Estratégia para as lojas do futuro

Ko Floor em Branding a Store faz um excelente exercício de 'reframing' sobre o futuro das lojas, dando pistas interessantes para as hipóteses de actuação e posicionamento futuro.

“The retail market will become increasingly between functional and emotional shopping. On one side of the market, retail brands will focus on functional and solution-driven shopping of (replenishement) commodities like food, household products, drugs and basic textiles.

On the other side retail brands will operate that sell expressive merchandise with strong emotional appeal, like fashion, domestic accessories and perfumes. Functional stores will mainly choose price, range and or convenience as their positioning attributes. In contrast, emotional stores will mainly position themselves on range and store experience. Retail brands in between, that do not make a clear choice between functional and emotional shopping, will disappear.”

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“There will not only be a clear dichotomy between functional and emotional retail brands: a strong polarization over price will also occur.

Price will continue to be an important driver in retail in the coming years. Consumers want to save money in some stores in order to be able to afford premium prices in other stores. This will cause a clear dichotomy in retail: low-price and high-value mass retail brands on one side of the market, and premium-priced niche retail brands on the other side.

Low-price and especially high-value mass brands will grow rapidly. After all, for most consumers it is not about the lowest price; it is about the highest value.”

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“In contrast to these low-price and high-value brands, premium niche brands will position themselves as deriving their appeal from their exclusivity and very high prices. The difference between these luxury premium retailers and the low-price/high-value retailers will become bigger than it is now. While low-price/high-value stores will emphasize their range and price, premium stores will pay attention to range, service and often to store experience as well.”

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“For years, the middle segment was the largest part of the market, but that is going to change. Just like with the functional and emotional retail brands, the middle segment will also disappear. Retail brands that are stuck in the middle will loose territory at a quick rate. These medium-priced retail brands will get squeezed between the low-price and high-value brands on one side of the market, and the premium brands on the other. To the consumer they do not have a clear offer.”

Isto das marcas não serem claras, não terem uma mensagem coerente e consistente não é treta, por exemplo, o artigo “Building Brands Without Mass Media” de Erich Joachimsthaler e David Aaker, publicado pela Harvard Business Review em Janeiro de 1997 ilustra um exemplo de como uma marca que quer ser tudo não é nada e anda à deriva:

“Consider Farggi. In 1993, a Spanish company called Lacrem launched Farggi as a premium ice cream in Spain--one year after the arrival of Haagen-Dazs. The Farggi name was chosen because it sounded Italian and hence would evoke images of quality ice cream among Europeans. It also drew on the reputation of the successful Farggi line of pastry outlets.

The problem was that the name had too many associations and messages. It had already been used for a standard-quality ice cream sold to food service establishments.

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The Farggi strategy, confusing at best, had too many elements: competing directly with Haagen-Dazs, exploiting ties to Spain, having an Italian-sounding brand, and cashing in on the popularity of American-style ice cream.

(The brand was positioned as being based on an authentic American recipe featuring the best-quality ingredients from Spain.)

Confusing messages were sent by Farggi’s method of distribution as well. It said "premium" by offering the ice cream in 500-milliliter cups for two people (originally pioneered by Haagen-Dazs in Europe) through Farggi-owned or franchised ice-cream parlors reminiscent of nearby Haagen-Dazs stores. At the same time, it said "cut-price" by distributing Farggi through hypermarket stores in low-rent neighborhoods and through concessions at regional soccer stadiums.

In short, the brand was everything and nothing. And we believe that, ultimately, its muddled identity confused consumers and put them off. Not surprisingly, today Farggi is trailing Haagen-Dazs in Spain by a significant margin in both sales and market share."

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Voltando a Ko Floor:

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“The differences between stores will become larger. Mid-priced stores and stores that do not make a clear choice between functional and emotional shopping will disappear. The disappearance of these mid-market stores will lead to a split of the retail market into four extremes: efficient routine, small pleasures, affordable dreams and luxurious experiences.”

Este esquema ajuda a enquadrar os desafios que as lojas têm pela frente, as escolhas que terão de fazer.
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E voltamos a temas já aqui abordados na óptica das empresas, temas como polarização dos mercados, stuck in the middle e fim do middle market.

Um conselho

Quem sou eu para dar conselhos.

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Pero todavia aconselho os decisores na Centromarca a lerem o primeiro capítulo do livro de Ko Floor "Branding a Store".

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O autor, usa o primeiro capítulo como um descritor do cenário de fundo onde operam as lojas, a distribuição, a manufactura, os consumidores e clientes. Assim, lista várias dezenas de factores que estão em ebulição, em trânsito, de onde vêm e para onde eventualmente vão.

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É interessante perceber como, mesmo que a distribuição fosse uma anjinha (que não é), é fácil e inevitável tirar partido da guerra das prateleiras para sacar benesses a um fabricante. É interessante constatar que algumas das críticas que os fabricantes fazem à distribuição não resultam de uma conspiração desta, resultam sim da lógica do modelo de negócio que esta adoptou.

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Por exemplo aqui "Power, But Few Profits - Hey Retailers, if You're so Powerful, Why Aren't You More Profitable?", pode ler-se:

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"The findings suggest that, although the retail sector in these markets is still structurally immature compared to the environment enjoyed by manufacturers, other strategic factors are needed to explain better why retailers have yet to translate power into performance. Retailers are largely stuck in an equilibrium favouring price-based competition, which the authors' findings indicate looks set to be long lasting.
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The analysis use the so-called "prisoner's dilemma" model in an attempt to understand why retailers do not act more on their built-in incentives to increase EP margins on behalf of their shareholders. Why do they instead tend to cut prices to inspire sales growth?
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First, retailers are competing in a world where, increasingly, differentiation is of secondary importance to price. (Moi ici: Uma oportunidade para os contrários agirem!)
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They note that leading North American and European players, (e.g. Wal-Mart, Tesco, Aldi) have chosen to focus on creating cultures that enable continuous performance improvements, mainly by being able to consistently lower prices.
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Second, they suggest that more research is also needed into "smart differentiation" (Moi ici; Cá está!) and pricing techniques that could enable retailers to discriminate price-wise between customers. They note that players in other low-margin sectors (e.g., airlines) have found ways to maximise profitable sales and loyalty through non-price differentiation. Strangely enough, retailers have not yet really done so.

The authors also propose that, for players that are not cost-advantaged, innovative use of customer technology may have the potential to create low-cost, non-price differentiation. In fact, the ultimate alternative for non-innovators might well be being forced into smaller niche markets by low-cost rivals."

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Bom mas já estou a desviar-me, voltando ao conselho, a leitura do primeiro capítulo permite colocar as peças no terreno, permite ler as curvas de nível do terreno, permite equacionar que correntes, que ventos e marés estão no tabuleiro do jogo para começar a desenhar alternativas hipotéticas de actuação. É que não há respostas na prateleira à espera de serem encontradas, têm de ser desenhadas. Se se aposta no marketing para clientes em detrimento do marketing para os distribuidores temos custos, e vice versa outra vez custos. Por isso, há sempre opções a fazer, ou se "aprisiona" o dono da prateleira com inovação, ou se compra a relação com ele, ou... faz-se o by-pass a ele e chega-se directamente ao consumidor.

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Enfim, pensamento estratégico puro e duro em vez de queixinhas e de colocar o locus de controlo no exterior.

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BTW, a inércia também está aqui presente e também faz estragos.

Não complicarás o que é básico (parte III)

Continuado daqui.

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Don Taylor e Jeanne Archer no seu livro "Up Against the Wal-Marts" apresentam 10 estratégias de sobrevivência para quem está a competir pelos mesmos clientes que as grandes superfícies.
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As nona e décima estratégias são "9. Embrace Change with a Positive Attitude" e "10. Pull the Trigger and Start the Battle."
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Acerca da atitude destaco:

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"It's your attitude that determines your attitude." Attitude, according to the dictionary, is "the state of mind with which we approach any given situation." We are in control of our own attitudes. Kmart doesn't control our attitudes, and Best Buy can't make us a bad day unless we let it. We are in charge of how we choose to compete. The most successful small competitors are keeping a positive attitude."

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Ainda acerca da atitude recordo o texto de Gladwell que citamos recentemente, a atitude é tudo.

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Acerca da predisposição para a acção:

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"Nearly all the successful small-business owners we know are "Ready, fire, aim" advocates. They prefer to pull the trigger rather than wait for the perfect shot. After the shot hits, they can see how far from the mark they are, adjust their aim, reload, and fire again. They may waste a little ammunition, but if they waste time squinting at the target, they'll miss some good opportunities."

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Não complicarás o que é básico. (parte II)

Continuado daqui.
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Don Taylor e Jeanne Archer no seu livro "Up Against the Wal-Marts" apresentam 10 estratégias de sobrevivência para quem está a competir pelos mesmos clientes que as grandes superfícies.
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As quinta e sexta estratégias são, também, velhas habitués deste blogue "5. Change the Value Perception" e "6. Position for Uniqueness."
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Acerca da percepção do valor destaco:
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““Competing on price alone is like putting your head in front of a shotgun… You’re just never going to win.” (Moi ici: It's the value, stupid... you cannot compete on price with Wal-Mart (B2C), or on cost with China (B2B))
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We agree with him, but that doesn’t mean that you can’t earn a profit by staying focused on what customers really want and need, and giving it to them. Hundreds of small independent owners just like you are finding ways to stay close on price, and making up the difference by providing a package of values that the giants can’t mach.” (Moi ici: recordando a história de David e Golias, Golias é mais pesado, mais lento, luta com as armas onde é forte e no terreno que melhor conhece e lhe dá vantagem)
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Acerca do posicionamento sublinho:
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“As we pointed out earlier in this chapter, positioning is the ability to match your uniqueness with the needs and wants of your target customers. This strategy is also known as “niche picking.”
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There are chinks in the armor of the giants. By positioning your business well, you can carve out a section of the market where you are able to deliver better than your competitors.
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To position effectively, you must be different, stand out, and be memorable. You aren’t Wal-Mart, so don’t try to be just like it. Study its success, learn from it, but position your business in those areas where the megastores can’t compete effectively with you. Look for areas where you can say “We’re better because…"”

Não complicarás o que é básico.

Don Taylor e Jeanne Archer no seu livro "Up Against the Wal-Marts" apresentam 10 estratégias de sobrevivência para quem está a competir pelos mesmos clientes que as grandes superfícies.
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A primeira estratégia é uma velha habitué deste blogue "Focus completely on satisfying the customers."
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Em vez de protestos e lobby ou pressão junto dos políticos e autarcas, seduzir os clientes.
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As linhas de orientação sugeridas pelos autores são:
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"Develop a True Customer Focus

• Get Acquainted with Your Customer (Moi ici: conhecê-lo muito bem)
• Identify a Target Customer (Moi ici: os clientes não são todos iguais. Diferentes clientes pretendem e valorizam diferentes atributos. Pretender servir todo o tipo de clientes, pretender servir o cliente médio... um fantasma estatístico vai dar problema)
• Know What Your Customer Wants to Buy (Get to know your customers and focus on their wants and needs. Then you can predict what they will want to buy in the future)
• Know Why Your Customer Wants to Buy
• Know When Your Customer Wants to Buy
• Know Where People Like to Shop"

Para quê e porquê complicar o que é tão simples e básico... quem são os clientes-alvo? O que os atrai? A que é que dão valor? Qual o seu retrato-robot? Esta é a base, o ponto de partida para a batota de desenhar a experiência que queremos que os clientes-alvo sintam em cada momento de verdade.

Agarrem-me senão eu mato-me!!! (parte IX)

Na sequência desta série, chamo a atenção para o texto de André Pires de Carvalho no Jornal de Negócios "O desafio colocado pelas marcas próprias da distribuição".
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"Dada a actual conjuntura e dinâmica do sector de distribuição em Portugal, as marcas próprias ainda têm um elevado potencial de crescimento. A sua penetração actual de 33% no nosso país compara-se a valores superiores a 40% na Inglaterra e na Alemanha, e a 50% na Suíça, sendo que o nível de sofisticação e atractividade do portfólio de marcas próprias que se encontra nas prateleiras dos supermercados portugueses ainda está longe daquela com que se depara o consumidor inglês que realiza as suas compras na Tesco ou na Sainsbury's, por exemplo."
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Agarrem-me senão eu mato-me!!! (parte VIII)

Continuado da parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI e parte VII.
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Para terminar esta série remato com alguns trechos retirados do último número da revista strategy+business, onde encontrei um artigo dos autores do livro "The Brand Bubble" com o sugestivo e apropriado título "The Trouble with Brands":
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"We found that most brands were not adding to the intangible value of their enterprises the way they used to. Instead, the majority of brands seemed to be stalled in the consumer marketplace.
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we discovered that, yes, there was an increasing expansion of the value that financial markets are attributing to brands, but this value growth is actually attributable to fewer and fewer brands.
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brand trustworthiness rankings had dropped more than 50 percent, perceptions of quality had fallen 24 percent, awareness of brands was down 20 percent, and esteem and regard for brands had fallen 12 percent. We saw thousands of well-respected brands that had, on average, lower scores on these metrics — results low enough that marketers would consider them indicative of “commoditized attitudinal patterns.”
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The first major problem with brands is excess capacity. Every marketer is up against this new reality: The world is overflowing with brands, and consumers are having a hard time assessing the differences among them.
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The second major problem is lack of creativity. ... consumers are continuously exposed to and able to share brilliant content. ... The result of this democratization of creativity is that it has raised the consumer’s “creativity quotient.” Consumers expect more big ideas from brands, and they expect to get them faster.
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The final major problem with brands is loss of trust. Our data shows that the amount of trust consumers place in a brand today is a ghost of what it was 10 years ago.
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Differentiation not only represents the brand’s point of difference, it also creates the meaning, margin, and competitive advantage in the brand. Differentiation is made up of the way consumers perceive three brand attributes: the offering, or the measure of the brand’s special characteristics in terms of products, services, and other content that the consumer experiences; uniqueness, the brand’s essence, positioning, and brand equity; and distinction, the reputation the brand has earned through existing communications and brand image created up to this point."
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Conclusão: não vale a pena chorar pelo fim de um tempo que não volta... faz lembrar as palavras que a mãe dirigiu ao seu filho, Boabdil, o último senhor mouro de Córdoba, quando abandonou a chorar a cidade, (algo do género, não chores como uma mulher aquilo que não foste capaz de defender como um homem). Em vez de chorar há que trabalhar. As private label são elas próprias marcas. As marcas que fazem parte da Centromarca concorrem com outras marcas, pois bem, olhem para as private labels como marcas também. Lembrem-se de que o negócio da distribuição não é vender produtos, é ganhar dinheiro. Assim, procurem ser diferentes, invistam no produto, criem diferenciação.

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ADENDA (11:55): "VE - Como é que se sensibiliza o consumidor para comprar marcas de fabricante?

AR - Eu acredito nas marcas e no valor das marcas. A diferenciação é uma e pode ser, em produtos como os nossos, de duas índoles: a organoléptica e a do ?apport? nutricional. É sempre possível, através desses dois parâmetros, criar diferenciação. Se quiser, temos ainda a qualidade percebida, embora seja uma coisa muito pouco perceptível. Depois há o aspecto emocional e a qualidade percebida. Além de que, hoje em dia, há também um cada vez maior ?screening? sobre quem está por trás das marcas." (extraído de "«A relação da Nestlé com a distribuição é tensa»")

Agarrem-me senão eu mato-me!!! (parte VII)

Continuado da parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V e parte VI.

Private Labels Are Brands

“Brands give us meaning in our role as consumers. Consumers want brands for the quality assurance and the emotional satisfaction they provide. … However, brands do not necessarily have to be manufacturer brands. They can also be store brands. And this is what has happened over the last decade as retailers became bigger and more sophisticated and their private labels became more ubiquitous and successful – providing the necessary mass for investments in branding activities.”

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(Moi ici: O que é a Quechua?) ("Decathlon, a 331-store sports equipment retailer that generates over $3.5 billion in sales. It has increased private label share from 33 percent to over 50 percent in a dozen years.”

(Moi ici: um dos meus clientes fez o mesmo trajecto que a Suleve, começou por ser uma empresa que produzia private label, e aproveitou a relação para aprender e investir na investigação e desenvolvimento. Hoje, tem a sua própria marca, cada vez mais forte, e é contratada pela grande distribuição já não pelo preço mais baixo mas pela inovação porque esta reconhece a capacidade inovadora da empresa. Uma outra empresa com que estou a trabalhar actualmente fez, no ano passado, a experiência de continuar a produzir private label e avançar com uma marca própria no calçado de caça. Está a ser um sucesso, porque têm um produto, enquanto que muitas marcas existentes vivem dos louros obtidos há muitos anos e entretanto amoleceram. )

Growing Consumer Acceptance of Private Labels

“In the past, private labels were primarily targeted to the poor. Today, while the poor still buy private labels more often than other consumers, one observes even wealthy consumers purchasing store brands. Increasingly, it is considered “smart” shopping to purchase private label products of (supposedly) comparable quality for a much lower price, rather than being “ripped off” by high-priced manufacturer brands.”

Private Labels Are Not a Recessionary Phenomenon

“Part of private label growth in a recession is permanent, caused by consumer learning. As consumers learn about the improved quality of private labels in recessions, a significant proportion of them remain loyal to private labels, even after the necessity to economize on expenditures is over. … Growing consumer acceptance of store brands results in decreased loyalty to well-known manufacturer brands.”

“Are brands dead? And, we argue, no, brands are not dead. But, as many brand manufacturers are discovering, some of the leading and best-loved consumer brands are now store brands.”

The Consumer Is the Winner

“An overlooked story in the private label revolution has been the impact on consumer welfare. The mega retailers have used their negotiating power to push brand manufacturers to reduce their prices. Rather than pocket all these negotiating gains, retailers have ploughed a large part of them into price cuts for the consumer. … the only way for manufacturer brands to compete against private labels is by launching innovative products and constantly improving quality.”

Moi ici: Definitivamente, o problema não é português. Enquanto preparava este postal recebi um e-mail a chamar-me a atenção para um livro que desconhecia “Bubble Brands” onde o tema é mais uma vez apresentado. Será que o choradinho é a melhor estratégia que a Centromarca pode seguir?

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Recortes retirados do livro "Private Label Strategy - How to Meet the Store Brand Challenge" de Nirmalya Kumar e Jan-Benedict Steenkamp.

Agarrem-me senão eu mato-me!!! (parte VI)

Continuado da parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV e parte V.
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Mais um conjunto de conselhos para as "grandes marcas" que compõem a Centromarca. Estes conselhos foram retirados do livro "How to succeed at retail: winning case studies and strategies for retailers and brands" de Keith Lincoln e Lars Thomassen.
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"Retailers are fantastic at selling things, but very few retailers are very good at developing things. That used to be the raison d’être of the brands. But with their obsession for volume they have often mixed up genuine innovations with the next flavour-extension or volume-variant package. Many FMCG companies have forgotten what originally made them big. When it comes to the retail arena, shoppers reach out for products, but they are often disappointed. Lots of companies have a brand these days, but few have a product. Or as Sir Martin Sorrel puts it: ‘We have become so obsessed with the sizzle that we have forgotten the steak’. The brand is never the solution. The product is. In their book Blue Ocean Strategy, authors W Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne researched the effect of creating groundbreaking, creative new products, rather than variations of already existing products. Their conclusion was that 86 per cent of new product launches were variants of existing products and accounted for 39 per cent of total profit. The remaining 14 per cent of new products were real new products and accounted for a massive 61 per cent of total profit. Real products mean real profit. (Moi ici: Gente com o locus de controlo no interior, em vez de procurar culpados no exterior, volta para o estirador e aguça o ouvido, em busca de algo que faça a diferença)
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The only way you can truly make your brand consistently innovative is to offer far more for more. When you look at your own products innovations, do you really meet this objective?
Or are you just producing line extensions and calling them innovations?
As the head of a major Scandinavian retailer recently said to us: ‘I’m sick of brands coming here and saying they’ve been in the business for a hundred years and know everything there is to know. Here’s our new line extension flavour variant. Give us more shelf space. I don’t want this. I want innovation.
I want food iPods.’
Yes, product development is difficult, but it is one of the most important ways for a brand to keep its position at retail level, and one of the only really consistent ways to avoid private label competition. Food brands in particular should be embracing the leading trends like health, food labelling and the environment and using them to distance themselves from the retailer brands. ...The future belongs to retailers and brands that proactively create wants – retailers and brands that are transforming boring consumption situations into highly motivating shopping experiences.
Shopping for your brand is as important as your brand. There is no doubt that brands need retailers and that retailers need brands, but retailers only need strong brands (as brands need strong retailers) – brands that understand the new retail world; brands that understand that the product is key; that they have to build their brands, not only from mass media, but also from the shelf. Innovation is and always has been the key.
You need to make this innovation work for you as a cooperative tool with retailers.
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The shelf is at the beginning of everything and every single shelf represents an arena that has a unique set of opportunities and challenges that define our strategic perspectives and resulting actions.
Understanding our shelf – key points to be addressed
• Define your shelves – your arenas.
• Define the way those shelves are structured.
• Define the main shelf challenges you face.
• Identify the means to meet those challenges.
• Evaluate and optimize your selection of the shelves you want to be on.
• Decide whether you’re fighting on the right shelves today.
• Start exploring alternative shelf opportunities, from the internet to concept stores.
• Consider creating your own unique shelves.
• Consider reinventing the shelves you’re already on.
• Consider if there are any possibilities for co-opetition that will maximize shelf opportunities."
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O leitor José Silva escreveu-me ontem defendendo que o próprio distribuidor pode vir a ter os dias contados com o advento da internet.
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"Você já reparou quão eficiente é o modelo em que há uma grande superfície entre o produtor e o consumidor?

Há custos com a logistica, com a marca, com os funcionários, custos de deslocação do cliente à grande superficie. Tudo isto para se apresentar os produtos nas prateleiras para os consumidores poderem escolher, pagar e levar para as prateleiras lá de casa.

Tudo parece obvio até 1995. Com a Internet não devia haver necessidade de um intermediário entre o produtor e consumidor. Não é dificil conceptualizar um mundo onde não existem retalhistas e em que cada produtor distribui os seus produtos em casa dos seus clientes com maior benefício para ambos.

Tudo isto para dizer o quê ? Não acredito que o poder dos retalhistas dure muitos mais anos."
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Não há rendas vitalícias, nem para as marcas, nem para a distribuição. Quem melhor perceber e servir as necessidades e expectativas do consumidor do futuro terá o seu benefício... sempre à condição. Não adianta é fazer o choradinho! O equilíbrio pontuado da parte V pode servir para suportar que actualmente já estão a fermentar as forças que mudarão o panorama.

Agarrem-me senão eu mato-me!!! (parte V)

Continuado da parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.
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Interrompo aqui, momentaneamente, a análise dos livros da parte III, para apresentar uma teoria que tenta explicar a evolução das empresas:
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"Tushman e Romanelli (TUSHMAN, M. L., ROMANELLI, E. Organizational Evolution: A Metamorphosis Model of Convergence and Reorientation. In: STAW, B. M., CUMMINGS, L. L. (Eds.). Research in Organizational Behavior. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985.) desenvolveram o modelo do equilíbrio pontuado para descrever a mudança das organizações ao longo do tempo (com base na abordagem inicial de Niles Eldredge e Stephen Jay Gould no campo da paleobiologia).
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A evolução das organizações é descrita como um encadeamento de períodos de mudança incremental, pontuados por períodos de mudança descontínua.
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Assim, as organizações progridem através de períodos convergentes pontuados por reorientações que determinam limites para os tempos convergentes.
Segundo o modelo, o estágio de convergência consiste num longo período de tempo onde ocorrem mudanças incrementais e pequenas adaptações. Reorientações são períodos relativamente curtos de mudanças revolucionárias.
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Nos períodos de convergência os tipos de mudança presentes são: sintonia fina (fine-tuning) das estratégias vigentes e ajustes incrementais ao ambiente. Isto envolve mudanças graduais que são fáceis de implementar e dão tempo para que a organização se concentre na busca da eficácia. Quando as organizações se tornam bem sucedidas, aumentam as forças inerciais internas e o padrão se reforça. Isto é, quanto maior, quanto mais longo, o período de convergência, maior o momentum de conformidade com o status quo.
Longos períodos de convergência ocorrem quando a estratégia é apropriada às condições externas e internas da organização. Se ela enfrenta uma forte ameaça, tal como uma grande alteração no ambiente e uma estratégia inapropriada, as forças da inércia agem para prevenir que se adoptem novas mudanças. Quanto maior o período de convergência (período de sucesso), maior o período entre a mudança ambiental e a divergência (reorientação) na organização. (Quando oiço o choradinho de quem pede ao papá Estado que o proteja da mudança não posso deixar de pensar nestas forças internas da inércia que se habituaram a um status-quo que os beneficiava e que entretanto se desintegrou.)
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Períodos de reorientações são caracterizados por mudanças revolucionárias que tomam a forma de trocas simultâneas e definidas nas dimensões estratégicas. Tipicamente, estas mudanças ocorrem não somente na estratégia, mas também na estrutura, nas pessoas e nos processos, tanto que a organização é remoldada. (Quanto mais tempo e recursos se investir no choradinho, mais tempo se adiará a inevitável transformação para triunfar no novo ecossistema.)
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Este tipo de mudança é utilizado em resposta a descontinuidades no ambiente, tal como a regulamentação ou o aumento das pressões competitivas. Frequentemente, as forças de inércia agem para evitar que novas estratégias sejam implementadas, fazendo com que a estratégia actual provoque uma inexorável erosão do desempenho. (Cá está!!!!) Neste momento, os períodos de reorientação são activados. A figura apresenta o modelo do equilíbrio pontuado da evolução das organizações segundo Tushman e Romanelli (1985).(1) Primeiro, uma mudança ambiental ocorre. Em resposta a esta mudança, a organização age experimentalmente porque a estabilidade e a certeza são diminuídas por aquela mudança. Isto conduz para um período de fomento para uma mudança revolucionária. Ao mesmo tempo, forças de inércia são construídas para manter o status quo.
(2) Contudo, durante este tempo, as forças da mudança começam a ser construídas e desencadeiam uma mudança revolucionária.
(3) Com isto, uma nova estratégia dominante surge com o advento de um novo período de convergência. Ajustes incrementais e de sintonia fina caracterizam a mudança na estratégia, neste período de tempo.
(4)Como a estabilidade é restaurada, as forças da inércia começam a agir novamente, determinando o estágio para a próxima mudança."
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Adaptado do artigo "O Processo de Adaptação Estratégica Segundo o Modelo de Tushman e Romanelli: Um Estudo de Caso no Setor de Edificações" de Carlos Rossetto e Adriana Rossetto.

Agarrem-me senão eu mato-me (parte IV)

Continuado da parte II e da parte III.

Vou começar a comparar o que pensa a Centromarca com o que se escreve no segundo livro da lista da parte III, um livro muito, muito interessante que se lê de uma penada, de tão bem escrito e suportado em números: (Retailization – Brand Survival in the Age of Retail Power; de Lars Thomassen, Keith Lincoln e Anthony Aconis).

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A capa chama, grita, logo à partida para a situação crítica das marcas.

Eis os recortes que saliento.

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Do prefácio: "Imagine a mountain of brands, a very big mountain of brands: a mountain so heavy and so dense, everything in it has been squeezed. It has been squeezed physically to a point where the individual brands have lost their form and identity. And right in the middle of this heap is your brand.
This is the reality for the majority of brands today. They are part of that squeezed mountain. They are fighting for their very survival. They are fighting for their identity. They are fighting for their sales.
Managing a brand these days is an increasingly difficult job and no longer glamorous. It is a job that is under more and more strain, a job that is about survival – squeezed by everyone:

squeezed by retailers;
squeezed by shoppers;
squeezed by private label;
squeezed by media.

The first of these squeezes is the retailer. We face a new era that will not go away – a new era called ‘the era of retail power’. When the largest retailer in the world is now several hundred times larger than an individual brand it is clear where the power of the business world is residing. When only a few retailers control 75 per cent of an individual market and the biggest brands control less than 1 per cent, it is clear where the real power lies. When a few buyers at a few major retailers determine total effective consumer choice, it is clear where the real power lies. We used to live in a world where brand power was all, but slowly and inexorably brand power is being replaced by retail power." (Moi ici: a Centromarca acha que a concentração no mercado português é grande? E quando a comparamos com a que se verifica noutros países?)
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"The mountain here is the shelf: a shelf in a supermarket, a shelf in a concept store or a shelf on the internet. Once the shelf was the place we proudly displayed our brands. Now it’s the place we fight to stay on. Now it’s the place we can be evicted from on the smallest whim."

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Do primeiro capítulo, chamo a atenção para a dimensão da concentração:

"According to Fortune magazine (Boyle, 2003), the largest discount retailers are responsible for 80 per cent of the daily groceries sales in the United States – 10 years ago it was only 30 per cent.
In the United States, retail is the second largest industry in terms of both establishments and number of employees, generating approximately $3.8 trillion in sales (About, 2005).
In the United Kingdom, four chains have 75 per cent of the grocery market (Economist, 2005a) and nearly one pound in every eight is spent on shopping at Tesco (Couch, 2005).
In Scandinavia the major retailers have more than 80 per cent of the market – a staggering 91 per cent of the Finnish market is dominated by three retailers (www.kesko.fi; www.s-kanava; www.tradeka.fi; www.elanto.fi).
Aldi, Germany’s big discount retailer and one of the strongest retail brands in Europe, has a market share of the German discount market of approximately 50 per cent (Ramos, 2004).
Even in China the retail market is already dominated by four major retailers (Ørskov, 2004).

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With these sorts of shares it is pretty clear who is in charge As one grocery retailer CEO told us, ‘Whoever owns the shelf, owns the market.’ The consequences of the above numbers are self-evident. Not only are retailers increasingly taking charge of the brands’ customers, they are also starting to own the key points of contact with them. They often know their customers much better than any individual brand. They increasingly own and shape customers’ consumption patterns, influencing not only how they buy brands but also which brands to buy. Retailers increasingly dictate the prices charged and are themselves setting the terms for their relationships with each individual brand. This is much to the frustration of many brand owners, which to a large extent find themselves with no other option than to do exactly what the retailers tell them to do. No questions asked. The only thing on their mind is simply trying to maintain distribution.
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There was a clear message to us from the retailers – don’t expect to live on high fat margins anymore! You need to provide constant price value to our customer." (Moi ici: Ter uma "grande" marca, reconhecida, com tradição, não é um título nobiliárquico. Tem de se prestar contas todos os dias perante os juízes, os compradores.)

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Na introdução do capítulo 7:

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"There is no point in fighting the retailer. Instead you should focus on creating proprietary distribution, reinventing your arena or coopetition." (Moi ici: dá para perceber a posição da Centromarca?)
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Um dos subtítulos do capítulo 10 é precioso "Everybody has a brand, few have a product."
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"When it comes down to the retail arena, shoppers reach out for products. Make sure that you can offer one for them to reach out for; make sure they reach out for yours. You see, everybody these days has a brand, but very few have a product. The truth is that behind every great brand there is an even greater product. Without that great product there is no great brand. Always, always remember that there is no such thing as a power brand, only products that sell a lot." (Moi ici: Como os sublinhadores que às vezes os Lidl tem á venda, literalmente não têm marca, mas são os melhores que encontro como produto)
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"This does not mean that brands are void and irrelevant, but it does mean that the future is not brand-driven in the way we thought it would be. It is shopping-driven and therefore product-driven, and that has huge implications for the way we create new products and new brands. No longer can we rely on image alone to guarantee preference and loyalty. No longer can we rely on image alone to deliver the selection of the brand at the purchase point. No longer can we rely on image alone to drive shoppers towards our products. Only the product can deliver these things. Our product must deliver on every front. It is far too easy for shoppers these days to know the reality about our products and the truth of their claims. Sometimes they are better informed than the companies who deliver the brands! You have to remember that the brand is merely a vehicle for communication; it is not the product or an excuse for a bad product. Great retail presence works when you have great products, it is as simple as that. All the advertising, listing fees, marketing and relationships in the world mean nothing, if your product sucks. The product is the ultimate closer."
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"If you are not able to create continued differentiation and constant newness you risk being replaced by private label brands. You risk death by commoditization. It is one thing to get back into a category where you were previously outperformed in the competitive context, but it is a completely different thing to get back into a category where the retailers are perfectly able to take care of the shelf space themselves."
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Do capítulo 14 retiro, para finalizar:
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"Once prestigious key partners to retailers, brands have often been relegated to simple suppliers. Brands have lost respect, fallen in status and no longer have the power they once had, the power they took for granted for so long. Much of this they have brought upon themselves. Inertia, apathy, formulaic thinking and an inability to move forward with consumer change have left most brands standing in an obsolete yesteryear. It is time to regain that lost power."
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Qual o propósito da intervenção da Centromarca?
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São palavras duras mas que apontam para a única forma de dar a volta por cima, e não é através das queixas e do choradinho. É arregaçando as mangas e lutando pela conquista da preferência do comprador final.
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Continua.