... outro comboio que se aproxima.
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Será que vem mesmo aí outra rodada de bordoada financeira?
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No António Maria "A segunda vaga da crise hipotecária".
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Via José Silva do Norteamos "Global systemic crisis – New tipping-point in March 2009: 'When the world becomes aware that this crisis is worse than the 1930s crisis' "
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Um cheirinho (fétido de sulfureto de hifrogénio, dado o conteúdo):
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"A whole range of psychological factors will contribute to this tipping point: general awareness in Europe, America and Asia that the crisis has escaped from the control of every public authority, whether national or international; that it is severely affecting all regions of the world, even if some are more affected than others (see GEAB N°28); that it is directly hitting hundreds of millions of people in the “developed” world; and that it is only worsening as its consequences reveal throughout the real economy. National governments and international institutions only have three months left to prepare themselves to the next blow, one that could go along severe risks of social chaos. The countries which are not properly equipped to cope with a surge in unemployment and major risks on pensions will be seriously destabilized by this new public awareness. "
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"we anticipate that the minimum duration of the decanting phase of the crisis is 3 years (1). It shall be finished neither in spring 2009, nor in summer 2009, nor at the beginning of 2010. It is only towards the end of 2010 that the situation will start stabilizing again and improving a little in some regions of the world, i.e. Asia and the Eurozone, as well as in countries producing energy, mineral and food commodities (2). Elsewhere, it will continue; in particular in the US and UK, and in all the countries depending on their economy, were the duration could approximate a decade. In fact these countries should not expect any real return to growth before 2018. Moreover no one should imagine that the improvement at the end of 2010 will correspond to a return of high growth. The recovery will take long."
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"Finally, among the various consequences of the crisis for dozens of millions of people in the US, Canada, UK, Japan, Netherlands and Denmark in particular (3), there is the fact that, from the end of the year 2008 onward, news about major losses on the part of the organizations in charge of managing the financial assets supposed to finance pensions will multiply. "
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Um comentário a um postal de Roubini ilustra bem a minha maior preocupação actual. Gosto de pensar em sistemas, em cadeias de relações de causa-efeito, em jogos de equilibrio e desiquilibrio entre vectores concorrentes ou divergentes, gosto de modelar o comportamento dos sistemas e tenho horror ao tratamento dos acontecimentos como eventos isolados. Por isso, não posso estar mais de acordo com este comentário e recear as consequências do que ele significa:
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"“The government is looking at this from a purely macroeconomic level. They have to consider the microeconomics and buil a model up from that to macro to find a way to hopefully fix this. This would hopefully help the common man survive this turmoil with something left to show for years of hard work.” "
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Adenda: a primeira vez que usei aquele marcador "desde que ouvi o ministro pinho dizer que a crise financeira não afectará a economia" neste blogue foi a 15 de Setembro de 2007... mais uma vez "Não há acasos, todas as coincidências são significativas)
sexta-feira, dezembro 19, 2008
Não há acasos...
... todas as coincidências são significativas.
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Para ilustrar este postal de Pedro Arroja "o custo da trapalhice" que tal descobrir que o principal grupo normando faz destas: "Fisco reembolsa contribuintes com cheques fora da validade"
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Para ilustrar este postal de Pedro Arroja "o custo da trapalhice" que tal descobrir que o principal grupo normando faz destas: "Fisco reembolsa contribuintes com cheques fora da validade"
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Este é o tempo para repensar a estratégia (parte IV)
Continuando com a reflexão de Rumelt do artigo da Mckinsey Quarterly e em linha com estes outros conselhos.
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- "If you can’t survive hard times, sell out early. Once you are in financial distress, you will have no bargaining power at all.
- In hard times, save the core at the expense of the periphery. When times improve, recapture the periphery if it is still worthwhile.
- Any stable source of good profits—any competitive advantage—attracts overhead, clutter, and cross-subsidies in good times. You can survive this kind of waste in such times. In hard times you can’t and must cut it.
- If hard times have a good side, it’s the pressure to cut expenses and find new efficiencies.
- Cuts and changes that raised interpersonal hackles in good times can be made in hard ones.
- Use hard times to concentrate on and strengthen your competitive advantage. If you are confused about this concept, hard times will clarify it. Competitive advantage has two branches, both growing from the same root. You have a competitive advantage when you can take business away from another company at a profit and when your cash costs of doing business are low enough that you can survive in hard times.
- Take advantage of hard times to buy the assets of distressed competitors at bargain-basement prices. The best assets are competitive advantages unwisely encumbered with debt and clutter.
- In hard times, many suppliers are willing to renegotiate terms. Don’t be shy.
- In hard times, your buyers will want better terms. They might settle for rapid, reliable payments. Focus on the employees and communities you will keep through the hard times.
- Good relations with people you have retained and helped will be repaid many times over when the good times return."
Este é o tempo para repensar a estratégia (parte III)
Continuado daqui.
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A revista The Mckinsey Quarterly publicou um interessante artigo de Richard Rumelt intitulado "Strategy in a ‘structural break’ ".
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Mais um convite para a reflexão estratégica que se impõe neste momento, e recheado de interessantes conselhos:
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Alguns trechos que destaco do pensamento de Rumelt são:
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"There is nothing like a crisis to clarify the mind. In suddenly volatile and different times, you must have a strategy. I don’t mean most of the things people call strategy—mission statements, audacious goals, three- to five-year budget plans. I mean a real strategy."
...
"By strategy, I mean a cohesive response to a challenge. A real strategy is neither a document nor a forecast but rather an overall approach based on a diagnosis of a challenge. The most important element of a strategy is a coherent viewpoint about the forces at work, not a plan."
...
"I think we are looking at a structural break with the past—a phrase from econometrics, where it denotes the moment in time-series data when trends and the patterns of associations among variables change.A corporate crisis is often a sign that the company’s business model has petered out—that the industry’s underlying structure has changed dramatically, so old ways of doing business no longer work."
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"We know in our bones that the future will be different. When the business model of part or all of the economy shifts in this way, we can speak of a structural break."
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"Structural breaks render obsolete many existing patterns of behavior, yet they point the way forward for some companies and at times even for whole economies."
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"The wrong way forward in a structural break during hard times is to try more of the same. The break and the hard times are sure indications that an old pattern has already been pushed to its limits and is destroying value"
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"So during structural breaks in hard times, cutting costs isn’t enough. Things have to be done differently, and on two levels: reducing the complexity of corporate structures and transforming business models. At the corporate level, the first commandment is to simplify and simplify again. Since companies must become more modular and diverse, eliminate coordinating committees, review boards, and other mechanisms connecting businesses, products, or geographies. The aim of these cuts is to provide lean central and support services that don’t require business units to spend time and energy coordinating their activities."
.
A revista The Mckinsey Quarterly publicou um interessante artigo de Richard Rumelt intitulado "Strategy in a ‘structural break’ ".
.
Mais um convite para a reflexão estratégica que se impõe neste momento, e recheado de interessantes conselhos:
.
Alguns trechos que destaco do pensamento de Rumelt são:
.
"There is nothing like a crisis to clarify the mind. In suddenly volatile and different times, you must have a strategy. I don’t mean most of the things people call strategy—mission statements, audacious goals, three- to five-year budget plans. I mean a real strategy."
...
"By strategy, I mean a cohesive response to a challenge. A real strategy is neither a document nor a forecast but rather an overall approach based on a diagnosis of a challenge. The most important element of a strategy is a coherent viewpoint about the forces at work, not a plan."
...
"I think we are looking at a structural break with the past—a phrase from econometrics, where it denotes the moment in time-series data when trends and the patterns of associations among variables change.A corporate crisis is often a sign that the company’s business model has petered out—that the industry’s underlying structure has changed dramatically, so old ways of doing business no longer work."
.
"We know in our bones that the future will be different. When the business model of part or all of the economy shifts in this way, we can speak of a structural break."
.
"Structural breaks render obsolete many existing patterns of behavior, yet they point the way forward for some companies and at times even for whole economies."
.
"The wrong way forward in a structural break during hard times is to try more of the same. The break and the hard times are sure indications that an old pattern has already been pushed to its limits and is destroying value"
.
"So during structural breaks in hard times, cutting costs isn’t enough. Things have to be done differently, and on two levels: reducing the complexity of corporate structures and transforming business models. At the corporate level, the first commandment is to simplify and simplify again. Since companies must become more modular and diverse, eliminate coordinating committees, review boards, and other mechanisms connecting businesses, products, or geographies. The aim of these cuts is to provide lean central and support services that don’t require business units to spend time and energy coordinating their activities."
quinta-feira, dezembro 18, 2008
Só fazendo desenhos
Depois destas lições one-on-one pedir mais a Pedro Arroja... só se for pedir-lhe que faça um desenho ... e eu, que sou um visual, mesmo sem desenho, percebi.
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- como castelos de cartas
- acima das suas possibilidades
- BMW's
- oh tio! ... oh tio!...
- as brincadeiras dos meninos
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Este é o tempo para repensar a estratégia (parte II)
Continuado daqui.
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Acerca da necessidade de repensar as estratégias das empresas, li um artigo que vai directo ao assunto.
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Um artigo que devia ser lido por muita boa gente, sobretudo por quem grita a plenos pulmões que os bancos têm de emprestar dinheiro às empresas, às cegas.
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Ler e estudar este artigo é um must “Rethink Your Strategy: An Urgent Memo to the CEO” da autoria de Paul Branstad, Bill Jackson e Shumeet Banerji.
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“the events of October 2008 should cause you to rethink the strategy for your business. The purpose of this article is to explain why this is so important and what to do next.
…
But the speculative bubbles have burst, and now, the most critical thing is to see the dynamics clearly—not as an investor, but as a decision maker with a company to steer.
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Given the potential for discontinuous changes in the structure of your industry, playing your hand well means changing your stance. It also means preparing your company to move aggressively to seize strategic opportunities. These opportunities will likely present themselves sooner rather than later. That’s why the preparation cannot be postponed. The prescriptions for the weak are different from those for the strong.“
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Neste blogue tenho escrito sobre o tema da “Migração de valor” (por exemplo: Migração de valor (parte XII) ou Ersatz (parte III), da frugalidade (Frugalidade e ilusionismo) e da poupança (A Via Espartana).
Os autores do artigo ilustram as mudanças no padrão de consumo dos consumidores da seguinte forma:
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Depois, à boa maneira anglo-saxónica, os autores entram a matar:
“If your company is not well positioned right now, it is time to face the facts. (e se uma empresa que não está bem posicionada pede dinheiro emprestado a um banco, para arranjar tempo para suster a respiração, sem estudar previamente o que tem a fazer) You are probably going to be up against the wall—or, at best, your business will be much reduced. It doesn’t matter how you rationalize the circumstances that brought you here. The important thing is to prepare to take bold action to save as much value as you can. Denial will not add value.
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The most precious thing you have is time—and you may not have much. Do not waste it as some others recently have, notably at The Bear Stearns Companies and Lehman Brothers Holdings. Instead, look dispassionately at your business.
Judge its relative position honestly, by answering a few tough, value-testing questions:”
…
Depois, continuam no mesmo estilo “If you honestly conclude you are weak, time is of the essence. Figure out how to best position your assets and your people and take the right steps to give every piece of your company its best chance to succeed, even if under different ownership.
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Para as empresas que não estão encostadas à parede os autores propõem:
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“For everyone else—all those companies that aren’t up against the wall— the first objective is to become as strong as possible, as fast as possible. We are entering a period in which it will be enormously valuable to be able to act decisively from a position of strength and in a long-term, genuinely strategic manner.”
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Em cima da mesa estão 5 jogadas estratégicas possíveis neste ambiente de turbulência.
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Acerca da necessidade de repensar as estratégias das empresas, li um artigo que vai directo ao assunto.
.
Um artigo que devia ser lido por muita boa gente, sobretudo por quem grita a plenos pulmões que os bancos têm de emprestar dinheiro às empresas, às cegas.
.
Ler e estudar este artigo é um must “Rethink Your Strategy: An Urgent Memo to the CEO” da autoria de Paul Branstad, Bill Jackson e Shumeet Banerji.
.
“the events of October 2008 should cause you to rethink the strategy for your business. The purpose of this article is to explain why this is so important and what to do next.
…
But the speculative bubbles have burst, and now, the most critical thing is to see the dynamics clearly—not as an investor, but as a decision maker with a company to steer.
.
Given the potential for discontinuous changes in the structure of your industry, playing your hand well means changing your stance. It also means preparing your company to move aggressively to seize strategic opportunities. These opportunities will likely present themselves sooner rather than later. That’s why the preparation cannot be postponed. The prescriptions for the weak are different from those for the strong.“
.
Neste blogue tenho escrito sobre o tema da “Migração de valor” (por exemplo: Migração de valor (parte XII) ou Ersatz (parte III), da frugalidade (Frugalidade e ilusionismo) e da poupança (A Via Espartana).
Os autores do artigo ilustram as mudanças no padrão de consumo dos consumidores da seguinte forma:
.
Depois, à boa maneira anglo-saxónica, os autores entram a matar:
“If your company is not well positioned right now, it is time to face the facts. (e se uma empresa que não está bem posicionada pede dinheiro emprestado a um banco, para arranjar tempo para suster a respiração, sem estudar previamente o que tem a fazer) You are probably going to be up against the wall—or, at best, your business will be much reduced. It doesn’t matter how you rationalize the circumstances that brought you here. The important thing is to prepare to take bold action to save as much value as you can. Denial will not add value.
.
The most precious thing you have is time—and you may not have much. Do not waste it as some others recently have, notably at The Bear Stearns Companies and Lehman Brothers Holdings. Instead, look dispassionately at your business.
Judge its relative position honestly, by answering a few tough, value-testing questions:”
…
Depois, continuam no mesmo estilo “If you honestly conclude you are weak, time is of the essence. Figure out how to best position your assets and your people and take the right steps to give every piece of your company its best chance to succeed, even if under different ownership.
.
Para as empresas que não estão encostadas à parede os autores propõem:
.
“For everyone else—all those companies that aren’t up against the wall— the first objective is to become as strong as possible, as fast as possible. We are entering a period in which it will be enormously valuable to be able to act decisively from a position of strength and in a long-term, genuinely strategic manner.”
.
Em cima da mesa estão 5 jogadas estratégicas possíveis neste ambiente de turbulência.
Já à muito que escrevo e prego a máxima “concentrar uma organização no que é essencial”. Deitar fora, eliminar, vender tudo o que não é essencial para chegar ao futuro desejado.
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“First, reexamine your portfolio of businesses and shed the marginal ones.“
…
“For each business, ask: Is it core to your company’s future value? Can you envision it as the basis for a sustaining stream of attractive rowth opportunities? Does it offer a path to building financial performance that is greater than what investors can earn elsewhere in their equity portfolios?
Concentrate your corporate strategy on the businesses for which you can answer “yes” to all three questions— and monetize the rest. There will be too many good opportunities for you to build on this core to bother with anything else.“
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Como Portugal vive em crise há oito anos, as receitas que tenho pregado neste blogue e junto das empresas são as mesmas que os autores propõem agora para as empresas neste ambiente de crise global. Reparem bem na linguagem…
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“Also answer this question: Who are your most important customers? Focusing on your most valuable customers will be just as important as focusing on your most valuable businesses.
On the demand side, these are the customers whose missions will grow the fastest and who reward you with loyalty and respect. If you are a business-to-business producer, seek out customers who recognize your product or service as the one that delivers the greatest surplus value relative to their next best alternative—regardless of its price or your profits.
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On the supply side, your most valuable customers are those with critical needs for the products that offer you the greatest ability to compete not just on price but on value. Forget about your also-ran, me-too offerings.
Bet your business on the products and services in which you have a competitive advantage through your capabilities: your technology, your cost position, your design and manufacturing skills, and your ability to reach and serve customers effectively.
If you are strong, you will always see opportunities to better serve your most valuable customers and to gain more market share. You only have to be willing to challenge yourself to look. Spare extra cash for the customers that matter. Stay focused on your best businesses, your best products, and your best customers.”
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Convém analisar as outras 4 propostas de acção.
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“Prepare to Weather the Storm”: “We are and will continue to be in a recession. Consumer demand is not coming back to superheated levels anytime soon, and pressure on prices and margins will only increase (Não tenham ilusões!!! Não vão voltar!!!). So don’t wait. Reduce your breakeven now—by a lot. (E os bancos não têm razão ao serem prudentes sobre emprestar dinheiro neste momento?)
If at all possible, you should make your company profitable even in the worst-case scenario, if for no other reason than to demonstrate its staying power. This means lowering your break-even volume, your break-even volume as a percentage of capacity, and your capacity, all at the same time.”
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“Anticipate the Future Industry Structure”: (Esta proposta devia ser enviada a muito boa gente. Gente que fala muito e reflecte pouco ou, apesar da pouca experiência que tem no terreno, não se coíbe de mandar postas-de-pescada). “do your economic homework and decide how your industry should be structured as it moves into recovery.
Anticipate that major changes may now be possible whereas before you may only have thought incrementally.
This downturn is a once-in-a-century opportunity to redefine your competitive position.
(Atenção a este pormaior) “Voices arguing for simple, rapid solutions should be suppressed. The situation you are in is unique and you probably do not yet know enough. Most likely, you do not already have an established process within your business for rigorously constructing fact-based industry perspectives. You need to direct your company to create such a process.” (Pois, recorrer a empréstimos sem qualquer reflexão estratégica, para suster a respiração debaixo de água faz-me lembrar esta estória, infelizmente verdadeira À espera da retoma).
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“Resolve Your Game Plan”: “The key for these expenditures is prioritization. In good times, companies are known to become sloppy with some investments. R&D, new product development, and capital expenditures are the places where your priorities should play out most clearly.
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Within your core businesses, you will want to be strategically aggressive— to fight for increased market share and the conversion to your brands of the most valuable product and customer segments. But avoid using pricing to secure the volume you need to cover fixed costs you shouldn’t have in the first place. Maintaining both the value you deliver to customers and your ability to get customers to recognize and pay for that value will be particularly critical in the quarters ahead. Required rates of return have gone up (Está escrito nas estrelas… crédito mais caro implica que o dinheiro investido no negócio tem de render mais do que era o padrão no universo económico anterior onde vivíamos). Market demand is going down.
Quanto às conclusões:
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“… Understand and plan for the worst-case scenario (atenção spin-doctors estão a seguir a opção errada nesta estórias da gestão das expectivas), and manage your balance sheet tightly.
• Concentrate on your core businesses and on your most strategically valuable customers. These are your only priorities. (Agora ainda mais importante do que nunca)
• Rethink your growth and investment strategy for those core businesses, anticipating the opportunities that will come to you. Seek out opportunities to restructure the industries around these businesses.”
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Se um banco pedir evidências deste tipo de reflexão estratégica a uma empresa que lhe peça dinheiro emprestado o que é que vai receber?
Por tudo isto não creio que este seja um bom título, ou um bom tema "Conferência “Como Crescer em Tempo de Crise”".
Adenda das 08:08 - "Fresh credit strains in Europe as Deutsche Bank shocks markets"
"Standard & Poor's warned that a fifth of all lower-rated companies in Western Europe and the UK are likely to default over the next two years, greatly exceeding the scale of bankruptcies after the dotcom bust." ...
"The European Central Bank warned in its Financial Stability Report this week that lenders are at risk from a deeper slowdown than expected. "Banks need to be especially vigilant in ensuring that they have adequate capital and liquidity buffers to cushion the risks that lie ahead," it said."
Sem comentários...
"O empresário acrescentou que a sua firma não tem recebido o reconhecimento devido por parte do Governo e lamenta que a Energie só tenha conhecimento de apoios para a indústria quando "já é demasiado tarde" e os "players habituais" se apropriaram das verbas disponíveis. E exemplificou com o facto de a empresa não ter recebido qualquer informação sobre o recente lançamento de um pacote de 60 milhões de euros de ajudas para o sector das energias alternativas."
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O pão nosso de cada dia...
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"e Portugal perderia um pólo de produção na área da "energia limpa"." tanta preocupação do governo com 35 postos de trabalho numa empresa 'marginal'... então, os amigos que recebem os apoios não são pólos de produção na área da "energia limpa".
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Artigo "Ministério tenta travar deslocalização para Espanha de fábrica de painéis solares" assinado por Ângelo Teixeira Marques no Público de hoje.
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O pão nosso de cada dia...
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"e Portugal perderia um pólo de produção na área da "energia limpa"." tanta preocupação do governo com 35 postos de trabalho numa empresa 'marginal'... então, os amigos que recebem os apoios não são pólos de produção na área da "energia limpa".
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Artigo "Ministério tenta travar deslocalização para Espanha de fábrica de painéis solares" assinado por Ângelo Teixeira Marques no Público de hoje.
quarta-feira, dezembro 17, 2008
Minha alma está parva!!!
A União das Republicas Socialistas Europeias nunca esteve tão próxima.
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"Estado admite entrar no capital de empresas a reestruturar"
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O ministro das Finanças, Teixeira dos Santos, admitiu hoje a possibilidade de o Estado entrar "transitoriamente" no capital das empresas que vierem a ser reorganizadas e que recorram ao fundo de reestruturação industrial.
...
O governante, que falava na Comissão de Orçamento e Finanças, adiantou ainda que a criação deste fundo, aprovado sábado no conselho de ministros extraordinário, no âmbito do plano anti-crise, prevê "investimentos e participações no capital para que, caso as empresas assim o queiram, o Estado possa ser sócio transitoriamente no processo de reestruturação da empresa."
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A medida visa essencialmente pequenas e médias empresas."
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Ouvi esta manhã o presidente do Sporting na TSF. O homem disse algo do género "O dinheiro é um bem cada vez mais escasso que tem de ser usado com sabedoria."
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"The freedom to fail is an essential part of freedom." (hat tip para o Gabriel Silva)
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Estes governantes americanos e europeus parecem lemingues em marcha ordenada para o irresistível precípicio.
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"Estado admite entrar no capital de empresas a reestruturar"
.
O ministro das Finanças, Teixeira dos Santos, admitiu hoje a possibilidade de o Estado entrar "transitoriamente" no capital das empresas que vierem a ser reorganizadas e que recorram ao fundo de reestruturação industrial.
...
O governante, que falava na Comissão de Orçamento e Finanças, adiantou ainda que a criação deste fundo, aprovado sábado no conselho de ministros extraordinário, no âmbito do plano anti-crise, prevê "investimentos e participações no capital para que, caso as empresas assim o queiram, o Estado possa ser sócio transitoriamente no processo de reestruturação da empresa."
.
A medida visa essencialmente pequenas e médias empresas."
.
Ouvi esta manhã o presidente do Sporting na TSF. O homem disse algo do género "O dinheiro é um bem cada vez mais escasso que tem de ser usado com sabedoria."
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"The freedom to fail is an essential part of freedom." (hat tip para o Gabriel Silva)
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Estes governantes americanos e europeus parecem lemingues em marcha ordenada para o irresistível precípicio.
Paulatinamente...
... a onça de ouro hoje já 'tocou' os 880 dolares.
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E o dolar já vale menos de 87,8 yenes.
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E o dolar já vale menos de 87,8 yenes.
E já olharam bem para eles?
Raquel Martins no Jornal de Negócios de hoje escreve:
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"Metade dos funcionários públicos não tem objectivos definidos
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Quase metade dos funcionários públicos não tem objectivos definidos para 2008 não podendo por isso ser avaliados, o que terá consequências graves na progressão na carreira e na atribuição de prémios de desempenho no próximo ano."
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E olhando para os objectivos já definidos o que se vê? Já olharam bem para eles?
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Já avaliaram até que ponto estão alinhados com os objectivos do departamento ou organização?
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Já perguntaram a um funcionário público com objectivos definidos como é que estes objectivos foram estabelecidos?
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Conheço alguns que têm os objectivos definidos por eles próprios a pedido das chefias.
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E as metas? Outro filme...
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"Metade dos funcionários públicos não tem objectivos definidos
.
Quase metade dos funcionários públicos não tem objectivos definidos para 2008 não podendo por isso ser avaliados, o que terá consequências graves na progressão na carreira e na atribuição de prémios de desempenho no próximo ano."
.
E olhando para os objectivos já definidos o que se vê? Já olharam bem para eles?
.
Já avaliaram até que ponto estão alinhados com os objectivos do departamento ou organização?
.
Já perguntaram a um funcionário público com objectivos definidos como é que estes objectivos foram estabelecidos?
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Conheço alguns que têm os objectivos definidos por eles próprios a pedido das chefias.
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E as metas? Outro filme...
Gestão de pessoas
Diferentes propostas de valor requerem diferentes culturas organizacionais e pessoas com diferentes características de personalidade.
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Se a sua empresa aposta na inovação, na diferenciação pela novidade, pela surpresa, pelo desempenho superior, então, é uma empresa que tem de caminhar por terrenos novos, que tem de abrir estradas e caminhos, que tem de ir à frente, que tem de testar novidades e arriscar.
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Nesse caso faz todo o sentido ler e emular estas práticas tão bem descritas por Robert Sutton em "Extraordinary Contempt and Defiance Beyond the Normal Call of Engineering Duty"
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Pero todavia, se a sua empresa aposta na competição pelo preço mais baixo... cuidado com as prima donnas, el@s vão, de boa-fé, querer introduzir alterações que vão perturbar a eficiência dos processos. Imagine um empregado criativo na cozinha de um MacDonald's!
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Pero todavia, se a sua empresa aposta na competição pelo serviço feito à medida ... cuidado com as prima donnas, el@s vão, de boa-fé, esquecer que as ideias dos clientes são mais importantes que as suas próprias ideias e vão querer introduzir novidades não desejadas.
.
.
Se a sua empresa aposta na inovação, na diferenciação pela novidade, pela surpresa, pelo desempenho superior, então, é uma empresa que tem de caminhar por terrenos novos, que tem de abrir estradas e caminhos, que tem de ir à frente, que tem de testar novidades e arriscar.
.
Nesse caso faz todo o sentido ler e emular estas práticas tão bem descritas por Robert Sutton em "Extraordinary Contempt and Defiance Beyond the Normal Call of Engineering Duty"
.
Pero todavia, se a sua empresa aposta na competição pelo preço mais baixo... cuidado com as prima donnas, el@s vão, de boa-fé, querer introduzir alterações que vão perturbar a eficiência dos processos. Imagine um empregado criativo na cozinha de um MacDonald's!
.
Pero todavia, se a sua empresa aposta na competição pelo serviço feito à medida ... cuidado com as prima donnas, el@s vão, de boa-fé, esquecer que as ideias dos clientes são mais importantes que as suas próprias ideias e vão querer introduzir novidades não desejadas.
.
Este é o tempo para repensar a estratégia (parte I)
Na passada segunda-feira, num comentário ao postal Como eu olho para a crise o meu amigo Aranha comentou:
.
“Eu hoje em dia sinto-me esmagado! Cansado do tema Crise...”
.
Por que escrevo e procuro o máximo de informação sobre a Crise?
.
Não, não é para chorar!!!
Não, não é por masoquismo!!!
.
Não, não é para ganhar pontos políticos!!! (Prisioneiros da sua natueza... sem alternativa para escapar?)
.
Não, não é para …
.
É para melhor compreender a realidade que me rodeia, o que se passou, o que se está a passar e as janelas de possibilidades para o que poderá se passar no futuro.
.
É para melhor identificar as forças motrizes em jogo e melhor articular as relações de causa-efeito entre elas.
.
É para melhor caracterizar o terreno onde as organizações com que trabalho vão ter de actuar.
.
Podemos não ter poder para mudar o oceano e as correntes onde as organizações operam, mas podemos tentar percebê-los um pouco menos mal para nos situar-mos e melhor conceptualizar-mos as opções disponíveis.
.
Se procuro retratar e sentir os fluxos da realidade, e a energia em jogo nas regiões de subducção das placas tectónicas do mercado, não é para me queixar ou melhor aconselhar as organizações a pedirem subsídios e apoios (essa é uma guerra onde não entro). O segundo homem da minha vida profissional, Stephen Covey (o primeiro foi Peter Drucker) chama a atenção no seu livro, "The seven habits of highly effective people", para:
.
"It means more than merely taking initiative. It means that as human beings, we are responsible for our own lives. Our behavior is a function of our decisions, not our conditions."
.
"Highly proactive people recognize that responsibility. They do not blame circumstances, conditions, or conditioning for their behavior. Their behavior is a product of their own conscious choice, based on values, rather than a product of their conditions, based on feeling.
.
Because we are, by nature, proactive, if our lives are a function of conditioning and conditions, it is because we have, by conscious decision or by default, chosen to empower those things to control us.
.
In making such a choice, we become reactive."
(...)
"It's not what happens to us, but our response to what happens to us that hurt us." (Isto é tão verdadeiro!!!)
(...)
"Many people wait for something to happen or someone to take care of them. But people who end up with the good jobs are the proactive ones who are solutions to problems, not problems themselves, who seize the initiative to do whatever is necessary, consistent with correct principles, to get the job done."
.
Percepcionando a realidade, percepcionando as mudanças em curso, chega-se a uma situação onde se torna imperativa a frieza da análise à la Greenwald e Kahn: Faz sentido continuar a apostar num negócio?
.
O governo e as associações empresariais pressionam os bancos para que emprestem dinheiro às empresas "Teixeira dos Santos: ”É preciso pressionar os bancos para que façam chegar o dinheiro às empresas”" (que comentei aqui: Comunicamos por sombras através de biombos)
.
No entanto, as mudanças em curso muito cedo desenharam um cenário muito mais exigente para as empresas no futuro, ainda antes da derrocada na procura que ocorreu no último mês, com o aumento da exigência de rentabilidade do negócio:
.
“Pelo contrário, se o crédito se tornar mais escasso e com taxas de juro superiores (cuidado com os spreads), as empresas terão de apostar em estratégias com um maior grau de pureza, risco e taxas de mortalidade mais elevadas, mas taxas de rentabilidade mais atractivas.” que avancei aqui: Que futuro? e esquematizei assim:
O governo e as associações empresariais querem que os bancos emprestem dinheiro às empresas!
Para que serve um banco?
O dinheiro não é do banco, é dos seus depositantes e investidores. A função do banco é salvaguardar os interesses dos donos do dinheiro.
.
Que garantias têm os bancos de que as empresas vão aplicar bem o dinheiro?
.
E as empresas vão aplicar o dinheiro onde? A fazer o quê?
.
Que reflexão estratégica fizeram?
.
Se o dinheiro for para suster a respiração e manter tudo como está quase de certeza que vai ser mal aplicado. Para evitar esse desperdício há que repensar o futuro das empresas e das suas estratégias nestes tempos turbulentos e no “day after”.
.
Quando há um terramoto de grande magnitude comparam-se fotografias do aspecto de construções, de bairros, de estradas e pontes antes e depois do acontecimento.
.
Nós estamos a viver um desses terramotos só que em slow-motion, não dura apenas os 40-70 segundos da praxe.
.
Assim, antes que o futuro fique desenhado convém aproveitar o tempo para rever a estratégia, para rever o posicionamento de uma empresa e agir.
.
Do livro "Confronting Reality - Doing what matters to get things right" de Larry Bossidy & Ram Charan relembro:
.
“To confront reality is to recognize the world as it is, not as you wish it to be, and have the courage to do what must be done, not what you’d like to do.”
.
"The most widespread unrealistic behavior when the game changes drastically is to violate the First Law of Holes (when you're in one, stop digging). People redouble their efforts to do waht they know best. They often achieve heroic results - which are, alas, almost as often pointless, because they fail to confront the new realities.”
.
Se o dinheiro dos bancos chegar às empresas quanto dele não será para cavar ainda mais o buraco?
.
Este é o tempo para repensar o futuro e a estratégia. Sem isso emprestar dinheiro é pôr dinheiro sobre os problemas e não sobre as oportunidades.
.
Este é o tempo de voltar ao fundamental (back to the basics) e o fundamental foi capturado por Peter Drucker no livro “Managing in Turbulent Times. Para tempos turbulentos propunha:
.
“The manager will have to look at her task and ask, “What must I do to be prepared for danger, for opportunities, and above all for change?”
.
First, this is a time to make sure that your organization is lean and can move fast. So this is a time when one systematically abandons and sloughs off unjustifiable products and activities—and sees to it that the really important tasks are adequately supported.”
…
"In turbulent times, the first task of management is to make sure of the institution’s capacity for survival, to make sure of its structural strengths, of its capacity to survive a blow, to adapt to sudden change, and to avail itself of new opportunities."
.
“The greatest and most dangerous turbulence today results from the collision between the delusions of the decision makers—whether in governments, in the top managements of businesses, or in union leadership—and the realities.
.
But a time of turbulence is also one of great opportunity for those who can understand, accept, and exploit the new realities. One constant theme is, therefore, the need for the decision maker in the individual enterprise to face up to reality and resist the temptation of what “everybody knows,” the temptations of the certainties of yesterday, which are about to become the deleterious superstitions of tomorrow. To manage in turbulent times, therefore, means to face up to the new realities. It means starting with the question: “What is the world really like?” rather than with the assertions and assumptions that made sense only a few years ago.”
.
Continua brevemente.
.
“Eu hoje em dia sinto-me esmagado! Cansado do tema Crise...”
.
Por que escrevo e procuro o máximo de informação sobre a Crise?
.
Não, não é para chorar!!!
Não, não é por masoquismo!!!.
Não, não é para ganhar pontos políticos!!! (Prisioneiros da sua natueza... sem alternativa para escapar?)
.
Não, não é para …
.
É para melhor compreender a realidade que me rodeia, o que se passou, o que se está a passar e as janelas de possibilidades para o que poderá se passar no futuro.
.
É para melhor identificar as forças motrizes em jogo e melhor articular as relações de causa-efeito entre elas.
.
É para melhor caracterizar o terreno onde as organizações com que trabalho vão ter de actuar.
.
Podemos não ter poder para mudar o oceano e as correntes onde as organizações operam, mas podemos tentar percebê-los um pouco menos mal para nos situar-mos e melhor conceptualizar-mos as opções disponíveis.
.
Se procuro retratar e sentir os fluxos da realidade, e a energia em jogo nas regiões de subducção das placas tectónicas do mercado, não é para me queixar ou melhor aconselhar as organizações a pedirem subsídios e apoios (essa é uma guerra onde não entro). O segundo homem da minha vida profissional, Stephen Covey (o primeiro foi Peter Drucker) chama a atenção no seu livro, "The seven habits of highly effective people", para:
.
"It means more than merely taking initiative. It means that as human beings, we are responsible for our own lives. Our behavior is a function of our decisions, not our conditions."
.
"Highly proactive people recognize that responsibility. They do not blame circumstances, conditions, or conditioning for their behavior. Their behavior is a product of their own conscious choice, based on values, rather than a product of their conditions, based on feeling.
.
Because we are, by nature, proactive, if our lives are a function of conditioning and conditions, it is because we have, by conscious decision or by default, chosen to empower those things to control us.
.
In making such a choice, we become reactive."
(...)
"It's not what happens to us, but our response to what happens to us that hurt us." (Isto é tão verdadeiro!!!)
(...)
"Many people wait for something to happen or someone to take care of them. But people who end up with the good jobs are the proactive ones who are solutions to problems, not problems themselves, who seize the initiative to do whatever is necessary, consistent with correct principles, to get the job done."
.
Percepcionando a realidade, percepcionando as mudanças em curso, chega-se a uma situação onde se torna imperativa a frieza da análise à la Greenwald e Kahn: Faz sentido continuar a apostar num negócio?
.
O governo e as associações empresariais pressionam os bancos para que emprestem dinheiro às empresas "Teixeira dos Santos: ”É preciso pressionar os bancos para que façam chegar o dinheiro às empresas”" (que comentei aqui: Comunicamos por sombras através de biombos)
.
No entanto, as mudanças em curso muito cedo desenharam um cenário muito mais exigente para as empresas no futuro, ainda antes da derrocada na procura que ocorreu no último mês, com o aumento da exigência de rentabilidade do negócio:
.
“Pelo contrário, se o crédito se tornar mais escasso e com taxas de juro superiores (cuidado com os spreads), as empresas terão de apostar em estratégias com um maior grau de pureza, risco e taxas de mortalidade mais elevadas, mas taxas de rentabilidade mais atractivas.” que avancei aqui: Que futuro? e esquematizei assim:
O governo e as associações empresariais querem que os bancos emprestem dinheiro às empresas!Para que serve um banco?
O dinheiro não é do banco, é dos seus depositantes e investidores. A função do banco é salvaguardar os interesses dos donos do dinheiro.
.
Que garantias têm os bancos de que as empresas vão aplicar bem o dinheiro?
.
E as empresas vão aplicar o dinheiro onde? A fazer o quê?
.
Que reflexão estratégica fizeram?
.
Se o dinheiro for para suster a respiração e manter tudo como está quase de certeza que vai ser mal aplicado. Para evitar esse desperdício há que repensar o futuro das empresas e das suas estratégias nestes tempos turbulentos e no “day after”.
.
Quando há um terramoto de grande magnitude comparam-se fotografias do aspecto de construções, de bairros, de estradas e pontes antes e depois do acontecimento.
.
Nós estamos a viver um desses terramotos só que em slow-motion, não dura apenas os 40-70 segundos da praxe.
.
Assim, antes que o futuro fique desenhado convém aproveitar o tempo para rever a estratégia, para rever o posicionamento de uma empresa e agir.
.
Do livro "Confronting Reality - Doing what matters to get things right" de Larry Bossidy & Ram Charan relembro:
.
“To confront reality is to recognize the world as it is, not as you wish it to be, and have the courage to do what must be done, not what you’d like to do.”
.
"The most widespread unrealistic behavior when the game changes drastically is to violate the First Law of Holes (when you're in one, stop digging). People redouble their efforts to do waht they know best. They often achieve heroic results - which are, alas, almost as often pointless, because they fail to confront the new realities.”
.
Se o dinheiro dos bancos chegar às empresas quanto dele não será para cavar ainda mais o buraco?
.
Este é o tempo para repensar o futuro e a estratégia. Sem isso emprestar dinheiro é pôr dinheiro sobre os problemas e não sobre as oportunidades.
.
Este é o tempo de voltar ao fundamental (back to the basics) e o fundamental foi capturado por Peter Drucker no livro “Managing in Turbulent Times. Para tempos turbulentos propunha:
.
“The manager will have to look at her task and ask, “What must I do to be prepared for danger, for opportunities, and above all for change?”
.
First, this is a time to make sure that your organization is lean and can move fast. So this is a time when one systematically abandons and sloughs off unjustifiable products and activities—and sees to it that the really important tasks are adequately supported.”
…
"In turbulent times, the first task of management is to make sure of the institution’s capacity for survival, to make sure of its structural strengths, of its capacity to survive a blow, to adapt to sudden change, and to avail itself of new opportunities."
.
“The greatest and most dangerous turbulence today results from the collision between the delusions of the decision makers—whether in governments, in the top managements of businesses, or in union leadership—and the realities.
.
But a time of turbulence is also one of great opportunity for those who can understand, accept, and exploit the new realities. One constant theme is, therefore, the need for the decision maker in the individual enterprise to face up to reality and resist the temptation of what “everybody knows,” the temptations of the certainties of yesterday, which are about to become the deleterious superstitions of tomorrow. To manage in turbulent times, therefore, means to face up to the new realities. It means starting with the question: “What is the world really like?” rather than with the assertions and assumptions that made sense only a few years ago.”
.
Continua brevemente.
terça-feira, dezembro 16, 2008
O canário grego
Antes de ler este postal "Why We All Need To Keep A Watchful Eye On What Is Happening In Greece" convém arranjar um tempo para o ler com clama e para reflectir no seu conteúdo.
.
Como já confessei neste blogue um bom 'soundbyte' é um isco enrolado no anzol a que raramente resisto, e o Joaquim do Portugal Contemporâneo conseguiu um com o título "vai ser bonita a festa, pá"... mas voltemos ao artigo assinado por Edwar Hugh no Europe EconoMonitor.
.
"The above quited paragraph from the IMF is a very good example of what used to be the orthodox wisdom about Greece's economic imbalances - that given EMU membership the availability of external financing should not be a concern, and that the Greek economy is effectively too small for it to constitute a menace to the stability of the eurozone itself, even on a worst case scenario. Well, if we look at the growing yield spreads you can see in the chart above (please click for better viewing) the first premiss seems to be in real danger of falling, EMU membership no longer gives an automatic guarantee of oncost-free external financing, and if you look at the names of the other countries lining up in the queue behind Greece - Italy, Spain and Portugal in particular - you can begin to see the outline of a contagion mechanism whereby the coming to reality of the worst case Greek scenario might just extend itself into a problem of sufficient magnitude to transmit Greek vulnerabilities across and into the entire euro area. No one is too small to be a problem when it comes to financial crises, ..."
.
"In addition to the evident weaknesses which have now come to light in the Greek (pode sempre optar-se por trocar o nome do país por outro ...) financial system, the other worrying development we are seeing in Greece at the present time - apart that is from the largescale social conflict that has been hitting the headlines in recent weeks - is the movement in what is know as the yield spreads.
...
What this means is Greek government bonds are sold cheaper (ie the government receives less for them) than their German counterparts, but their yields are higher and this is because external investors increasingly see Greece as a less creditworthy country. If Greece itself was fully self sufficient in finance (like say Japan is) then this wouldn't present a problem for bond yields (as we can see in the case of an equally indebted Japanese govenment) since domestic investors could be relied on to buy up the bonds (in a process known as "home bias"), but Greece is not self sufficient, and has to depend on external finance to fund a current account deficit of around 15% of GDP (12% para o nosso país). Thus the opening up in these spreads over the last two months most now constitute the biggest headache those responsible for managing European Monetary Union have had to face since the creation of the eurozone, since according to the well know neo-classical theory of contingent convergence they should be disappearing, and not increasing.
...
These widening spreads mean more expensive bond auctions for the Greek government, and this is just where the trouble comes, since Greece has a very hefty accumulated debt to continually refinance (around 90% GDP), and it is partly because investors don't see how a government with a damaged banking system and an economy which may soon start shrinking as the recession bites can shoulder the weight of this debt, especially given the evident difficulty faced by the Greek government in enforcing measures to reduce it (claro, aposto que por lá também há direitos adquiridos), that the widening is occuring."
...
"Basically, if I could sum all this up in a nutshell I would ask, just why are we seeing rioting out on the streets of Greece, and calm placidity down there on the Spanish highway. Well, apart from the evident differences in national cultures (which I am certainly not in any way equipped to get into) I would say there is one single fact that marks out the difference: Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero can still sign any cheque he wants to to try to fend off the worst of the Spanish crisis, while Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis no longer can. Words of warnings left unheard are now coming home to roost and the Greek government's room for fiscal manoeuvre is very very limited indeed at this point. Undoubtedly time will also run out on the Spanish Prime Minister too if we continue on the present course but my point here is that we should be aware that events in Greece, depending on how badly things go, or how quickly they go bad, could end up cutting the available time for Spain (e outros, vocês sabem de quem estou a falar...) even further, via a nasty little process which is frequently known to go to work during financial crises: regional contagion."
.
"The core of the problem we have before us lies in the Greek twin deficit - Greece has a very large and continuing current account defcit (around 15% of GDP) (12% para Portugal) and a very large accumulated government debt (around 90% of GDP). (mais de 60% para Portugal)"
.
"Part of the reason for the recent surge in Greek external debt has been a rapid rise in domestic investment which was not matched by a similar increase in national saving (esta ideia de que o dinheiro cresce nas árvores...) - in fact household savings have been more or less stagnant - and this has meant that the gap between national saving and investment has been steadily growing since 2001" (um filme que também passou por cá e vai continuar a passar no próximo ano e a agravar-se).
,
"To a large extent the decline in household saving and the increased demand for housing as a private investment vehicle can be explained by the increased access to and demand for credit in the context of financial liberalization and the lower interest rates which have followed from Greece's euro participation (same for us here in the West Coast). Undoubtedly during the years in which Greece "enjoyed" negative real interest rates, it seem a much more attractive proposition to buy a piece of property whose price it was imagined would "never fall" rather then watch savings steadily lose their value in time deposits which were effectively being ravaged by inflation attrition. On the other hand it is worth bearing in mind that gross Greek household debt - at a little over 40% of GDP - never reached the heady levels attained in Spain of around 90% of GDP."
.
"In contrast, the Greek corporate sector has been running a net savings surplus throughout the entire period (and this of course is another big difference from Spain) (e de nós), with rising saving repeatedly exceeding investment. This notable increase in corporate saving has largely been the result of the strong profitability in the shipping and financial sectors, and it is this profitability which is now, suddenly, under threat in the current downturn.
.
Greek government debt, on the other hand is somewhere in the region of 90% of GDP, while the deficit is currently somewhere around 3% of GDP, but none of us (including the European statistics agency Eurostat or the EU Commission) can really be too sure of all this, since the goalposts seem to be being constantly moved in more than the football stadia down in Greece, and while it would be an exaggeration to say the data changes on a weekly basis, sometimes it seems we are not so far away from that point."
.
"And so it went on, until it simply couldn't go on any more, which is where we are now, and why Prime Minister Karamanlis cannot simply keep signing the cheques to buy social peace (Se houver um Medina Carreira grego há-de estar a repetir "I told you!) and satve off the downturn, although it is quite clear that this evident reality still hasn't been gotten across to Greece's two largest union federations who last week held a nationwide general strike to protest a set of government's remedial policies which, if they are anything, are already too little and too late."
.
"Given the difficulties Greek banks are having in raising finance in the global financial and capital markets, the ensuing tightening credit conditions are bound to lead to a further slowdown in private consumption." (wait and you will see)
.
.
Como já confessei neste blogue um bom 'soundbyte' é um isco enrolado no anzol a que raramente resisto, e o Joaquim do Portugal Contemporâneo conseguiu um com o título "vai ser bonita a festa, pá"... mas voltemos ao artigo assinado por Edwar Hugh no Europe EconoMonitor.
.
"The above quited paragraph from the IMF is a very good example of what used to be the orthodox wisdom about Greece's economic imbalances - that given EMU membership the availability of external financing should not be a concern, and that the Greek economy is effectively too small for it to constitute a menace to the stability of the eurozone itself, even on a worst case scenario. Well, if we look at the growing yield spreads you can see in the chart above (please click for better viewing) the first premiss seems to be in real danger of falling, EMU membership no longer gives an automatic guarantee of oncost-free external financing, and if you look at the names of the other countries lining up in the queue behind Greece - Italy, Spain and Portugal in particular - you can begin to see the outline of a contagion mechanism whereby the coming to reality of the worst case Greek scenario might just extend itself into a problem of sufficient magnitude to transmit Greek vulnerabilities across and into the entire euro area. No one is too small to be a problem when it comes to financial crises, ..."
.
"In addition to the evident weaknesses which have now come to light in the Greek (pode sempre optar-se por trocar o nome do país por outro ...) financial system, the other worrying development we are seeing in Greece at the present time - apart that is from the largescale social conflict that has been hitting the headlines in recent weeks - is the movement in what is know as the yield spreads.
...
What this means is Greek government bonds are sold cheaper (ie the government receives less for them) than their German counterparts, but their yields are higher and this is because external investors increasingly see Greece as a less creditworthy country. If Greece itself was fully self sufficient in finance (like say Japan is) then this wouldn't present a problem for bond yields (as we can see in the case of an equally indebted Japanese govenment) since domestic investors could be relied on to buy up the bonds (in a process known as "home bias"), but Greece is not self sufficient, and has to depend on external finance to fund a current account deficit of around 15% of GDP (12% para o nosso país). Thus the opening up in these spreads over the last two months most now constitute the biggest headache those responsible for managing European Monetary Union have had to face since the creation of the eurozone, since according to the well know neo-classical theory of contingent convergence they should be disappearing, and not increasing.
...
These widening spreads mean more expensive bond auctions for the Greek government, and this is just where the trouble comes, since Greece has a very hefty accumulated debt to continually refinance (around 90% GDP), and it is partly because investors don't see how a government with a damaged banking system and an economy which may soon start shrinking as the recession bites can shoulder the weight of this debt, especially given the evident difficulty faced by the Greek government in enforcing measures to reduce it (claro, aposto que por lá também há direitos adquiridos), that the widening is occuring."
...
"Basically, if I could sum all this up in a nutshell I would ask, just why are we seeing rioting out on the streets of Greece, and calm placidity down there on the Spanish highway. Well, apart from the evident differences in national cultures (which I am certainly not in any way equipped to get into) I would say there is one single fact that marks out the difference: Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero can still sign any cheque he wants to to try to fend off the worst of the Spanish crisis, while Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis no longer can. Words of warnings left unheard are now coming home to roost and the Greek government's room for fiscal manoeuvre is very very limited indeed at this point. Undoubtedly time will also run out on the Spanish Prime Minister too if we continue on the present course but my point here is that we should be aware that events in Greece, depending on how badly things go, or how quickly they go bad, could end up cutting the available time for Spain (e outros, vocês sabem de quem estou a falar...) even further, via a nasty little process which is frequently known to go to work during financial crises: regional contagion."
.
"The core of the problem we have before us lies in the Greek twin deficit - Greece has a very large and continuing current account defcit (around 15% of GDP) (12% para Portugal) and a very large accumulated government debt (around 90% of GDP). (mais de 60% para Portugal)"
.
"Part of the reason for the recent surge in Greek external debt has been a rapid rise in domestic investment which was not matched by a similar increase in national saving (esta ideia de que o dinheiro cresce nas árvores...) - in fact household savings have been more or less stagnant - and this has meant that the gap between national saving and investment has been steadily growing since 2001" (um filme que também passou por cá e vai continuar a passar no próximo ano e a agravar-se).
,
"To a large extent the decline in household saving and the increased demand for housing as a private investment vehicle can be explained by the increased access to and demand for credit in the context of financial liberalization and the lower interest rates which have followed from Greece's euro participation (same for us here in the West Coast). Undoubtedly during the years in which Greece "enjoyed" negative real interest rates, it seem a much more attractive proposition to buy a piece of property whose price it was imagined would "never fall" rather then watch savings steadily lose their value in time deposits which were effectively being ravaged by inflation attrition. On the other hand it is worth bearing in mind that gross Greek household debt - at a little over 40% of GDP - never reached the heady levels attained in Spain of around 90% of GDP."
.
"In contrast, the Greek corporate sector has been running a net savings surplus throughout the entire period (and this of course is another big difference from Spain) (e de nós), with rising saving repeatedly exceeding investment. This notable increase in corporate saving has largely been the result of the strong profitability in the shipping and financial sectors, and it is this profitability which is now, suddenly, under threat in the current downturn.
.
Greek government debt, on the other hand is somewhere in the region of 90% of GDP, while the deficit is currently somewhere around 3% of GDP, but none of us (including the European statistics agency Eurostat or the EU Commission) can really be too sure of all this, since the goalposts seem to be being constantly moved in more than the football stadia down in Greece, and while it would be an exaggeration to say the data changes on a weekly basis, sometimes it seems we are not so far away from that point."
.
"And so it went on, until it simply couldn't go on any more, which is where we are now, and why Prime Minister Karamanlis cannot simply keep signing the cheques to buy social peace (Se houver um Medina Carreira grego há-de estar a repetir "I told you!) and satve off the downturn, although it is quite clear that this evident reality still hasn't been gotten across to Greece's two largest union federations who last week held a nationwide general strike to protest a set of government's remedial policies which, if they are anything, are already too little and too late."
.
"Given the difficulties Greek banks are having in raising finance in the global financial and capital markets, the ensuing tightening credit conditions are bound to lead to a further slowdown in private consumption." (wait and you will see)
.
Há uma diferença...
João Miranda explica de forma clara e pedagógica, ou direi antes andragógica, o caso Madoff Escândalo Madoff explicado aos portugueses.
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Esquece-se é de uma pequena grande diferença; é que no caso Madoff a adesão é voluntária, no caso da Segurança Social a adesão é obrigatória.
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Esquece-se é de uma pequena grande diferença; é que no caso Madoff a adesão é voluntária, no caso da Segurança Social a adesão é obrigatória.
A importância de um modelo
Quando me pedem a opinião sobre ideias para oportunidades de negócio procuro sempre descortinar qual é a máquina para ganhar dinheiro e se a mesma tem pernas para andar, ou seja ser sustentável, ser auto-reprodutora.
Algo que permita chegar a 
Se isto é uma condição básica para investir num negócio ... não faria sentido pensar no mesmo para um qualquer plano governamental?
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Por exemplo:
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como é que pessoas mais qualificadas conseguem arranjar emprego?
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como é que o mais recente plano anti-crise nos vai tirar do buraco?
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Ou seja, antes de gastar um euro que seja, com papel e um lápis procurar testar a razoabilidade do que se pretende fazer.
Solidariedade?
Como copiamos aqui:
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"Solidarity means, if it means anything, that everyone shoulders some part of the burden in difficult times, and that people behave responsibily with their national resources and heritage, and accepting that when there is no money to pay for something, then there simply is no money to pay for it."
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Quanto é que o PIB cresceu em 2007? Quanto é que o PIB cresceu em 2008? Quanto é que o PIB vai crescer em 2009?
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Quanto é que vai aumentar a facturação das PME's no próximo ano de 2009?
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Now, for the stunner:
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"As grandes universidades como o Porto, Coimbra, Lisboa e a Técnica, tiveram um crescimento de 2%, que é completamente insuficiente para o próximo ano. O que me preocupa"
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Trech retirado de “Escolas entram todas no vermelho em 2009” assinado por Madalena Queirós no Diário Económico.
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Não há aqui gente abstraída, alienada da realidade?
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Knock!Knock! Helloooooooo!!!
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"Solidarity means, if it means anything, that everyone shoulders some part of the burden in difficult times, and that people behave responsibily with their national resources and heritage, and accepting that when there is no money to pay for something, then there simply is no money to pay for it."
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Quanto é que o PIB cresceu em 2007? Quanto é que o PIB cresceu em 2008? Quanto é que o PIB vai crescer em 2009?
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Quanto é que vai aumentar a facturação das PME's no próximo ano de 2009?
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Now, for the stunner:
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"As grandes universidades como o Porto, Coimbra, Lisboa e a Técnica, tiveram um crescimento de 2%, que é completamente insuficiente para o próximo ano. O que me preocupa"
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Trech retirado de “Escolas entram todas no vermelho em 2009” assinado por Madalena Queirós no Diário Económico.
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Não há aqui gente abstraída, alienada da realidade?
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Knock!Knock! Helloooooooo!!!
"Are We A Bunch Of Hypocrites In Southern Europe?
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One question I often ask myself when speaking with Spanish government employees who timidly ask me the predictable "crisis, what crisis? (BTW será sempre um dos meus dois albuns preferidos, together with The Allan Parson's Project... God I'm getting old!!!) Can't you see, all the bars are still full!" question is just what is meant by that much used and little understood word "solidarity". We are proud to note down here in Southern Europe that we have a complex set of collective institutions which are driven by objectives of "social solidarity", not like those nasty little anglo saxon types (you know, the "neo-liberals") who live up north. But why is it, I ask myself, that I don't here this "crisis, what crisis" stuff from those working in the private sector, who spend the best part of the day at the present time looking across the factory or office floor at their colleagues and asking themselves who it is who will find themself going out of the door this week?
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Solidarity means, if it means anything, that everyone shoulders some part of the burden in difficult times, and that people behave responsibily with their national resources and heritage, and accepting that when there is no money to pay for something, then there simply is no money to pay for it. If you find yourself having to depend on the stringent demands of others from outside your country, then the best thing you can do is to get your country out of the debt which is the cause of the problem, and then you can freely decide your own future for yourself. But while I can well understand how a relatively poor country like Ecuador gets itself into such a dependence-based mess, I am at a loss to understand how comparatively rich countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal have allowed things to come to the pass they have now come to, or how their citizens have let them get to the point they are at now.
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Trecho roubado a Edward Hugh "Why We All Need To Keep A Watchful Eye On What Is Happening In Greece"
One question I often ask myself when speaking with Spanish government employees who timidly ask me the predictable "crisis, what crisis? (BTW será sempre um dos meus dois albuns preferidos, together with The Allan Parson's Project... God I'm getting old!!!) Can't you see, all the bars are still full!" question is just what is meant by that much used and little understood word "solidarity". We are proud to note down here in Southern Europe that we have a complex set of collective institutions which are driven by objectives of "social solidarity", not like those nasty little anglo saxon types (you know, the "neo-liberals") who live up north. But why is it, I ask myself, that I don't here this "crisis, what crisis" stuff from those working in the private sector, who spend the best part of the day at the present time looking across the factory or office floor at their colleagues and asking themselves who it is who will find themself going out of the door this week?
.
Solidarity means, if it means anything, that everyone shoulders some part of the burden in difficult times, and that people behave responsibily with their national resources and heritage, and accepting that when there is no money to pay for something, then there simply is no money to pay for it. If you find yourself having to depend on the stringent demands of others from outside your country, then the best thing you can do is to get your country out of the debt which is the cause of the problem, and then you can freely decide your own future for yourself. But while I can well understand how a relatively poor country like Ecuador gets itself into such a dependence-based mess, I am at a loss to understand how comparatively rich countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal have allowed things to come to the pass they have now come to, or how their citizens have let them get to the point they are at now.
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Trecho roubado a Edward Hugh "Why We All Need To Keep A Watchful Eye On What Is Happening In Greece"
segunda-feira, dezembro 15, 2008
Acerca da gestão de expectativas
"While the IMF seem to be more aware of the scale of the problem than the Spanish government currently are, they do seem to be putting all of the emphasis for recovery on some much needed labour market reforms, but personally I don't think even these are playing in the right ball park, we need a big picture "breakout" escape plan, to cut loose from the pincers of cash drought, corporate bankruptcy, construction dependency, large scale contraction and price deflation. (Também acredito que quem confia nas reformas laborais só confia num mito e nunca fez as contas que interessam) It's a big mess, and will need an equally bold and ambitious plan to get to grips with it."
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Tenho referido muitas vezes esta história da gestão de expectativas: Outra vez a gestão das expectativas ; Gestão de expectativas (parte III) ; Gestão de expectativas (parte II); Gestão de expectativas.
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"One point which is obvious at this stage is that Spanish government forecasting - which has currently built a 1% expansion into the 2009 budget - is getting ever more out of line with the economic dynamic. Really this is the first thing which has to change. Spain urgently needs someone leading the country who is able to turn the page, put some realistic numbers on the table, and try to work to meet objectives, instead of simply failing to achieve them time after time. (Confesso que pensei nisto na véspera das eleições em Espanha, o PSOE devia ter, eu sei que era impossível, apresentado outro candidato a primeiro-ministro, não por causa das ideias de Zapatero, mas porque esta legislatura seria diferente da anterior, seiam precisas outras ideias, outras posturas, seria preciso romper com alianças e práticas antigas). (Spins doctors do governo português aprendam como se faz no que vem a seguir) What do I mean by this, well, if you seriously think that the contraction next year will be of 2% of GDP then it is better to say 3%, and beat your target, than say its going to be 1% growth and come in with a 2% contraction. Not only will your citizens be getting more and more fed up with all of this (and the impact on morale should not be treated lightly) but much more to the point, since Spain is heavily dependent on foreign finance to buy the debt that the government is going to need to issue (see more below) to finance the fiscal deficit, then each and every failure to achieve target is likely to be punished with a higher cost of financing debt (as the yield spread on the risk rises). So as well as the credibility cost, this kind of playing fast and loose with the forecast is now likely to carry a real financial cost."
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Prepare to be dazzled:
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"So Just How Much Will The Spanish Economy Contract In 2009?
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Well, I think this is a very hard question to answer. I think a 1% contraction is a done deal, and my own previous best guess was in the 3% to 5% contraction range, which is, of course, very strong indeed. And there I was happy to leave it, until that is Deutsche Bank came out with their latest 2009 forecast for the German economy, where chief economist Norbert Walter has said that Germany's gross domestic product could contract by as much as 4 percent next year. This has to be "bottom of the range" estimate, but then, it might happen, I mean these are not just numbers spun out of thin air, they are backed by analysis, German manufacturing is contracting very rapidly at the moment (but not as rapidly as Spanish manufacturing). The German government itself is forecasting a 1% contraction, and the IFO institute came out today with 2% contraction for 2009 estimate (the median forecast?). At this point I won't go so far as to modify my original forecast for Spain, but what I will say is that if German GDP contracts by 4% in 2009, then Spain's will contract in the 5% to 7% range, since on every important reading Spain is contracting more rapidly than Germany at this point, and there really is no bottom in sight, just what appears to be a "black hole", sucking us down."
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Aqui estamos melhor que Espanha, ora vejamos:
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"At the risk of boring to tears all my regular readers I would first like to stress that what we have in Spain is not a simple garden-variety housing correction. Spain is a country which was allowed across the 2000-2007 period to develop massive macroeconomic imbalances, which to some extent were reflected in a huge housing boom. But the imbalances (current account deficit of 10% of GDP, massive migrant flows - 5 million people in 8 years, rapidly rising household and corporate debt - rising at 20% pa, and reaching around 90% and 120% of GDP in 2008 respectively) and not the housing are the key to the problem. Thus Spain's economy is not reeling under the weight of the unwinding of the property boom, but rather Spain's property boom is reeling under the impact of the unwinding of the macro imbalances, and this unwinding became more or less inevitable once the US sub prime crisis broke out in August 2007. I think it is no accident that the two countries who noticed most the shell shock from the sub prime turmoil were Spain and Kazakhstan, since these two countries were the most dependent on selling some type of paper or other in the wholsale money markets to finance their imbalances, and the doors to these markets effectively closed in September 2007."
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"Spain's big problem is the current account deficit, which reached 10% of GDP last year (o nosso é de 12%). At the present time this deficit is dropping slightly as imports collapse, but it is not falling as fast as it should be, and meantime, as I am saying, the Spanish government is raising its borrowing needs (também o nosso). Spain has movied in 2008 from having a 2% of GDP surplus in January to a 3% deficit in December (ie a shift of 5% of GDP), in 2009 we will move up to at least 5% (as the IMF suggest, and we could even move higher depending on what happens to GDP)."
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Trechos retirados de "So Just When Does Spain's Twin Deficit Problem Become Unsustainable?" de Eward Hugh.
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Tenho referido muitas vezes esta história da gestão de expectativas: Outra vez a gestão das expectativas ; Gestão de expectativas (parte III) ; Gestão de expectativas (parte II); Gestão de expectativas.
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"One point which is obvious at this stage is that Spanish government forecasting - which has currently built a 1% expansion into the 2009 budget - is getting ever more out of line with the economic dynamic. Really this is the first thing which has to change. Spain urgently needs someone leading the country who is able to turn the page, put some realistic numbers on the table, and try to work to meet objectives, instead of simply failing to achieve them time after time. (Confesso que pensei nisto na véspera das eleições em Espanha, o PSOE devia ter, eu sei que era impossível, apresentado outro candidato a primeiro-ministro, não por causa das ideias de Zapatero, mas porque esta legislatura seria diferente da anterior, seiam precisas outras ideias, outras posturas, seria preciso romper com alianças e práticas antigas). (Spins doctors do governo português aprendam como se faz no que vem a seguir) What do I mean by this, well, if you seriously think that the contraction next year will be of 2% of GDP then it is better to say 3%, and beat your target, than say its going to be 1% growth and come in with a 2% contraction. Not only will your citizens be getting more and more fed up with all of this (and the impact on morale should not be treated lightly) but much more to the point, since Spain is heavily dependent on foreign finance to buy the debt that the government is going to need to issue (see more below) to finance the fiscal deficit, then each and every failure to achieve target is likely to be punished with a higher cost of financing debt (as the yield spread on the risk rises). So as well as the credibility cost, this kind of playing fast and loose with the forecast is now likely to carry a real financial cost."
.
Prepare to be dazzled:
.
"So Just How Much Will The Spanish Economy Contract In 2009?
.
Well, I think this is a very hard question to answer. I think a 1% contraction is a done deal, and my own previous best guess was in the 3% to 5% contraction range, which is, of course, very strong indeed. And there I was happy to leave it, until that is Deutsche Bank came out with their latest 2009 forecast for the German economy, where chief economist Norbert Walter has said that Germany's gross domestic product could contract by as much as 4 percent next year. This has to be "bottom of the range" estimate, but then, it might happen, I mean these are not just numbers spun out of thin air, they are backed by analysis, German manufacturing is contracting very rapidly at the moment (but not as rapidly as Spanish manufacturing). The German government itself is forecasting a 1% contraction, and the IFO institute came out today with 2% contraction for 2009 estimate (the median forecast?). At this point I won't go so far as to modify my original forecast for Spain, but what I will say is that if German GDP contracts by 4% in 2009, then Spain's will contract in the 5% to 7% range, since on every important reading Spain is contracting more rapidly than Germany at this point, and there really is no bottom in sight, just what appears to be a "black hole", sucking us down."
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Aqui estamos melhor que Espanha, ora vejamos:
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"At the risk of boring to tears all my regular readers I would first like to stress that what we have in Spain is not a simple garden-variety housing correction. Spain is a country which was allowed across the 2000-2007 period to develop massive macroeconomic imbalances, which to some extent were reflected in a huge housing boom. But the imbalances (current account deficit of 10% of GDP, massive migrant flows - 5 million people in 8 years, rapidly rising household and corporate debt - rising at 20% pa, and reaching around 90% and 120% of GDP in 2008 respectively) and not the housing are the key to the problem. Thus Spain's economy is not reeling under the weight of the unwinding of the property boom, but rather Spain's property boom is reeling under the impact of the unwinding of the macro imbalances, and this unwinding became more or less inevitable once the US sub prime crisis broke out in August 2007. I think it is no accident that the two countries who noticed most the shell shock from the sub prime turmoil were Spain and Kazakhstan, since these two countries were the most dependent on selling some type of paper or other in the wholsale money markets to finance their imbalances, and the doors to these markets effectively closed in September 2007."
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"Spain's big problem is the current account deficit, which reached 10% of GDP last year (o nosso é de 12%). At the present time this deficit is dropping slightly as imports collapse, but it is not falling as fast as it should be, and meantime, as I am saying, the Spanish government is raising its borrowing needs (também o nosso). Spain has movied in 2008 from having a 2% of GDP surplus in January to a 3% deficit in December (ie a shift of 5% of GDP), in 2009 we will move up to at least 5% (as the IMF suggest, and we could even move higher depending on what happens to GDP)."
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Trechos retirados de "So Just When Does Spain's Twin Deficit Problem Become Unsustainable?" de Eward Hugh.
Como eu olho para a crise
Sou um simples cidadão que tem uma visão bem diferente da dos políticos sobre como agir para fazer face à crise.
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Era uma vez o paraíso na Terra. O paraíso do endividamento, o paraíso do consumo sem poupança, o paraíso do dinheiro fácil e barato.
Os consumidores (C da figura) assentavam o seu nível de consumo no endividamento permanente e progressivo e numa ingénua confiança no futuro, os bancos (F da figura) forneciam crédito fácil e barato.
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Os negócios (B da figura) que interagiam com os consumidores (B2C), à conta do endividamento fácil e barato e aliciados pelo consumo progressivo dos clientes, crença de que as árvores crescem sempre até ao céu, aumentaram a capacidade de produção à custa de investimento.
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O mesmo aconteceu para os negócios (B da figura) que interagiam com outros negócios (B2B).
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O crédito fácil e barato alimentou um aumento do consumo e da capacidade de produção.
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O crédito fácil e barato foi também aproveitado pelos governos para obras e benesses para assegurar votos e perpetuação no poder.
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Todo este ecossistema era alimentado por yenes baratos a taxas de juro pornograficamente baixas, um truque para fazer do Ocidente nações de consumidores dóceis para a produção industrial nipónica (há um ano um dolar valia 114 yenes, quinta-feira chegou a valer menos de 89 yenes)
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Então, no ano passado deu-se o Pum!!!
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A confiança no futuro esvaíu-se e consumidores e negócios descobriram-se endividados até ao tutano. Com a falência da Lehman Brothers, os activos tóxicos e o fim do cash carry trade japonês acabou-se o crédito barato e fácil!!!!
As receitas de impostos começam a diminuir e as despesas sociais a explodir com os subsídios de desemprego, rodada após rodada, pois os empregados despedidos são também consumidores, reforçando o sentimento de receio e incerteza quanto ao futuro ...
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"We are already in a feedback loop of job losses and price reductions reinforcing each other. Expectations of consumers and businesses have become self-fulfilling. For instance the Calculated Risk (comentário-nota a este postal) blog notes a major trucking company will delay the purchase of 300 new trucks in anticipation of a slow down in 2009.
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We now have clear evidence reported in the last few days of all the part of the circle:
1. Falling sales, imports and exports.
2. Falling prices
3. Expectations of worsening conditions
4. Delay or cancel of purchases by both Consumers and Businesses.
5. Increasing layoffs due to weak demand for goods and services."
É então que os governos decidem, à beira de um ataque de pânico apoiar as empresas, tentando salvar os postos de trabalho na política. O espectro da desordem grega paira sobre o asilo europeu ...
Só que, por mais apoios que as empresas recebam... as empresas só fazem sentido se tiverem clientes.
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Era uma vez o paraíso na Terra. O paraíso do endividamento, o paraíso do consumo sem poupança, o paraíso do dinheiro fácil e barato.
Os consumidores (C da figura) assentavam o seu nível de consumo no endividamento permanente e progressivo e numa ingénua confiança no futuro, os bancos (F da figura) forneciam crédito fácil e barato..
Os negócios (B da figura) que interagiam com os consumidores (B2C), à conta do endividamento fácil e barato e aliciados pelo consumo progressivo dos clientes, crença de que as árvores crescem sempre até ao céu, aumentaram a capacidade de produção à custa de investimento.
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O mesmo aconteceu para os negócios (B da figura) que interagiam com outros negócios (B2B).
.
O crédito fácil e barato alimentou um aumento do consumo e da capacidade de produção.
.
O crédito fácil e barato foi também aproveitado pelos governos para obras e benesses para assegurar votos e perpetuação no poder.
.
Todo este ecossistema era alimentado por yenes baratos a taxas de juro pornograficamente baixas, um truque para fazer do Ocidente nações de consumidores dóceis para a produção industrial nipónica (há um ano um dolar valia 114 yenes, quinta-feira chegou a valer menos de 89 yenes)
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Então, no ano passado deu-se o Pum!!!
.
A confiança no futuro esvaíu-se e consumidores e negócios descobriram-se endividados até ao tutano. Com a falência da Lehman Brothers, os activos tóxicos e o fim do cash carry trade japonês acabou-se o crédito barato e fácil!!!!
Os consumidores descobrem que estão a consumir em excesso!!! E acentua-se a incerteza e o medo do que o futuro reserva.
Com a derrocada na procura, sobretudo daquela que exige capital, e uma vez que não há poupança prévia...
... os negócios descobrem que têm excesso de capacidade produtiva instalada, excesso de inventário, excesso de dívidas e ...
... os consumidores e clientes deixaram de consumir ao nível a que tinham consumido e os bancos cortaram a torneira do crédito
Para fazer face à nova realidade as empresas ou fecham, ou reduzem a capacidade ou reduzem custos, quase tudo leva a despedimentos e mais despedimentos.
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Isto começa a preocupar os governos (G da figura) ...
As receitas de impostos começam a diminuir e as despesas sociais a explodir com os subsídios de desemprego, rodada após rodada, pois os empregados despedidos são também consumidores, reforçando o sentimento de receio e incerteza quanto ao futuro ....
"We are already in a feedback loop of job losses and price reductions reinforcing each other. Expectations of consumers and businesses have become self-fulfilling. For instance the Calculated Risk (comentário-nota a este postal) blog notes a major trucking company will delay the purchase of 300 new trucks in anticipation of a slow down in 2009.
.
We now have clear evidence reported in the last few days of all the part of the circle:
1. Falling sales, imports and exports.
2. Falling prices
3. Expectations of worsening conditions
4. Delay or cancel of purchases by both Consumers and Businesses.
5. Increasing layoffs due to weak demand for goods and services."
É então que os governos decidem, à beira de um ataque de pânico apoiar as empresas, tentando salvar os postos de trabalho na política. O espectro da desordem grega paira sobre o asilo europeu ...
Só que, por mais apoios que as empresas recebam... as empresas só fazem sentido se tiverem clientes..
Como toda a gente sabe que está tudo a ser suportado por apoios artificiais a confiança não regressa, continua tudo na retranca. Ao minimo abrandar dos apoios e subsídios voltará tudo ao descalabro do desemprego pois a confiança de quem consome é a base da sustentabilidade do sistema.
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Os apoios são todos concentrados nas empresas e esquecem-se das pessoas.
Medidas do governo português:
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Modernização das escolas - apoio aos amigos e parceiros das construtoras, essa indústria exportadora que tantas divisas traz para o país, que tantos empregos bem remunerados e com alto valor acrescentado dá ao país.
Energias renováveis - só fumaça que faz com que paguemos cada vez mais cara a energia.
Modernização das infraestruturas tecnológicas - só fumaça.
Exportações e PMEs - basta ver o Pùblico de ontem ("Abrir uma linha de crédito para as PME pode ser importante, mas depende. Paulo Trigo Pereira defende que poderá combater a crise, sobretudo num momento em que há fortes restrições de crédito às empresas. Mas Octávio Teixeira lembra que tudo depende do objectivo a que se destina essa linha de crédito. Se for para investimento, diz, poderá não ser eficaz porque se desconhece se as empresas têm possibilidade de suportar o encargo financeiro, dado que já estão fortemente condicionadas pelos problemas de tesouraria. Se for uma linha de crédito para tesouraria, ou seja, para sustentar a operação das empresas no dia-a-dia (salários, compras correntes, etc.), talvez seja útil." útil só para ajudar a suster a respiração, mas por quanto tempo?)
Emprego - basta ver o Público de ontem ("Em geral, as três medidas que se seguem foram apoiadas pelos economistas que o PÚBLICO ouviu ontem, mas com efeitos diferenciados. Chamam a atenção para o carácter recorrente deste tipo de medidas, nalguns casos sem o efeito pretendido.")
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Os consumidores foram longe demais, as empresas foram longe de mais e hoje estão sobredimensionadas para uma procura sustentada.
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O choque económico não tem apenas um efeito pontual, as suas repercussões vão-se prolongar por muito tempo, a migração de valor vai obrigar a re-orientar recursos. E o fim, ou antes, a reformulação da globalização vão criar novas oportunidades de negócio.
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Quem é que sabe que sectores, que apostas serão privilegiadas? Os governos?
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Quem é que sabe que sectores terão de sofrer mais reduções de capacidade? Os governos?
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Eu, que não tenho a informação que têm os governos, e que não tenho medo de eleições que não disputo, proporia uma receita diferente.
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Apoio mínimo às empresas de qualquer sector, os consumidores que decidam quem tem direito a sobreviver como empresa.
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Em contrapartida, apoio máximo às pessoas e sobretudo aos desempregados.
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A opção de não apoiar empresas (e desconfio que as medidas do governo só vão proteger as construtoras, por isso até a opção de apoiar as empresas) gera muitas falências e muito desemprego rapidamente.
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Com o reforço do apoio aos desempregados e eventual apoio ao pagamento ou moratória de algumas dívidas (hipotecas por exemplo) as pessoas verse-iam rapidamente na pior situação (desemprego) mas apoiadas. A partir daí não poderiam piorar a sua situação.
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Assim, estabelecer-e-ia rapidamente uma nova 'baseline' para a confiança no futuro. Quem já está na pior situação só tem duas hipóteses, ou mantém ou melhora.
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Algures no tempo haveria condições para uma melhoria ainda que pequena. Porque pior não poderia ficar e alguma poupança poderia abrir a hipótese de aumentar o consumo.
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Assim, com o apoio às empresas apenas se ajuda a suster a respiração debaixo de água, mas todos os actores do sistema sabem que mais tarde ou mais cedo é preciso vir à tona respirar e aí as coisas podem piorar. Como podem piorar ... é melhor ficar na retranca e poupar e não consumir.
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Adenda das 17:55 - Estas são as minhas ideias, em total oposição às do último Nobel Krugman: aqui... ou talvez não. IMHO estas medidas que os endividados governos europeus andam a tomar só fariam sentido serem tomadas por um país... a Alemanha.
Comunicamos por sombras através de biombos
Se considerarmos o significado da mensagem de Van Zeller quando afirma "Próximo ano será "trágico" e "terrível" para a economia mundial"
"Para o presidente da CIP, na actual conjuntura a maior atenção deverá incidir no próximo ano sobre os apoios sociais e no desemprego." (nota do autor do blogue: algo em que acredito mesmo, muito mais no que o apoio às empresas, como vou tentar explicar mais tarde)
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A ser assim, e dado o fenómeno de migração de valor, de retorno à frugalidade e de correcção acentuada dos níveis de consumo insustentáveis, com a consequente falência e consolidação de muitas empresas, quem é que pode assegurar que uma dada empresa em particular vai ser capaz de sobreviver a esta crise, que poderá durar 1, 2, 3, ... 5, 10 anos (à japonesa)?
.
Por isso, só por motivos plenamente justificáveis do negócio (desconto outras interpretações possíveis) compreendo perfeitamente o receio dos bancos em não emprestar dinheiro... que garantias têm de que o cliente-empresa vai sobreviver à crise?
.
"Teixeira dos Santos: ”É preciso pressionar os bancos para que façam chegar o dinheiro às empresas”"
.
Será que o governo está disponível para dar avales, como no caso do BPP? (humor negro)
"Para o presidente da CIP, na actual conjuntura a maior atenção deverá incidir no próximo ano sobre os apoios sociais e no desemprego." (nota do autor do blogue: algo em que acredito mesmo, muito mais no que o apoio às empresas, como vou tentar explicar mais tarde)
.
A ser assim, e dado o fenómeno de migração de valor, de retorno à frugalidade e de correcção acentuada dos níveis de consumo insustentáveis, com a consequente falência e consolidação de muitas empresas, quem é que pode assegurar que uma dada empresa em particular vai ser capaz de sobreviver a esta crise, que poderá durar 1, 2, 3, ... 5, 10 anos (à japonesa)?
.
Por isso, só por motivos plenamente justificáveis do negócio (desconto outras interpretações possíveis) compreendo perfeitamente o receio dos bancos em não emprestar dinheiro... que garantias têm de que o cliente-empresa vai sobreviver à crise?
.
"Teixeira dos Santos: ”É preciso pressionar os bancos para que façam chegar o dinheiro às empresas”"
.
Será que o governo está disponível para dar avales, como no caso do BPP? (humor negro)
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