"brand feedback mechanism"

“we felt uneasy buying something that cost a few hundred pounds without the reassurance of a recognizable name.
...
Without the brand feedback mechanism, there was no incentive for any one manufacturer to make a safer, better version of the board, since they were not positioned to reap the gains. As a result, the market became a commoditised race to the bottom, in which both innovation and quality control fail. Why make a better product if no one knows it was you who made it? So no one did make a better board, and the whole category more or less died as a result. It may correct itself if better boards arise, or if a shrewd company such as Samsung cannily attaches its name to the best.
...
Branding isn’t just something to add to great products – it’s essential to their existence.”

Uma marca é o princípio da concorrência imperfeita, como bem sabia o totó do Chamberlin.

Mais do que o custo

"The ability to create an advantage for the buyer is dependent on a seller’s competitive strength. This strength is reflected in its ability to offer better exchange ratios.
...
At equal prices, a seller with a cost advantage will gain greater profits than its competitors. At lower prices, the seller will increase its market share and strengthen its cost advantage, creating the basis for higher profits in later periods. A seller that provides its buyers with a greater net benefit is valued more highly by them; it strengthens its reputation, and buyers satisfied with its performance will become repeat customers. These are the conditions for profits being greater than competitors’ and for increased market share.

Profits that are the outcome of an advantageous position can be used by the seller as additional investments that competitors can only finance from other sources. The effects are as follows: a competitive advantage facilitates investment and thereby it helps to protect existing advantages and/or create new ones. Hence, it is vital for every competitor to create, find, or extend its competitively advantageous position. It is the very nature of competition that success or failure depends on the firm’s competitive position and every action has to be analyzed in terms of its effects on this position—how it improves or degrades it and how it utilizes it."

Lembram-se dos economistas da Junqueira? Julgo que eles ainda pensam com as redes neurais que foram criadas na sua mente quando aprenderam as regras de funcionamento do Normalistão, afinal o mundo onde nasceram. Para eles só existem duas posições: vantagem de custo ou desvantagem de custo.

Uma pregação em prol da ... concorrência imperfeita

Continuo a minha leitura matinal de "Fundamentals of Business-to-Business Marketing - Mastering Business Markets" editado por Michael Kleinaltenkamp, Wulff Plinke, Ian Wilkinson e Ingmar Geiger.

Estão a ver o choradinho e a falta de noção deste senhor, "Boas notícias, Portugal a ser abandonado pelo negócio do preço (parte II)"?

Imaginem o que diria desta linguagem:

"We have come to understand the market process as a never-ending process of learning for all involved, a process that is kept running by the entrepreneur who detects profit opportunities. Entrepreneurs sense differences in the market, they discover the possibility to sell something at a higher price than they can buy it for, and they disperse this knowledge—voluntarily or involuntarily—to other market participants. This process is a competitive one that rewards the capable and punishes the less able. Competition among sellers, therefore, has a selection function that creates better problem solutions for the buyer.
The Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises described the situation in the following way: “The entrepreneur can only act a step ahead of his competitors if he strives toward serving the market more cheaply and better. More cheaply means richer supply; better means supply with products not yet in the market”"

Depois, o livro apresenta esta figura:

Sabem o que vem aí?
Uma pregação em prol da ... concorrência imperfeita.

"Homogeneity: The offers in a market are homogeneous if they resemble each other in all aspects, so that the buyer perceives no difference among them. Offers are heterogeneous if they differ either objectively or as perceived by the buyer.
• Knowledge: Buyers have complete market knowledge if they know without delay about all offers in the market.
• Barriers: Barriers hinder free market entry: new sellers cannot enter the market without entry costs or constraints, and sellers already in the market cannot imitate the characteristics and behavior of other sellers.
...
Information shortages and quality differences that initially exist will tend to disappear, and the temporary profits of cases 2–4 will disappear, shifting the situation to case 1.
.
Cases 5 and 6 differ from cases 1 to 4 because barriers exist. Barriers act as an obstacle to competition for new entrants as well as for those already in the market. Market entry barriers are always disadvantageous for new entrants compared to incumbent sellers, because the latter can approach buyers more easily than new entrants. And if a seller has a first mover advantage compared to its competitors then others cannot catch up—either because they are unable to (the advantage is too great) or because they do not want to (e.g., they are afraid of the first movers’ response).
...
Hence, barriers are, among other things, the reason for sellers earning profits significantly higher than competitors.
...
The picture of competition created in cases 5 and 6 provides the basis for an analysis of competitive advantage. Dynamic seller competition means that sellers are permanently searching for and experimenting with new products or services in order to find or create ones that distinguish themselves from those of other sellers, in terms of value to the buyer and/or the costs they incur. If a competitor succeeds in operating with lower costs than its competitors, then it can offer lower prices to buyers, which can increase its market share and profits. If a seller succeeds in offering a better product or service without higher costs, then it can increase prices and earn higher profits. This never-ending search and experimentation has only one aim: By differentiation, the seller wants to avoid being substitutable. Furthermore, a seller strives to establish a difference that is sustainable; it wants to avoid being imitated."

"strategic choices should flow mainly from the analysis of its unique skills and capabilities"

Excelente abstract:

"Much of the current thinking about competitive strategy focuses on ways that firms can create imperfectly competitive product markets in order to obtain greater than normal economic performance. However, the economic performance of firms does not depend simply on whether or not its strategies create such markets, but also on the cost of implementing those strategies. Clearly, if the cost of strategy implementation is greater than returns obtained from creating an imperfectly competitive product market, then firms will not obtain above normal economic performance from their strategizing efforts. To help analyze the cost of implementing strategies, we introduce the concept of a strategic factor market, i.e., a market where the resources necessary to implement a strategy are acquired. If strategic factor markets are perfect, then the cost of acquiring strategic resources will approximately equal the economic value of those resources once they are used to implement product market strategies. Even if such strategies create imperfectly competitive product markets, they will not generate above normal economic performance for a firm, for their full value would have been anticipated when the resources necessary for implementation were acquired. However, strategic factor markets will be imperfectly competitive when different firms have different expectations about the future value of a strategic resource. In these settings, firms may obtain above normal economic performance from acquiring strategic resources and implementing strategies. We show that other apparent strategic factor market imperfections, including when a firm already controls all the resources needed to implement a strategy, when a firm controls unique resources, when only a small number of firms attempt to implement a strategy, and when some firms have access to lower cost capital than others, and so on, are all special cases of differences in expectations held by firms about the future value of a strategic resource. Firms can attempt to develop better expectations about the future value of strategic resources by analyzing their competitive environments or by analyzing skills and capabilities they already control. Environmental analysis cannot be expected to improve the expectations of some firms better than others, and thus cannot be a source of more accurate expectations about the future value of a strategic resource. However, analyzing a firm's skills and capabilities can be a source of more accurate expectations. Thus, from the point of view of firms seeking greater than normal economic performance, our analysis suggests that strategic choices should flow mainly from the analysis of its unique skills and capabilities, rather than from the analysis of its competitive environment."

Abstract retirado de "Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and Business Strategy", de Jay Barney e publicado por Journal Management Science, Volume 32 Issue 10, October 1986.

Contra a academia, marchar, marchar! (parte II)

Parte I.

"Ultimately, strategy is a way of thinking, not a procedural exercise or a set of frameworks.
...
For a company to beat the market by capturing and retaining an economic surplus, there must be an imperfection that stops or at least slows the working of the market. An imperfection controlled by a company is a competitive advantage. These are by definition scarce and fleeting because markets drive reversion to mean performance
...
Good strategies emphasize difference—versus your direct competitors, versus potential substitutes, and versus potential entrants.
...
To beat the market, therefore, advantages have to be robust and responsive in the face of onrushing market forces. Few companies, in our experience, ask themselves if they are beating the market—the pressures of “just playing along” seem intense enough. But playing along can feel safer than it is. Weaker contenders win surprisingly often in war when they deploy a divergent strategy, and the same is true in business
...
The need to beat the market begs the question of which market. Research shows that the unit of analysis used in determining strategy (essentially, the degree to which a market is segmented) significantly influences resource allocation and thus the likelihood of success: dividing the same businesses in different ways leads to strikingly different capital allocations.
.
What is the right level of granularity? Push within reason for the finest possible objective segmentation of the market"

Trechos retirados de "Have you tested your strategy lately?"

Contra a academia, marchar, marchar!

“At its heart, business strategy is all about beating the market, or in other words defying the power of “perfect” markets to push economic surplus back to zero. Economic profit—the total profit after the cost of capital is subtracted—measures the success of that defiance by showing what is left on the table after the forces of competition have played out”

A concorrência imperfeita é vista como uma coisa tenebrosa a abater, como uma chatice que impede usarem-se umas formulas-maravilha, e dá azo ao lado irracional dos humanos ao fazerem escolhas. Chamberlin era um economista americano que até queria acabar com as marcas, porque elas são a base para animar a imperfeição dos mercados.

Aqui, este consultor, não quer outra coisa: fomentar, promover a concorrência imperfeita. Criar monopólios informais na mente dos clientes. Alavancar a chegada de Mongo!

Excerto de: Chris Bradley. “Strategy Beyond the Hockey Stick”.

"Giants invariably descend into suckiness" (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

Há dias apanhei este texto, "Craft Beer Is the Strangest, Happiest Economic Story in America". O texto, face ao que se escreve há anos neste blogue, não traz nada de novo. No entanto, é interessante um artigo do mainstream trazer um conjunto de mensagens que por cá são pouco pensadas por quem tem obrigação de preparar as pessoas que vão viver na economia do depois de amanhã.

Ora vejamos:

"The monopolies are coming. In almost every economic sector, including television, books, music, groceries, pharmacies, and advertising, a handful of companies control a prodigious share of the market.[Moi ici: Foi até aqui que nos trouxe o modelo económico do século XX, a crença no eficientismo e, no preço/custo como o principal factor para ganhar clientes/consumidores. Convém não esquecer que nos anos 60 nos Estados Unidos havia um académico, Chamberlin, que queria acabar com as marcas porque iludiam o paradigma da concorrência perfeita introduzindo uma coisa horrorosa, as preferências irracionais]
...
The beer industry has been one of the worst offenders.[Moi ici: Basta pesquisar o marcador cerveja para perceber o quanto é um tema que se segue aqui há anos e até se sonhou no longínquo ano de 2007]"

O artigo começa com factos, 90% da produção de cerveja é da responsabilidade de um duopólio.

"This sort of industry consolidation troubles economists. Research has found that the existence of corporate behemoths stamps out innovation and hurts workers. Indeed, between 2002 and 2007, employment at breweries actually declined in the midst of an economic expansion.[Moi ici: É o eficientismo a funcionar, concentração, automatização, redução da variedade, redução de trabalhadores, unidades cada vez mais produtivas e mais volumosas]
But in the last decade, something strange and extraordinary has happened. Between 2008 and 2016, the number of brewery establishments expanded by a factor of six, and the number of brewery workers grew by 120 percent. Yes, a 200-year-old industry has sextupled its establishments and more than doubled its workforce in less than a decade. Even more incredibly, this has happened during a time when U.S. beer consumption declined.[Moi ici: Por favor, PARAR!!! E voltar a ler este parágrafo]
...
Preliminary mid-2017 numbers from government data are even better. They count nearly 70,000 brewery employees, nearly three times the figure just 10 years ago. Average beer prices have grown nearly 50 percent. So while Americans are drinking less beer than they did in the 2000s (probably a good thing) they’re often paying more for a superior product (another good thing). Meanwhile, the best-selling beers in the country are all in steep decline, as are their producers. Between 2007 and 2016, shipments from five major brewers—Anheuser-Busch, MillerCoors, Heineken, Pabst, and Diageo, which owns Guinness—fell by 14 percent. Goliaths are tumbling, Davids are ascendant, and beer is one of the unambiguously happy stories in the U.S. economy." 

Depois dos factos vêm as interrogações e as estranheza:

"When I first came across these statistics, I couldn’t quite believe them. Technology and globalization are supposed to make modern industries more efficient, but today’s breweries require more people to produce fewer barrels of beer. Moreover, consolidation is supposed to crush innovation and destroy entrepreneurs, but breweries are multiplying, even as sales shrink for each of the four most popular beers:
...
The source of these new jobs and new establishments is no mystery to beer fans. It’s the craft-beer revolution, that Cambrian explosion of small-scale breweries that have sprouted across the country.
...
But what explains the nature of the craft-beer boom?
...
The first cause is something simple yet capricious—consumer tastes. “At the end of the day, the craft-beer movement was driven by consumer demand,” said Bart Watson, the chief economist at the Brewers Association, a trade group. “We’ve seen three main markers in the rise of craft beer—fuller flavor, greater variety, and more intense support for local businesses.”[Moi ici: Tudo coisas que encaixam no nosso modelo de Mongo - não somos plankton, explosão de diversidade e tribos, proximidade e autenticidade]
...
Craft breweries have focused on tastes that were underrepresented in the hyper-consolidated beer market. Large breweries ignored burgeoning niches, ... It’s also significant that the craft beer movement took off during the Great Recession, as joblessness created a generation of “necessity entrepreneurs” who, lacking formal offers, opened small-time breweries.
...
A phalanx of small businesses doesn’t automatically constitute a perfect economy. There are benefits to size. Larger companies can support greater production, and as a result they often pay the highest wages and attract the best talent. But what the U.S. economy seems to suffer from now isn't a fetish for smallness, but a complacency with enormity. The craft-beer movement is an exception to that rule. It ought to be a model for the country."

Os gigantes não resvalam para a "suckiness" por causa de má gestão, mas porque está-lhes no sangue. As vantagens de ser gigante só existem se se produzir grandes séries iguais. Grandes séries iguais têm de apontar ao gosto mais comum, não podem fugir da média. Isto num tempo em que há cada vez mais tribos que valorizam o que é visto pela maioria, cada vez mais pequena, como extremismo. E essas tribos extremistas não transigem.

Esta série não fica por aqui.

Promover a assimetria

"If possession of a positive added value is the key to value appropriation, we must next determine how a player comes to have a positive added value. In particular, how can a firm come to have a positive added value? The answer is that the firm must enjoy a favorable asymmetry between itself and other firms. We identify four routes that lead to the creation of such asymmetries, terming each a ”value-based’ strategy for the firm.
...
it is evident that for a firm to have a positive added value it must be “different” from its competitors. That is, it must enjoy a favorable asymmetry between itself and other firms.
...
Favorable asymmetries can also arise on the supplier side. Specifically, suppliers may have a lower opportunity cost of providing resources to one firm than of providing them to other firms. Notice that each of these asymmetries can come about in either of two ways. An asymmetry in willingness-to-pay may arise because the firm finds a way to raise the willingness-to-pay of buyers for its product. Or it may arise because buyers end up with a lower willingness-to-pay for other firms’ products. A favorable asymmetry results in either case. Similarly, an asymmetry in opportunity cost may arise because the firm finds a way to lower the opportunity cost of suppliers of providing resources to it. Or it may arise because suppliers end up with a higher opportunity cost of providing resources to other firms. Again, a favorable asymmetry results in either case.
We call each of these routes to enjoying a favorable asymmetry a ”value-based’’ strategy for the firm.
...
In the top left box is the strategy of raising the willingness-to- pay of buyers for the firm’s product. This is the classic differentiation strategy. It involves the firm’s finding ways to meet the needs of buyers better than do other firms. This strategy is well known and well understood, and so we do not dwell on it here.

In the bottom left box is the strategy of lowering the opportunity cost to suppliers of providing resources to the firm. One way the firm can do this is by reducing a supplier’s costs of doing business with it. This type of value-based strategy, the existence of which follows logically from our analytical approach, thus has close connections with the sorts of ideas that have been emphasized recently in writings on supplier relations. It is also closely related to the consulting prescription, currently in vogue, that firms should establish ”value-managed partnerships” with their suppliers.
Other ways in which the firm can lower suppliers’ opportunity costs are found in the area of human resource management. An example is offering employees nonsalary benefits which other firms cannot readily match.
In the top right box is the strategy of lowering the willingness- to-pay of buyers for other firms’ products. In its most literal form, this strategy might include negative advertising (“bad-mouthing” competitors). A more subtle variant involves the creation of switching costs for buyers. These are present if existing buyers of a firm find buying from a competitor in the future less attractive than buying from the same firm again-say, because of retraining costs associated with switching to use of a competitor’s product. This says exactly that buyers have a lower willingness-to-pay for the products of competi- tors than for those of the original firm.
Finally, in the bottom right box is the strategy of raising the opportunity cost to suppliers of providing resources to other firms. This largely mirrors the previous strategy. Influencing suppliers’ perceptions of other firms fits in here, as does the creation of switching costs for suppliers."

Trechos retirados de "Value-Based Business Strategy" de Adam Brandenburger e Harborwne Stuart

Sintomas de Mongo

No cabeçalho deste blogue pode ler-se "Promotor da concorrência imperfeita e dos monopólios informais".

Neste blogue escreve-se com regularidade sobre Mongo, um mundo cheio de "weird people", um mundo com cada vez mais diversidade de tribos apaixonadas, um mundo em que as produções não precisam de ser de milhões de unidades semelhantes produzidas em unidades assépticas por autómatos perfeitos, mas sairão de oficinas de modernos artesãos que interagem com os seus clientes.  Em Mongo funciona a concorrência imperfeita, mais do que competição pratica-se o "live and let live".

Este texto, "If America’s Economy Is Winner-Take-All, Why Are Some Smaller Businesses Thriving?" tem tudo a ver com Mongo:

"markups have soared from 18% in 1980 to 67% today. If that change is being driven by a rise in market power, then the fundamental nature of the American economy has changed over the last four decades
...
The new paper shows that markups are actually increasing faster for small businesses than for large ones. This is precisely the opposite of what we would expect in an environment dominated by large, powerful firms. In that environment, we would expect smaller firms to face stronger pressure to cut prices. In fact, the story this data tells is less one of declining competition and domination by a handful of large multinational firms than it is a story of ever increasing market power by relatively small businesses.
.
And that offers a clue as to what is truly happening. The following is speculative, but so far it is my best guess at how to square the data. In 1980, we had healthy “Main Streets” all over the U.S. Small- and medium-sized businesses were in fairly robust competition with one another. Likewise, local manufacturers participated in a nationwide marketplace in which each of them had little market power.
.
Over the next several decades, that economy was replaced by one of big-box retailers and global supply chains. Those giant retailers brought even lower prices. The competition was so intense that the typical Main Street business couldn’t keep up. Manufacturers who already faced low profit margins in the national marketplace were completely driven out of business by suppliers from around the world.
.
Yet, as intense as this competition was, it didn’t drive all small businesses out of business, and it didn’t signal an end to U.S. manufacturing. The smaller businesses that survived were precisely the ones that couldn’t be undercut by big-box retailers and global suppliers. They offered a specialized retail experience, a niche product, or simply served a market that was otherwise hard to reach.[Moi ici: Recordar aqui o exemplo da Marlin, sobre como se foge da concorrência pelo preço, como se sobe na escala de valor]
.
The sweeping away of the small, generalized firm made room for the rise of increasingly specialized local businesses, offering what might be thought of as a more artisanal experience. Yes, these firms charge more than the amount needed to cover costs, but those markups don’t represent a lack of competition. Instead, they represent a return to the particular skills or vision necessary to make a specialized product. Economists refer to this market pattern as monopolistic competition, and it provides the variety of products and services that consumers in wealthy, developed economies desire.
.
If my story is correct, the trend toward higher markups is linked to the major changes sweeping the American economy, as the researchers argue. However, it isn’t the cause of them. Instead, it is another consequence of the radical changes brought about by globalization, and the creative destruction that continues to reshape American Main Streets."

Optar pela concorrência imperfeita

Outro exemplo, apesar de norte-americano, que ilustra a evolução do nosso têxtil, calçado, mobiliário, ...

"Emi-G made sports socks. Color: white. Styles: crew and athletic. "Knit them, put a toe in them, and out the door in 300-pound cases," [Moi ici: Quantidade, eficiência, margens apertadas] says Terry. For 12 years, Russell Athletic was the company's only customer.
.
But by the mid-2000s, Fort Payne's hosiery industry--once booming, according to Gina, with more than 120 mills employing roughly half the area's population--had been decimated by a mass exodus to Central America. [Moi ici: Por cá foi por causa da China. No entanto, se falássemos com um Ferreira do Amaral, ou um Vítor Bento, ou um Paes Mamede diriam que foi por causa da adesão ao euro] More than 100 mills had closed, and in 2007, Russell decided to terminate its business with Emi-G. Over the next seven months, the Locklears let go of their entire staff,"

Um dos meus relatos preferidos no mundo do calçado é o da empresa portuguesa que deixou de ser competitiva a produzir sapatos que se vendem a 20€ e agora tem sucesso a produzir sapatos que se vendem a 230€.

"In 2008, Gina, then 28, was living in Birmingham, working as a real estate agent. Years before, when she was employed at a ski shop, she had observed that specialty ski socks sold for $20 a pair. She'd also recently begun to buy organic--food, cleaning products, personal care--but had trouble finding apparel made from organic cotton.
.
Gina pitched her parents what to them seemed like a radical idea: an organic cotton sock brand for the eco-chic set.
.
"I didn't understand about organic anything, let alone socks," says Terry. "And I knew it would be very expensive to start a brand." Terry's main sticking point was that organic cotton costs several times as much as standard cotton. Gina spent a year making the business case, pointing to the higher price tag and margin on a premium fashion product. She finally persuaded her parents--who were also out of options--to fund the venture with $100,000 from Emi-G's coffers.
...
worked with her parents' plant manager to reconfigure Emi-G's machines to produce small batches of patterned, multicolored socks.
...
In 2010, Whole Foods picked up Zkano; then, five years later, Martha Stewart selected Little River Sock Mill--Gina's second line, specifically for specialty boutiques--for an American Made award. Today, Zkano sells primarily online, while Little River has accounts with some 200 retailers.
.
With new revenue coming in, Gina's parents were able to slowly rebuild Emi-G by doing smaller, limited runs for clients such as a medical company that sells socks to hospitals. Zkano and Little River now account for roughly half of Emi-G's revenue, which is approaching $3 million."

Quando não se pode ser competitivo pelo custo, as empresas têm de fugir desse terreno e procurar fazer como David face a Golias e optar pela concorrência imperfeita.

Trechos retirados de "This Sock Company Is Making 'Made in Alabama' Cool--Thanks to Martha Stewart and Whole Foods"

Quando as mensagens deste blogue se tornam cliché

You nailed it! When you life message becomes a cliche, yes, take that as success! https://t.co/61whbU9nGs

— Joe Pine (@joepine) January 19, 2017

A competitividade das PME.

Somos todos alemães.

Competir por fazer subir os preços unitários em vez de concentrar tudo na redução dos custos unitários.

Apostar no numerador para aumentar a produtividade.

Não ter a veleidade de servir tudo a todos.

Não resisto a recordar três cromos:

• Zé Reis (cromo nº 12)
• André Macedo (cromo nº 6)
• Daniel Bessa (cromo nº 5)

"achieving strategic Agility"

Onde se lê "Strategic Agility" leia-se concorrência imperfeita, leia-se batota:

"While most large organizations are still learning how to master operational Agility, the main financial benefits from Agile management will flow from the next Agile frontier: achieving strategic Agility.
.
Today, the practice of Agile management (and its analogs, such as “Lean” and “design thinking”) still reflects a preoccupation with achieving operational agility... with efficiency gains or quality improvements.
...
“We tend to confuse capitalism with competition,” [Moi ici: Procurar criar uma situação de concorrência imperfeita é fugir da concorrência em busca de um monopólio informal] says Peter Thiel, the creator of PayPal and a lecturer at Stanford. “We tend to think that whoever competes best comes out ahead. In the race to be more competitive, we sometimes confuse what is hard with what is valuable. The intensity of competition becomes a proxy for value…Instead of being slightly better than everybody else in a crowded and established field, it’s often more valuable to create a new market and totally dominate it. The profit margins are much bigger, and the value to society is often bigger, too.”
.
This is the dark secret of the Agile management revolution: the major financial gains from Agile management will come from the next frontier of Agile management: moving beyond operational Agility to strategic agility—namely, through mastering market-creating innovation."

Trechos retirados de "Beyond Agile Operations: How To Achieve The Holy Grail Of Strategic Agility"

Outro exemplo analógico de Mongo; o chocolate

Na coluna do lado direito, nas citações, encontra-se:

"When something is commoditized, an adjacent market becomes valuable"

Ontem, ao ler "Little Chocolate’s Big Moment" sorri quando encontrei:

"“When you have increasing concentration of producers in the center, you leave room on the periphery for specialization,”
...
In other words, as all the stuff in the middle, whether it’s from Hershey’s or Budweiser, gets more similar, there’s more room for outliers, whether from Dandelion or Brooklyn Brewery."[Moi ici: Vêem a lógica do canadiano e por que ela pode resultar?]

O artigo, para um missionário do Evangelho do Valor, um adepto da concorrência imperfeita que prevê um paradigma económico chamado Mongo, é das coisas mais deliciosas que se podem ler.

"Craft chocolate, like beer and coffee before it, is ready to go mainstream."

Lá chegaremos ao tempo em que o craft estará de volta, para alimentar e ser alimentado num baile de co-criação, a todos os sectores de actividade económica:

"The backlash against Big Food has crept from the supermarket’s beer and coffee aisles into the chocolate aisle—a rejection of candy as commodity, its units identical and cheap."

E para os que acreditam que tudo se resume a custos:

"At Whole Foods, for example, which sells only bars that it considers "ethically sourced,” the number of chocolate suppliers has increased 50 percent in the last four years.
.
“I don’t think Mars or Hershey has anything to worry about,” says Clay Gordon, a craft chocolate adviser, teacher, and author. The difference between craft chocolate (small, artisanal) and industrial stuff (mass-made, consistent), he says, is so fundamental that they aren’t really competitors."[Moi ici: Por isto é que deixei de pensar em David vs Golias e passei a David e Golias]

BTW, os problemas da Hershey com a compra da anterior marca craf Scharffen Berger só ilustram aquele repelão das tribos:

"-Tu não és meu irmão de sangue!"

Monopólios locais

Ontem a leitura de um texto chamou-me a atenção para o uso do termo "monopólios locais" por Warren Buffet. Desconfiado do significado fiz uma pesquisa na internet e confirmei que está em sintonia com o nosso mote:

Promotor da concorrência imperfeita, dos monopólios informais e das rendas anormais

Em "A Warren Buffett Insight: Buy Monopoly-Like Situations" encontrei:

"It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price
.
As it were, these wonderful companies can be seen as a kind of monopolies.
...
Investing in a monopoly is thus a very attractive thing for an investor. Monopolies necessarily tend to make for wonderful businesses. Businesses which are highly protected from competition. Businesses which exhibit pricing power. Businesses whose prices are decoupled from their costs, [Moi ici: Como não pensar logo no exemplo alemão ou das PME portuguesas] and thus their margins can be as large as the market will bear. Businesses which gain from technological advancements instead of having to pass on those gains to their customers through cost arbitrage.
...
[Moi ici: Recordar o que escrevemos sobre a beleza dos monopólios informais radicarem na mente dos clientes, em "Monopólios, eu gosto muito deles", "Quem é que ainda liga ao "princípio da eficiência económica"?" ou "Discriminação do preço"] For instance, broadly defined soft drinks are far from a monopoly: there are literally hundreds of different brands viying for the consumers' attention. Yet, when you sit in a bar and you ask for a Coke, you won't consider a Pepsi unless there's no Coke. You won't mind if there's RC Cola at half the price. You won't even want to know the price. Coca-Cola  thus has a monopoly in selling you those Cokes.
.
I would thus go further and expand what a monopoly can include powerful brands. Powerful brands can create monopolies because only Apple can sell you an Apple product. If you want a Coke, you can only get it from Coca-Cola."

Vinhos e concorrência imperfeita

O amigo Armando mandou-me um link muito interessante, "Dirk Niepoort: “As pessoas acham que eu sou maluco”". Uns trechos que são a cara da mensagem deste blogue é:

"Mas as pessoas andam tão vidradas no vinho do Porto que andam à pancada entre elas a baixar preços e estão-se a auto-destruir. A gente não tem de pensar no setor do vinho do Porto, mas sim no Douro. O setor do vinho do Porto vive do Douro e vice-versa. Mas o Douro tem um futuro fantástico se nós levarmos o vinho do Porto um pouco mais a sério, deixarmos de fazer tanta quantidade, ou seja, reduzir a produção de vinho do Porto aumentando o vinho de mesa — é bom para o setor, para o Douro. A solução para o vinho do Porto é muito fácil e passa por “snobizar” o vinho do Porto, mostrar ao mundo que é o melhor vinho doce do mundo. Não é um vinho para todos os dias, é um vinho especial. Em relação ao vinho de mesa, temos de fazer algumas marcas grandes e não vendê-las baratas — mas o vinho também não pode ser muito caro. Marcas fortes, vinhos de garagem, ou seja, pequenas quantidades — duas, três ou cinco mil garrafas — para mostrar ao mundo que conseguimos fazer vinhos tão bem como Bordéus ou Califórnia, e respeitar a região valorizando-a com o turismo. Fazer um turismo de qualidade e não barato, mas para isso é preciso entreter as pessoas. Isto é um ciclo global que acho que só pode correr bem porque o Douro é especial.
...
temos de levar o vinho do Porto mais a sério, temos de fazê-lo melhor, temos de vendê-lo mais caro e não podemos entrar em guerras de preço no supermercado porque, um dia destes, vai haver uma banalização e a partir daí morre tudo.
...
Portugal, lá para 1900, tinha nome e tinha qualidade. A culpa é nossa. Os franceses souberam vender o peixe deles. Fazem 300 mil garrafas de Château Lafite, mas fazem com mais cuidado as 300 mil do que quase todo o português que faz cinco mil garrafas. Há uma atitude de excelência, há um cuidado… Eles souberam ter muitos cuidados para preservar uma imagem e criaram uma imagem tão boa que conseguem vender os vinhos muito caros. As pessoas têm tendência para culpabilizar os outros, mas a culpa é só nossa. Nós fechámos-nos, fizemos desgraças durante muito tempo e agora estamos a pagar as favas — agora temos de fazer melhor do que eles e durante mais tempo para poder limpar a nossa imagem negativa. Acho que Portugal está num bom caminho. Portugal tem neste momento a faca e o queijo na mão para mudar tudo e mais alguma coisa. Agora vamos perguntar se nós “portuguesinhos” vamos fazer isso ou vamos aproveitar a moda para vender outra vez gato por lebre.
...
[Moi ici: O trecho que se segue parece cópia deste blogue] E há mais uma coisa: somos um país que ficou muito fechado, que ficou parado no tempo. Na Europa fizeram tudo muito bem, cresceram, mas com todo esse processo destruíram quase tudo. Nós temos um tesouro nacional que quase nenhum outro país tem — nós temos uma quantidade enorme de castas que já não existem, temos vinhas velhas que já não existem lá fora. O que temos de fazer é o contrário do que a maior parte dos intelectuais diz: não temos de ir copiar as pessoas lá fora, temos de acreditar em nós e, com a prata da casa, fazer uma coisa individual, com personalidade. [Moi ici: Começar do concreto em vez do abstracto, o truque que os teóricos da tríade desconhecem] Depois, é preciso fazer um esforço grande para mostrá-lo. Sendo diferente ao princípio custa, mas a partir do momento em que entrar numa moda, é fantástico porque aí já não somos comparáveis. Então, sim, podemos aumentar os preços.
...
[Moi ici: Agora sem brincadeiras. O que se segue foi copiado deste blogue ;-)))] Nos últimos 30 anos a conversa era sempre à volta de termos de produzir mais e ser mais competitivos, de termos de plantar cabernet sauvignon, chardonnay… termos de nos adaptar aos outros. O problema é que os outros vão sempre fazer mais barato e melhor do que nós. Nós podemos fazer muito melhor do que eles porque temos coisas que eles já não têm. Temos de ir pela individualidade. [Moi ici: Caramba Armando! Este trecho é divinal. É isto mesmo que escrevo há milhares de anos acerca da agricultura e da indústria. Nunca seremos competitivos a pensar como Saul... só damos o salto quando nos ajoelhamos perante o ribeiro de Elah e escolhemos cinco seixos redondos para a nossa funda, ou seja, apostamos em fazer diferente. Isto é a concorrência imperfeita que apregoamos e defendemos!!!]

Outubro de 2011 e Novembro de 2012 - o teste do tempo a demonstrar que o anónimo da província estava certo!
Setembro de 2015 - o teste do tempo.
Março de 2014 - o exemplo dos Pigarros
E para chorarem, recordem de Agosto de 2011 o país dos incumbentes

Subir preços (parte I)

Sabem como aprecio as imperfeições no mercado, como procuro induzir as PME a apostarem na concorrência imperfeita. Se a concorrência é perfeita não há diferenciação, se não há diferenciação a competição é pelo preço. Se a competição é pelo preço uma PME vai ter de praticar preços mais baixos, vai ter de se contentar com rentabilidades mais baixas e, vai correr o risco de erosão mais ou menos violenta da sua base de clientes, porque sempre aparece outro concorrente capaz de baixar o preço mais e mais.

"Competitiveness is closely linked to knowledge of the external environment and of the mechanisms that lead to some imperfections in the market. In efficient markets, which are characterized by perfect competition, the homogeneous distribution of resources and information would not allow any real competitive advantage. On the contrary, the edge of a firm over its rivals emerges when the market is imperfect. To achieve a competitive advantage, a firm must have firm knowledge of its own skills and resources, the environment and the industry in which it operates, and the internal and external sources of competitive advantage. To maintain a competitive edge, a firm must implement mechanisms of isolation (barriers), ensure that resources are not imitable, and develop dynamic capabilities.
Although the probability that a firm will succeed is related to business strategy, there is no magical “right strategy.”[Moi ici: E as estratégias são sempre transientes. O mundo muda e aquilo que funcionava antes deixa de funcionar depois] Different strategies are developed in response to different goals, firms, and competitive contexts."

O que é que a sua empresa faz para, deliberadamente, criar imperfeições no mercado a seu favor? Não estará na altura de nos contactar? Talvez possamos ajudá-la a fazer batota, a criar diferenciação que alavanca uma imperfeição que pode funcionar como vantagem competitiva.

Não é por acaso que assinamos como: Promotores da concorrência imperfeita e dos monopólios informais.

Trecho retirado de "Business Strategies and Competitiveness in Times of Crisis - A Survey on Italian SMEs" de Laura Gavinelli.

Pricing para a subida na escala de valor

Um trecho curto mas que resume bem uma série de temas importantes para o pricing, para a subida na escala de valor, para o aumento das margens:

"With  respect  to  pricing,  the  literature  has  only  fairly  recently  expanded  from  its microeconomic  foundations  to  incorporate  the  notions  of  customer  heterogeneity, bounded  rationality,  and  imperfect  competition. [Moi ici: OMG até que enfim!!!] Core  elements  of  profitable  and effective pricing are the abilities to create meaningful differentiation, to quantify the (differential)  value  to  customers,  to  measure  customer  price  elasticity,  to  segment customers, and to document value to customers. In the scale development process these items obviously play a vital role."

Trecho retirado de "Pricing capabilities: the design, development, and validation of a scale", publicado por Management Decision Vol. 52 No. 1, 2014 pp. 144-158

Trabalhar para tornar a concorrência imperfeita

"Finally, if purchasers are not indifferent as to which firms to buy their goods, then the perfect competition assumption cannot be postulated to work. In fact, Sraffa also deploys this line of critique since, according to Sraffa, purchasers are actually not indifferent as between different producers – this is “the chief obstacle which hinders the free play of competition” (Sraffa, 1926: 544) – the causes for such absence of indifference are custom, proximity, personal acquaintance, possibility to get credit, reputation of the trade mark and design of the product. From a formal point of view, these different reasons of preferences are reflected in the clientele of each firm being willing, if necessary, to pay a higher price."

E a sua empresa, o que é que ela faz para tornar a concorrência imperfeita?

Trecho retirado de "Alternative Theories of Competition - Challenges to the orthodoxy" editado por Jamee K. Moudud, Cyrus Bina e Patrick L. Mason

A verdade é que os mercados reais não são perfeitos

"To summarize: perfect markets, left to their own devices, concentrate wealth. Concentrated wealth results in less wealth, and far less collective well-being. (You’ll notice that I haven’t even mentioned fairness. It matters. But I’ll leave that to my gentle readers.)"

Trecho retirado de "How Perfect Markets Concentrate Wealth and Strangle Growth and Prosperity".
.
A verdade é que os mercados reais não são perfeitos apesar da legislação e dos académicos (aqui e aqui) que os tentam impor. E a nossa orientação passa por promover exactamente o oposto, a concorrência imperfeita.

.

A concorrência imperfeita acelerada e potenciada por Mongo vai no sentido de um mundo muito mais diverso, plural e antifrágil.

Recordar "Como surgem os Golias e pistas para o aparecimento de Davids"

A concorrência imperfeita a funcionar

Enquanto o governo, o presidente e a oposição se digladiam acerca das exportações, mais exemplos do que é a concorrência imperfeita a funcionar:

• "Exportações de mobiliário para EUA crescem 30 por cento"
• "Exportações de Vestuário Crescem 4,6% no Primeiro Trimestre"
• "Exportações de frutos e hortícolas portugueses cresceram 24% em 2015"

"A produção de fruta e produtos hortícolas em Portugal está cada vez mais direcionada para o exterior, tendo registado em 2015 um forte crescimento de 24% nas exportações face ao ano anterior, com um valor de 570 milhões de euros, de acordo com o estudo setorial ‘Frutas e Produtos Hortícolas’ da Informa D&B. Se recuarmos até ao início da década, este crescimento das exportações é de mais de 80%, já que o setor exportou 313 milhões de euros em 2010."

• "Vinhos de Lisboa aumentam exportações" 

"Os Vinhos de Lisboa aumentaram as suas exportações em 2015, apesar de Angola ter deixado de ser o principal mercado e ter baixado de 20% para 2,5% o peso que tinha nas vendas ao estrangeiro.
...
Vasco Avillez, presidente da Comissão Vitivinícola Regional (CVR) de Lisboa, disse que de 2014 para 2015 as exportações «aumentaram 35% em volume e 50% em valor», com o preço médio por garrafa a subir de 2,70 para 3 euros."

• "Portugal importa vinho para exportar"

"Em 2015, as exportações portuguesas de vinho crescerem 1,6% em valor, para atingirem o sexto recorde consecutivo, e caíram 1,2% em volume, com o preço médio por litro a subir 2,8%, para €2,63."