making the big decisions who don’t have skin in the game and are messing the whole thing up for everybody else. Thirty years ago, the French National Assembly was composed of shop owners, farmers, doctors, veterinarians, and small-town lawyers—people involved in daily activities. Today, it’s entirely composed of professional politicians—people who are just divorced from real life. America is a little better, but we’re heading that way."

No país dos zombies, porque não se morre...

Ontem sublinhei esta ideia de Pedro Arroja:

"A reforma - a capacidade para, ao longo do tempo, ir ajustando as instituições à realidade que vai mudando - é uma característica das culturas protestantes. De facto, o movimento protestante original ficou conhecido para a história como  "A Reforma". Portugal, pelo contrário, alinhou no movimento oposto, "A Contra-reforma".
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Reformar não é com os portugueses. Passam-se anos, décadas, às vezes séculos, e nada acontece, as instituições vão-se degradando, cada vez mais desajustadas da realidade e do mundo em que vivem, e nada muda."

Depois, recordei um postal recente de Nassim Taleb:

"Systems don’t learn because people learn individually –that’s the myth of modernity. Systems learn at the collective level by the mechanism of selection: by eliminating those elements that reduce the fitness of the whole, provided these have skin in the game.
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And in the absence of the filtering of skin in the game, the mechanisms of evolution fail: if someone else dies in your stead, the built up of asymmetric risks and misfitness will cause the system to eventually blow-up."

Depois ainda, por um acaso, cheguei a um outro texto de Taleb no livro Antifragile:

"For the economy to be antifragile and undergo what is called evolution, every single individual business must necessarily be fragile, exposed to breaking — evolution needs organisms (or their genes) to die when supplanted by others, in order to achieve improvement, or to avoid reproduction when they are not as fit as someone else"

O texto de Arroja continua assim:

"É preciso um acontecimento. De preferência dramático, E tem de estar centrado em pessoas. É então que até as mesas se viram. E as reformas que não se fizeram ao longo de anos, décadas, às vezes séculos, fazem-se então todas de uma vez, de forma brusca e radical que até parece uma revolução."[Moi ici: Aquele "will cause the system to eventually blow-up"]

Fazendo fé no tal Vintage Taleb, as reformas não acontecem porque não se deixa morrer o singular e por isso o colectivo sofre. O país dos incumbentes, o país dos zombies:

não há rasgo em lado nenhum, sempre os mesmos zombies: louçã, félix, ângelos correias...
uma classe política em circuito fechado há demasiado tempo, gente pré-windows, pré-apple, pré-DOS https://t.co/YU8rXomjyf

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) April 3, 2018

Não estamos a desejar a morte a ninguém, mas a protecção aos campeões nacionais, lembram-se deles? A protecção dos centros de decisão nacional, a protecção das empresas grandes porque empregam muita gente e das empresas pequenas porque empregam localmente distorce as forças evolutivas em presença.

Vintage Taleb

"Unless consequential decisions are taken by people who pay for the consequences, the world would vulnerable to total systemic collapse. And if you wonder why there is a current riot against a certain class of self-congratulatory “experts”, skin the game will provide a clear answer: the public has viscerally detected that some “educated” but cosmetic experts have no skin in the game and will never learn from their mistakes, whether individually or, more dangerously, collectively.
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Systems don’t learn because people learn individually –that’s the myth of modernity. Systems learn at the collective level by the mechanism of selection: by eliminating those elements that reduce the fitness of the whole, provided these have skin in the game.[Moi ici: Isto é tão Maliranta!!! Foi a Maliranta que roubei a primeira citação na coluna de citações no lado direito deste blogue - 2007!!! Como o tempo voa - ""In essence, creative destruction means that low productivity plants are displaced by high productivity plants""]
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And in the absence of the filtering of skin in the game, the mechanisms of evolution fail: if someone else dies in your stead, the built up of asymmetric risks and misfitness will cause the system to eventually blow-up.[Moi ici: Beware de sistemas políticos (todos sem skin in the game) que absorbem cada vez mais capacidade de decisão]
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Yet the social science and the bureaucrato-BSers have missed and keeps missing that skin in the game is an essential filter. Why? Because, outside of hard science, scholars who do not have skin in the game fail to get that while in academia there is no difference between academia and the real world, in the real world, there is."[Moi ici: Eheheheh os media ainda não perceberam isto - 25 exemplos aqui] 

BTW, e políticos que vivem em casa dos papás, ou ligados ao soro da máquina do estado, a debitar sobre o que é que os empresários devem ou não fazer?


Trechos retirados de "What do I mean by Skin in the Game? My Own Version"

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte XI)

Mais uma achega sobre porque Mongo não é amigável para gigantes:

"the artisan is someone like me: You cannot be a promiscuous entrepreneur if you're an artisan. And also, you know where to stop. The problem is Steve Jobs stopped at the product line. The typical artisan knows where to stop.
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Food is artisinal. And every single successful restaurant owner I know goes past the first restaurant and opens a second restaurant -- they go to the point of bankruptcy, typically. And I've seen that happen. Artisans typically have the instinct to stop. They say, "OK, I'm satisfied with this."
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Whereas if you hire someone [like] McKinsey, they'll end up making you keep going beyond and doing shit. They want you to expand until you end up in bankruptcy.
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Stoffel: So an artisan is someone who knows when to stop. That's one of your filters.
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Taleb: Exactly.
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Stoffel: Because you're producing to produce, and not because of something you love?.
Taleb: Exactly. You're going beyond your hobby point. You see, an artisan, as you notice, it becomes a hobby. So the distinction between hobby and work is blurred for an artisan. What happens sometimes is a hobbyist starts out, is doing OK, and then it turns into work."

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte X)

Trechos retirados de "Motley Fool Interview: Nassim Nicholas Taleb"

Pensamento estratégico em todo o lado

É reconfortante encontrar pensamento estratégico em todo o lado, em todos os sectores de actividade económica.

A ISO 9001:2015 começa a secção 4 com a cláusula 4.1 sobre compreender uma organização e o seu contexto, e a cláusula 4.2 sobre as partes interessadas relevantes e os seus requisitos relevantes. Não admira, uma organização inteligente e com skin-in-the-game tem de estar atenta e alinhada com o seu contexto e partes interessadas, e quando estas mudam as organizações têm de mudar, não podem contar com um qualquer direito adquirido a um queijo metafórico.

"When Tom and Mac Ehrhardt took over the seed company from their father in the 1970s, much of their business came from producers like Swieter.
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“Farmers in pickups would come in and buy soup to nuts,” said Tom Ehrhardt. “They’d buy some oats, alfalfa, corn, a little clover, a little pasture grass, and maybe sweet corn and tomatoes for the garden, so it was a whole grocery list of things.”
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Now, 40 years later, “lots of those small farms have disappeared, and we don’t see as many individual farmers coming in this time of year as we once did,” he said.
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Tens of thousands of farmers have patronized the seed company since its founding in 1923. Now in its third generation, Albert Lea Seed House has adjusted with the times, becoming more of a distribution center than general store and surviving by recognizing its changing customers and providing a wide variety of seeds that farmers like Swieter can’t find through co-ops and the agricultural behemoths."

Liderar uma organização é esta busca permanente de ajuste à realidade, e sublinho outra vez Nassim Taleb:

"Gracias a la paranoia, que es la mejor estrategia de supervivencia. El optimismo es malo. Los psicólogos siempre dicen que infravaloramos la posibilidad de que se produzca una catástrofe. Yo te hago una simple pregunta: ¿prefieres que tu piloto de avión sea un pesimista o un optimista?
. . .
Ya respondo yo: necesitamos que nuestros líderes sean pesimistas.
Muchos expertos dicen que la ansiedad es la enfermedad del siglo XXI.
Pues se equivocan. Si no eres ansioso en tu vida personal, te vas a la quiebra. Mira a los animales salvajes: siempre están vigilantes, no asumen riesgos. Yo soy una persona feliz, pero cada mañana me levanto como si fuera a irme a la quiebra ese mismo día.
Curiosamente, este pesimismo existencial de Nassim Nicholas Taleb le lleva a un corolario contraintuitivo. La ansiedad humana, que tantos esfuerzos dedicamos a erradicar, quizá sea el principal motivo para confiar en la supervivencia de la raza a largo plazo."

Trecho retirado de "Albert Lea Seed House still thriving as it adjusts to the same forces changing the farm industry" e citado em "Leaders and Strategies in Real Life: 4/3/18"

Anónimo engenheiro da província, mas à frente

Ontem a meio da tarde fui ao Twitter e não resisti a escrever:

não há rasgo em lado nenhum, sempre os mesmos zombies: louçã, félix, ângelos correias...
uma classe política em circuito fechado há demasiado tempo, gente pré-windows, pré-apple, pré-DOS https://t.co/YU8rXomjyf

— Carlos P da Cruz (@ccz1) April 3, 2018

Esta operação em circuito fechado, gera respostas absurdas para desafios novos. Como não recordar Napoleão:

"Napoleon said: To understand someone, you have to understand what the world looked like when they were twenty." 

Como não recordar Zapatero.

E volto ao postal "Mas claro, eu só sou um anónimo engenheiro da província" de Maio de 2013 sobre os Encontros da Junqueira.

Pensem bem no significado, no alcance e no impacte deste fenómeno: em Maio de 2013 elite que pensa em e a Economia em Portugal continuava embrenhada no século XX, continuava a acreditar na validade das hipóteses que venciam aquando da rodagem do filme Metrópolis por Fritz Lang.

Agora, leiam "The End of Scale":

"For more than a century, economies of scale made the corporation an ideal engine of business. But now, a flurry of important new technologies, accelerated by artificial intelligence (AI), is turning economies of scale inside out. Business in the century ahead will be driven by economies of unscale, in which the traditional competitive advantages of size are turned on their head.
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Investments in scale used to make a lot of sense. Around the beginning of the 20th century, the world was treated to a technological surge unlike any in history. That was when inventors and entrepreneurs developed cars, airplanes, radio, and television, and built out the electric grid and telephone system.
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Scale conferred an enormous competitive advantage. It not only lowered fixed costs — it also created a forbidding barrier to entry for competitors. Organizations of all kinds spent the 20th century seeking scale. That’s how we ended up with giant corporations, and universities with 50,000 students, and multinational health care providers.
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This is the basis of economics of unscale. The winning companies in today’s tech surge are companies that profitably give each customer exactly what he or she wants, not companies that give everyone the same thing.
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Thus, scaled companies find themselves beleaguered by unscaled competitors.
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This is a clear indication of what big corporations are facing in an era that favors economies of unscale over economies of scale. Small, unscaled companies can challenge big companies with products or services more perfectly targeted to niche markets — products that can win against mass-appeal offerings. When unscaled competitors lure away enough customers, economies of scale begin to work against the incumbents. The cost of scale rises as fewer and fewer units move through expensive, large-scale factories and distribution systems — a cost burden not borne by unscaled companies.
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Remember, the corporation hasn’t been around forever. [Moi ici: Como bem sublinhou Seth Godin] It was an invention of the Industrial Age and it was created in response to a unique set of conditions. It makes sense that a new set of conditions needs a new structure. Maybe it will look like something that doesn’t yet exist. But surely some kind of unscaled corporation will emerge in the near future."

Pensem mais uma vez na quantidade de enormidades que oposição e situação deitam cá para fora quando ciclo eleitoral após ciclo eleitoral são comandadas por gente sem skin-in-the game. Não resisto a citar Nassim Taleb:

"Son expertos de pega. Un fontanero sabe de fontanería. Un charcutero sabe de jamón serrano. Pero se ha demostrado que los economistas no saben de economía. Ninguno vio venir la crisis, con honrosas excepciones, y fuimos marginados durante años. Pero lo peor de todo: no han aprendido nada de los últimos 10 años.
Dice Taleb que el negocio de la restauración funciona porque son los clientes, y no otros restauradores, quienes deciden qué locales prosperan y cuáles cierran. Lo mismo ocurre con los médicos, que dependen de su buena reputación entre los pacientes. «Y de no matarlos, claro», bromea.
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En cambio, otros sectores, como la Universidad o la burocracia, están «envenenados» porque sus profesionales se evalúan entre ellos mismos, con nula transparencia."

Delicioso (parte II)

Parte I.

"This tendency to underestimate the complexity around us is now a well-studied aspect of human psychology and it is underpinned, in part, by the so-called narrative fallacy.
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You see the narrative fallacy in operation when an economist pops up on the early-evening news and explains why the markets moved in a particular direction during the day. His arguments are often immaculately presented. They are intuitive and easy to follow. But they raise a question: Why, if the market movements are so easy to understand, was he unable to predict the market movement in advance? Why is he generally playing catch-up?
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That is the power of the narrative fallacy. We are so eager to impose patterns upon what we see, so hardwired to provide explanations that we are capable of “explaining” opposite outcomes with the same cause without noticing the inconsistency.
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But think about what this means in practice. If we view the world as simple, we are going to expect to understand it without the need for testing and learning. The narrative fallacy, in effect, biases us toward top-down rather than bottom-up. We are going to trust our hunches, our existing knowledge, and the stories that we tell ourselves about the problems we face, rather than testing our assumptions, seeing their flaws, and learning. But this tendency, in turn, changes the psychological dynamic of organizations and systems. The greatest difficulty that many people face, as we have seen, is in admitting to their personal failures, and thus learning from them. We have looked at cognitive dissonance, which becomes so severe that we often reframe, spin, and sometimes even edit out our mistakes.
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But when we are misled into regarding the world as simpler than it really is, we not only resist testing our top-down strategies and assumptions, we also become more defensive when they are challenged by our peers or by the data. After all, if the world is simple, you would have to be pretty stupid not to understand it."

Isto faz lembrar Taleb e os fragilistas.

Trechos retirados de "Caixa Negra" de Matthew Syed.

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte IX)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI, parte VII e parte VIII.

Primeiro li "22 Retail Industry Predictions For Brick-And-Mortar Stores In 2018" e senti-me esmagado pela quantidade de informação e a diversidade de vias de actuação. Ainda esta semana animei uma sessão onde um grupo tentava calçar os sapatos dos seus clientes-lojistas e quase nada disto apareceu.

Depois, fui correr uns 6 km em cerca de 40 minutos. Tomei um duche e comecei a ler "Beyond process - How to get better, faster as “exceptions” become the rule":

"Over the past several decades, the business world has relentlessly pursued efficiency-driven business process reengineering, seeking to integrate, standardize, and automate tasks in ways that can reduce costs, increase speed, and deliver more predictable outcomes. As the landscape shifts, perhaps it’s time for organizations to expand their focus beyond business process reengineering to pursue business practice redesign, helping frontline workgroups to learn faster and accelerate performance improvement, especially in environments that are shaped by increasing uncertainty and unexpected events.
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Organizations that don’t get on an exponential trajectory may fall behind and become increasingly marginalized as the world advances at a faster rate. It could be the difference between plodding along, working harder and harder to get equivalent improvements in performance, versus improving performance at a rate that mirrors the surrounding rate of change. Existing approaches to performance improvement are falling short, and companies are already feeling the effects of mounting performance pressures.
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On the demand side, customers have more power and choice than ever before and are less willing to settle for the standardized products that long drove the success of large institutions.[Moi ici: Suckiness! Rings a bell?]  Platforms have expanded the range of available choices and made it easier to get information about them, and customers can express their feelings about companies globally and instantaneously. So can investors. At the same time, many customers are becoming more demanding, expecting different and more nuanced products and services that are tailored to their specific needs and preferences. [Moi ici: As tribos assimétricas de Taleb] On-demand services have further raised expectations for speed, convenience, and customization as basic requirements.
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On the supply side, businesses face intensifying competition as new platforms, connectivity, and other advances reduce the barriers to entry in many sectors.
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A challenge for large companies—or companies that aspire to be large—is that scalable effciency is often no longer effective. While the model yielded results in a relatively stable environment and may continue to improve productivity over time, it has created an environment that is often hostile to learning, where it is harder, and takes longer, to achieve higher levels of performance improvement."

Por todo o lado este reconhecimento de como Mongo é un-friendly para os gigantes e para os eficientistas.

VUCA rules!

A propósito da primeira compra do ano, acerca do último livro de Nassim Taleb:

"The problem, says Taleb, is that in modern times we have become increasingly preoccupied with prediction, and blind to the value of antifragility. As a result, iatrogenic damage (harm caused by well-meaning interventions) has become ubiquitous. ...
Taleb describes himself as a skeptical empiricist and a disciple of Seneca, the Stoic philosopher. We tend to think of the Stoics as being able to withstand life’s vicissitudes, but Taleb says they are always looking for situational asymmetries. This quest is the essence of an antifragile strategy: to identify and exploit options in which you can bet against the fragilistas with little to lose and much to gain."

Este trecho acerca da minha segunda compra do ano:

"vivid account of what happens when superbly trained and highly resourced teams that operate as part of a bureaucratic structure confront a decentralized and fluid network of underprepared and barely resourced competitors that are nonetheless fiercely aligned around a persuasive common narrative. And it offers a rich template for effective action. In the process, One Mission demonstrates precisely why 20th-century managerial innovations such as management by objectives and vertically cascading strategic alignment are doomed in an environment characterized by complexity, unpredictability, and speed." 

Primeira compra do ano

Um exemplo a propor, que os bares da Assembleia da República sigam as mesmas regras que os bares do SNS. Só assim teremos skin-in-the-game.

O veneno do activismo

"we consider scenario planning to be a good approach to support search and research approaches that can be adopted by managers seeking to either test existing VCSs or innovate new VCSs. Existing practices - particularly if they have encountered success for some time - can conceal tacit assumptions about existing and future roles. these assumptions may have made sense in the past but with changed conditions may now appear to be arbitrary demarcations between "what is (or can be) ours" and "what cannot be". Obsolete assumptions that remain unsurfaced and unquestioned may render potentially valuable strategic configurations difficult to explore."

Enquanto lia isto veio-me à mente Nassim Taleb: "Stressors are information" e uma notícia da manhã, "Vinho da Madeira: Excesso de produção leva Governo a comprar uvas a baixo preço".

Quando o activismo governamental mascara os sinais de stress, distorce a realidade e está a minar a realização de transições de modelo de negócio por alguns ao longo do tempo. O activismo cria uma espécie de reserva onde as premissas tornadas obsoletas no mundo real continuam válidas. Como o mundo real continua a evoluir, o gap entre a realidade real e a realidade distorcida da reserva continua a crescer até que algures, o activismo do governo deixa de ser capaz de suportar a reserva e a barragem rebenta obrigando muita gente a um choque brutal para o qual não estavam preparadas.

No Douro, o vinho DOP, as marcas e o enoturismo conjugaram-se com o vinho do Porto para criar um ecossistema muito mais estável e atraente. Até que ponto esta intervenção governamental na Madeira não impede a evolução do ecossistema da vitivinicultura da Madeira para uma nova realidade onde o vinho da Madeira se conjugue com outras formas de transformação das uvas da região em vinho com marca e DOP?

Trecho retirado de "Strategy in a Networked World" de Ramírez & Mannervik.

"make systems Tsunami proof"

Recordar ""-THERE WILL BE TURBULENCE!" por isso, safe-fail"

"Fragile systems collapse under stress. The opposite of fragile is robust – a system unaffected by stress. Robust systems do not improve. Antifragile systems gain from stress. Antifragile is a neologism coined by Taleb. Nature is antifragile. Hormesis, the long terms gains of the body from small stressors, is a recognized biological phenomenon which illustrates antifragility. The stresses in antifragile systems are like a live attenuated vaccine which protects the body from its more virulent counterpart.
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Black swan events can’t be predicted. But systems can be made less prone to outliers. According to Taleb, we should focus on pay-offs, not probabilities; exposure, not risk; mitigation, not prediction. Antifragile is Taleb’s peace offering – an epistemological middle ground where the unknowable compromises with our need to act. The fault lies not in our failure to predict Tsunamis, but in failing to make systems Tsunami proof."

Trechos retirados de "Why Doctors should read books by Nassim Taleb"

Acerca de Mongo

"When Voodoo launched, Friefeld said that the team began to realize that they were serving two different markets. The first market is made up of engineering companies that are launching new products and which need to produce a few thousand products for early testing and validation.Voodoo works with these firms to produce the first few thousand enclosures and other parts for their designs. The second market consists of marketing materials and other aesthetic products.
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How can a 3D printing company compete with the $162 billion injection molding market? Voodoo accomplished this by purchasing off-the-shelf 3D printers, which require very little up-front investment when compared to an industrial manufacturing operation. Running a series of print farms, Friefeld said that his startup is cost-competitive with injection molding for runs of up to 10,000 units. For print runs above that, it usually makes more economic sense to have parts made with injection molding.
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“With Voodoo, there’s no up-front investment,” Friefeld said.“We can get started with the file and get your part the next day, or 10,000 parts in two weeks. We’re fast and we have very little startup costs with our process.That’s all because we’re using 3D printers—digital manufacturing tools that can take in a digital file and produce a physical product with little human interaction. No tool, no tooling, no jigs, no fixtures. File in, product out.”
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“Ultimately, we will be producing low-volume runs of any manufactured product anywhere in the world,” Friefeld said.“[We’re] starting with plastic today, but we’ll eventually expand into other materials and processes built on top of these digital tools like 3D printers.”"

Isto encaixa perfeitamente na narrativa acerca da caminhada para esse novo mundo económico que designo por Mongo. Um mundo de diversidade e com cada vez menos necessidade de grandes séries.

Há algum tempo discutia-se numa empresa a necessidade de investir numa unidade toda automatizada, ao estilo 4.0, para se especializar na produção de grandes séries. Sinto que os escandalizei quando os tentei convencer a fazerem o contrário: investir numa nova unidade pequena, mas para se concentrar nas pequenas séries.

As empresas grandes pensam nas séries grandes e não dão a atenção suficiente às pequenas séries e a um outro estilo de marketing, de actividade comercial e de produção que requerem. Pensem no Director Comercial de uma empresa grande. Pensem no desafio que ele tem de enfrentar todos os anos de aumentar as vendas para ir ao encontro de objectivos de facturação muito ambiciosos. Pensem como o volume de vendas é muito mais fácil de medir que o lucro unitário obtido com essas mesmas vendas. Pensem como esse Director terá tendência a matar/asfixiar todos os projectos de novos produtos e serviços que não prometam pelo menos X de vendas rapidamente. Julgo que a única hipótese que uma empresa grande tem de fazer a transição para Mongo, é a de criar spinoffs e colocar gente apaixonada  e obrigada a passar fome de recursos, à frente desses projectos. (Interessante como esta referência a gente apaixonada me fez recordar este podcast recente de Nassim Taleb, "Nassim Nicholas Taleb on Work, Slavery, the Minority Rule, and Skin in the Game")


Trechos retirados de "Voodoo Automates 3D Printing to Take on Injection Molding"

"All (Literally) in the Same Boat"

Começo por recordar Aristóteles e a sua reflexão sobre os actos voluntários e involuntários. Depois, convido à leitura de Nassim Taleb acerca da Lei de Rhodes aplicável ao comércio marítimo (e parece que também aplicável às caravanas de camelos):

"All (Literally) in the Same BoatGreek is a language of precision; it has a word describing the opposite of risk transfer: risk sharing. Synkyndineo means “taking risks together”, which was a requirement in maritime transactions.
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The Acts of the Apostles describes a voyage of St Paul on a cargo ship from Sidon to Crete to Malta. As they hit a storm: “ When they had eaten what they wanted they lightened the ship by throwing the corn overboard into the sea.”
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Now while they jettisoned particular goods, all owners were to be proportioned the costs of the lost merchandise, not just the specific owners. For it turned out that they were following a practice that dates to at least 800 B.C., codified in Lex Rhodia, Rhodian Law, after the mercantile Aegean island of Rhodes; the code is no longer extant but has been cited since antiquity. It stipulates that the risks and costs for contingencies are to incurred equally, with no concern of responsibility. Justinian’s code summarizes it:
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“It is provided by the Rhodian Law that where merchandise is thrown overboard for the purpose of lightening a ship, what has been lost for the benefit of all must be made up by the contribution of all.”
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And the same mechanism for risk-sharing took place with caravans along desert routes. If merchandise was stolen or lost, all merchants had to split the costs, not just its owner."

Não conhecia esta Lei de Rhodes... sinto que o Tribunal Constitucional em Portugal não a aprovaria por ir contra direitos adquiridos.

Trecho retirado de "Why Each One Should Eat His Own Turtles (Revised)"

Num país que faz leis por tudo e por nada um tipo desconfia

"Indeed much of the work of investment banks my days was to play on regulations, find loopholes in the laws. And, counterintuitively, the more regulations, the easier it was to make money."

Trecho retirado de "Why Each One Should Eat His Own Turtles (Revised )"

O artigo é demasiado rico e merece ser lido e relido. Voltaremos a ele.

"If your private life conflicts with your intellectual opinion..."

"It is immoral to be in opposition of the market system and not live (like the Unabomber) in a hut isolated from it
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But there is worse:
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It is even more, much more immoral to claim virtue without fully living with its direct consequences
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As we saw with the interventionistas, a certain class of theoretical people can despise the details of reality, and completely so. If you believe that you are right in theory, you can completely ignore the real world –and vice versa. And you don’t really care how your ideas affect others because your ideas make you belong to some virtuous status that is impervious to how it affects others.
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If your private life conflicts with your intellectual opinion, it cancels your intellectual ideas, not your private life
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and
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If your private actions do not generalize then you cannot have general ideas"

Que dizer dos grandes defensores da escola pública que sempre tiveram os seus filhos num colégio privado com nome estrangeiro na zona de Cascais e até foram ministros de governos de esquerda?

Trechos retirados de "The Merchandising of Virtue"