O canário grego

Antes de ler este postal "Why We All Need To Keep A Watchful Eye On What Is Happening In Greece" convém arranjar um tempo para o ler com clama e para reflectir no seu conteúdo.
.
Como já confessei neste blogue um bom 'soundbyte' é um isco enrolado no anzol a que raramente resisto, e o Joaquim do Portugal Contemporâneo conseguiu um com o título "vai ser bonita a festa, pá"... mas voltemos ao artigo assinado por Edwar Hugh no Europe EconoMonitor.
.
"The above quited paragraph from the IMF is a very good example of what used to be the orthodox wisdom about Greece's economic imbalances - that given EMU membership the availability of external financing should not be a concern, and that the Greek economy is effectively too small for it to constitute a menace to the stability of the eurozone itself, even on a worst case scenario. Well, if we look at the growing yield spreads you can see in the chart above (please click for better viewing) the first premiss seems to be in real danger of falling, EMU membership no longer gives an automatic guarantee of oncost-free external financing, and if you look at the names of the other countries lining up in the queue behind Greece - Italy, Spain and Portugal in particular - you can begin to see the outline of a contagion mechanism whereby the coming to reality of the worst case Greek scenario might just extend itself into a problem of sufficient magnitude to transmit Greek vulnerabilities across and into the entire euro area. No one is too small to be a problem when it comes to financial crises, ..."
.
"In addition to the evident weaknesses which have now come to light in the Greek (pode sempre optar-se por trocar o nome do país por outro ...) financial system, the other worrying development we are seeing in Greece at the present time - apart that is from the largescale social conflict that has been hitting the headlines in recent weeks - is the movement in what is know as the yield spreads.
...
What this means is Greek government bonds are sold cheaper (ie the government receives less for them) than their German counterparts, but their yields are higher and this is because external investors increasingly see Greece as a less creditworthy country. If Greece itself was fully self sufficient in finance (like say Japan is) then this wouldn't present a problem for bond yields (as we can see in the case of an equally indebted Japanese govenment) since domestic investors could be relied on to buy up the bonds (in a process known as "home bias"), but Greece is not self sufficient, and has to depend on external finance to fund a current account deficit of around 15% of GDP (12% para o nosso país). Thus the opening up in these spreads over the last two months most now constitute the biggest headache those responsible for managing European Monetary Union have had to face since the creation of the eurozone, since according to the well know neo-classical theory of contingent convergence they should be disappearing, and not increasing.
...
These widening spreads mean more expensive bond auctions for the Greek government, and this is just where the trouble comes, since Greece has a very hefty accumulated debt to continually refinance (around 90% GDP), and it is partly because investors don't see how a government with a damaged banking system and an economy which may soon start shrinking as the recession bites can shoulder the weight of this debt, especially given the evident difficulty faced by the Greek government in enforcing measures to reduce it (claro, aposto que por lá também há direitos adquiridos), that the widening is occuring."
...
"Basically, if I could sum all this up in a nutshell I would ask, just why are we seeing rioting out on the streets of Greece, and calm placidity down there on the Spanish highway. Well, apart from the evident differences in national cultures (which I am certainly not in any way equipped to get into) I would say there is one single fact that marks out the difference: Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero can still sign any cheque he wants to to try to fend off the worst of the Spanish crisis, while Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis no longer can. Words of warnings left unheard are now coming home to roost and the Greek government's room for fiscal manoeuvre is very very limited indeed at this point. Undoubtedly time will also run out on the Spanish Prime Minister too if we continue on the present course but my point here is that we should be aware that events in Greece, depending on how badly things go, or how quickly they go bad, could end up cutting the available time for Spain (e outros, vocês sabem de quem estou a falar...) even further, via a nasty little process which is frequently known to go to work during financial crises: regional contagion."
.
"The core of the problem we have before us lies in the Greek twin deficit - Greece has a very large and continuing current account defcit (around 15% of GDP) (12% para Portugal) and a very large accumulated government debt (around 90% of GDP). (mais de 60% para Portugal)"
.
"Part of the reason for the recent surge in Greek external debt has been a rapid rise in domestic investment which was not matched by a similar increase in national saving (esta ideia de que o dinheiro cresce nas árvores...) - in fact household savings have been more or less stagnant - and this has meant that the gap between national saving and investment has been steadily growing since 2001" (um filme que também passou por cá e vai continuar a passar no próximo ano e a agravar-se).
,
"To a large extent the decline in household saving and the increased demand for housing as a private investment vehicle can be explained by the increased access to and demand for credit in the context of financial liberalization and the lower interest rates which have followed from Greece's euro participation (same for us here in the West Coast). Undoubtedly during the years in which Greece "enjoyed" negative real interest rates, it seem a much more attractive proposition to buy a piece of property whose price it was imagined would "never fall" rather then watch savings steadily lose their value in time deposits which were effectively being ravaged by inflation attrition. On the other hand it is worth bearing in mind that gross Greek household debt - at a little over 40% of GDP - never reached the heady levels attained in Spain of around 90% of GDP."
.
"In contrast, the Greek corporate sector has been running a net savings surplus throughout the entire period (and this of course is another big difference from Spain) (e de nós), with rising saving repeatedly exceeding investment. This notable increase in corporate saving has largely been the result of the strong profitability in the shipping and financial sectors, and it is this profitability which is now, suddenly, under threat in the current downturn.
.
Greek government debt, on the other hand is somewhere in the region of 90% of GDP, while the deficit is currently somewhere around 3% of GDP, but none of us (including the European statistics agency Eurostat or the EU Commission) can really be too sure of all this, since the goalposts seem to be being constantly moved in more than the football stadia down in Greece, and while it would be an exaggeration to say the data changes on a weekly basis, sometimes it seems we are not so far away from that point."
.
"And so it went on, until it simply couldn't go on any more, which is where we are now, and why Prime Minister Karamanlis cannot simply keep signing the cheques to buy social peace (Se houver um Medina Carreira grego há-de estar a repetir "I told you!) and satve off the downturn, although it is quite clear that this evident reality still hasn't been gotten across to Greece's two largest union federations who last week held a nationwide general strike to protest a set of government's remedial policies which, if they are anything, are already too little and too late."
.
"Given the difficulties Greek banks are having in raising finance in the global financial and capital markets, the ensuing tightening credit conditions are bound to lead to a further slowdown in private consumption." (wait and you will see)
.