Acerca da gestão de expectativas

"While the IMF seem to be more aware of the scale of the problem than the Spanish government currently are, they do seem to be putting all of the emphasis for recovery on some much needed labour market reforms, but personally I don't think even these are playing in the right ball park, we need a big picture "breakout" escape plan, to cut loose from the pincers of cash drought, corporate bankruptcy, construction dependency, large scale contraction and price deflation. (Também acredito que quem confia nas reformas laborais só confia num mito e nunca fez as contas que interessam) It's a big mess, and will need an equally bold and ambitious plan to get to grips with it."
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Tenho referido muitas vezes esta história da gestão de expectativas: Outra vez a gestão das expectativas ; Gestão de expectativas (parte III) ; Gestão de expectativas (parte II); Gestão de expectativas.
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"One point which is obvious at this stage is that Spanish government forecasting - which has currently built a 1% expansion into the 2009 budget - is getting ever more out of line with the economic dynamic. Really this is the first thing which has to change. Spain urgently needs someone leading the country who is able to turn the page, put some realistic numbers on the table, and try to work to meet objectives, instead of simply failing to achieve them time after time. (Confesso que pensei nisto na véspera das eleições em Espanha, o PSOE devia ter, eu sei que era impossível, apresentado outro candidato a primeiro-ministro, não por causa das ideias de Zapatero, mas porque esta legislatura seria diferente da anterior, seiam precisas outras ideias, outras posturas, seria preciso romper com alianças e práticas antigas). (Spins doctors do governo português aprendam como se faz no que vem a seguir) What do I mean by this, well, if you seriously think that the contraction next year will be of 2% of GDP then it is better to say 3%, and beat your target, than say its going to be 1% growth and come in with a 2% contraction. Not only will your citizens be getting more and more fed up with all of this (and the impact on morale should not be treated lightly) but much more to the point, since Spain is heavily dependent on foreign finance to buy the debt that the government is going to need to issue (see more below) to finance the fiscal deficit, then each and every failure to achieve target is likely to be punished with a higher cost of financing debt (as the yield spread on the risk rises). So as well as the credibility cost, this kind of playing fast and loose with the forecast is now likely to carry a real financial cost."
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Prepare to be dazzled:
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"So Just How Much Will The Spanish Economy Contract In 2009?
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Well, I think this is a very hard question to answer. I think a 1% contraction is a done deal, and my own previous best guess was in the 3% to 5% contraction range, which is, of course, very strong indeed. And there I was happy to leave it, until that is Deutsche Bank came out with their latest 2009 forecast for the German economy, where chief economist Norbert Walter has said that Germany's gross domestic product could contract by as much as 4 percent next year. This has to be "bottom of the range" estimate, but then, it might happen, I mean these are not just numbers spun out of thin air, they are backed by analysis, German manufacturing is contracting very rapidly at the moment (but not as rapidly as Spanish manufacturing). The German government itself is forecasting a 1% contraction, and the IFO institute came out today with 2% contraction for 2009 estimate (the median forecast?). At this point I won't go so far as to modify my original forecast for Spain, but what I will say is that if German GDP contracts by 4% in 2009, then Spain's will contract in the 5% to 7% range, since on every important reading Spain is contracting more rapidly than Germany at this point, and there really is no bottom in sight, just what appears to be a "black hole", sucking us down."
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Aqui estamos melhor que Espanha, ora vejamos:
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"At the risk of boring to tears all my regular readers I would first like to stress that what we have in Spain is not a simple garden-variety housing correction. Spain is a country which was allowed across the 2000-2007 period to develop massive macroeconomic imbalances, which to some extent were reflected in a huge housing boom. But the imbalances (current account deficit of 10% of GDP, massive migrant flows - 5 million people in 8 years, rapidly rising household and corporate debt - rising at 20% pa, and reaching around 90% and 120% of GDP in 2008 respectively) and not the housing are the key to the problem. Thus Spain's economy is not reeling under the weight of the unwinding of the property boom, but rather Spain's property boom is reeling under the impact of the unwinding of the macro imbalances, and this unwinding became more or less inevitable once the US sub prime crisis broke out in August 2007. I think it is no accident that the two countries who noticed most the shell shock from the sub prime turmoil were Spain and Kazakhstan, since these two countries were the most dependent on selling some type of paper or other in the wholsale money markets to finance their imbalances, and the doors to these markets effectively closed in September 2007."
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"Spain's big problem is the current account deficit, which reached 10% of GDP last year (o nosso é de 12%). At the present time this deficit is dropping slightly as imports collapse, but it is not falling as fast as it should be, and meantime, as I am saying, the Spanish government is raising its borrowing needs (também o nosso). Spain has movied in 2008 from having a 2% of GDP surplus in January to a 3% deficit in December (ie a shift of 5% of GDP), in 2009 we will move up to at least 5% (as the IMF suggest, and we could even move higher depending on what happens to GDP)."
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Trechos retirados de "So Just When Does Spain's Twin Deficit Problem Become Unsustainable?" de Eward Hugh.