Muito mais do que análise, o poder da imaginação

"Strategic work is interesting and difficult precisely because it is so demanding of our methodologies for constructing and applying knowledge. It dictates a move from thinking about method as no more than rigorous analysis, the process of fact-gathering, data reduction, and knowledge discovery, towards embracing the different methods of knowledge construction that have non-rigorous imaginative and creative dimensions. This goes beyond the bounds of analysis based on “causal theory” or “model,” the conventional idea into which so many of us have been trained—and gets into human creativity as the unpredictable process of  adding value to the world, precisely because the collision of identity, intention, and context is not fully determined, is changeable, and concedes our ideas are capable of changing the world. It goes beyond thinking of the reality we inhabit as fixed, unchangeable, and so knowable, the universe of physics as non-physicists understand it (real physics is much more complicated). The constructive aspects of  strategic work go beyond what some might call the Newtonian mode of thought, the causal or billiard-ball model of everything that logical analysis presumes.
Strategic work innovates, creating something new that did not exist before, a new fabric perhaps, or an opera or, most importantly, new economic value. New value is not simply the result of better allocation of our scarce resources, moving them to where their value is higher, but results from a transformative act of human imagination,"

Trecho retirado de "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender.

"There are no silver bullets"

Como eu aprecio esta abordagem de Spender:

"There are no silver bullets, simple explanations, formulae, or if–then causal models, no acceptance that things are merely what they seem to be. The world, of course, is not a simple place, we have to work hard to engage it with our minds, and reduce its complexity to the point we can think logically about it and commit to action with some confidence. Actually the philosophizing is not complicated, it is an everyday practice. [Moi ici: Como não recordar o texto do Eclesiastes] Doubt is key - we must remain open to the possibility that things are not what they seem, that we have been misinformed, that things will not turn out as expected, that we have to act afresh to keep things headed in the right direction. Behind this is the recognition that the possibility of profit hinges entirely on the interplay of doubt and surprise.
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Value, profit, and growth are the imagination’s artifacts as it engages a framed unknown; they are not the product of rational analysis. Neither are they the product of resources, designs, or logical mechanisms that transform resources into products and services.
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Life (and managing) is a situation of persistent doubt and uncertainty—hence the acronym FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt). [Moi ici: Quantos  "funcionários" perceberão o alcance desta afirmação?] Fear may seem excessive when it comes to business affairs, but if I was wholly invested in a single enterprise I might get the jitters too. U and D are essential states of mind for any strategist with something at stake, with skin in the game."

"agarrar o touro pelos cornos"

Ao ler "Lean People da Segurança e Saúde no Trabalho", de Ana Paula Caldeira e, publicado na revista "Segurança Comportamental" do 1º semestre de 2014, fiquei a pensar muito seriamente neste trecho:

"Foi Kiichiro Toyoda que desenvolveu o sistema Just-In-Time (JIT) ou stock zero, um sistema de produção "puxada" pelo cliente, que só produzia aquilo que o mercado encomendava dado que não dispunha de materiais e dinheiro para acumular stock. Foi a partir deste sistema também designado de "sistema de produção dos pobres", que surgiu o conceito dos japoneses de eliminar qualquer tipo de desperdício."

Como sublinhei no que li em Spender:

"it is not the firm’s resources that matter; rather it is the management team’s knowledge about how to use them - and this knowledge is the source of firm’s idiosyncrasy, profit, and growth."

E como não recordar o locus de controlo no interior...
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Em vez de esperar um milagre vindo do exterior, agarrar o touro pelos cornos e construir um novo futuro.

Shift happens! (parte IX)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V, parte VI, parte VII e parte VIII.

A parte I desta série começou com a revolta perante os que continuam a achar que um estado, um governo, um académico pode indicar o caminho para os empreendedores investirem sem risco, só porque detêm um suposto conhecimento superior. Spender, mais uma vez, volta ao ataque:

"it presumes the facts are (a) knowable, (b) relevant, and (c) available. Yet when relevant facts are available, the added value gets competed away unless the process is structured as both rent-yielding and sustained by non-economic forces. In which event the added value is perhaps more due to those political, cultural, or institutional forces rather than to economic ones; political shenanigans often lead to someone’s profit, which is why lobbying is so prevalent. But this book is about the private sector, the market economy, and the economic value that springs from (p) occupying a unique knowledge absence and (q) demarcating, operationalizing, and “owning” it via the exercise of entrepreneurial judgment.
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it is not the firm’s resources that matter; rather it is the management team’s knowledge about how to use them—and this knowledge is the source of firm’s idiosyncrasy, [Moi ici: Recordar o marcador "distribuição de produtividades" e a explicação para o facto de, num mesmo país, haver mais variabilidade no rendimento intra-sectorial do que no rendimento inter-sectorial] profit, and growth. My core proposition is that the firm is a unique human artifact, a particular act of the entrepreneurial imagination, partially reflecting the entrepreneur’s cognitive sense of the opportunity but ultimately her/his deeply practical and tacit knowledge, so resistant to rigorous analysis but able to occupy the instant of practice."

Trechos retirados de "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender.

Shift happens! (parte VII)

Parte I, parte II, parte III, parte IV, parte V e parte VI.
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Decididamente, o livro "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender é muito bom!!!

"A BM [business model] is not a rigorous or coherent theory of the firm for it must frame and engage uncertainties if it is to lead to the possibility of adding value.
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Thus a BM is never determined by outside circumstance, only by the strategic work of its construction. Nor is it detachable from its context; to the contrary it is an ever-evolving pattern of shaped interaction between the human beings who share and comprise the context. [Moi ici: Onde é que o Estado-Planeador tem em conta esta interacção idiossincrática?] It is typically incomprehensible to those who have not inhabited its context, time, and history.
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Nor is it fully expressible. It is organic, tacit, and vitalized, a dynamic form of knowing that is forever a “work in progress” as it responds to the strategist’s unfolding experience of applying the BM in its shifting context. But, equally, it is not organic in the strict biological sense of having a form of vitality that is independent of the human elements that, interacting through the BM, bring it to life. Its only vitality is that of the human beings involved, their practice of projecting their imagination into the context as intentional value-adding practice.
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The uncertainties in the socio-economy open up an economic space for the firm’s value-adding processes. Another way to put this is that firms exist only when their markets (shorthand for “the broader socio-economy”) “fail” to be fully determined because, perhaps, full information is not fully available to all economic actors. [Moi ici: Onde é que o Estado-Planeador tem em conta estas incertezas?] Real markets are not fully prescriptive, and they cannot determine the nature of the firm. There are other “causes” or determinants. Typically the firm has features and aspects imprinted on it by the imagination of its creators."

Shift happens! (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

"As economists probe deeper into profit they conclude that, in the long run, given perfect markets, all economic profits get competed away, so profits only arise in the short/medium term and/or in imperfect markets. In which case the profit reflects a return grounded in some market inefficiency or monopoly that might arise through government action, information asymmetries, or innovation.
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pure profit could only arise from engaging uncertainty with imaginative practice, leading to what some call the “uncertainty theory of profit.” [Moi ici: Comparar este parágrafo com a essência na base do texto do Público referido na Parte I desta série]
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Perfect markets that have equilibrated allow no uncertainty—or profit. Innovations engage and´resolve previous uncertainties—in which event innovations generate pure profit.
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The “uncertainty theory of profit” is pretty vacuous if the relevant uncertainty cannot be defined. Strategizing in pursuit of profit therefore begins with analyzing the relevant uncertainties and goes on to analyzing engaging them, thereby going beyond merely asserting, as Knight does, uncertainty’s central place in profit-making. Profit arises from the creative ways strategists engage selected uncertainties and manage the resulting practice.
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uncertainties arise only from the different ways in which we humans know. Neither firms nor situations are uncertain, the term is a reflection of how people feel about what they know." [Moi ici: Comparar este parágrafo com a essência na base do texto do Público referido na Parte I desta série e com a frase feita de que o governo deve definir uma estratégia para o país. Recordar os marcadores "Grande Planeador" e "Grande Geometra"]

Há dias o amigo Paulo Peres, no Twitter, escreveu, citando Max De Pree:

"A primeira responsabilidade de um líder é definir a realidade. A última é dizer obrigado." 

Depois, concordamos que a frase ficaria melhor com:

"A primeira responsabilidade de um líder é definir uma realidade. A última é dizer obrigado."

Precisamente por esta última citação: "Neither firms nor situations are uncertain, the term is a reflection of how people feel about what they know"
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Trechos retirados de "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender.

Shift happens! (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.
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Em "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender encontro esta figura:

A figura lista 4 paradigmas acerca de como se aborda a estratégia. A abordagem escolhida pelos autores do texto do Público, referido na parte I desta série, e tão disseminada na nossa sociedade, é o paradigma A.
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Segundo o paradigma A, o foco é a empresa e a realidade é objectiva.

"The Paradigm A implication is that the strategist must construct a logical theory of how to achieve the goal chosen—and articulate it into a plan. It assumes reasonable people will follow along willy-nilly because of what has been scientifically proven.
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Ultimately a well-constructed plan is a theory about how selected resources and their relationships must lead to the goal sought. The emphasis is on completeness and logicality and there is no distinction between theory/plan and strategy."

Por isso, ouve-se, tantas e tantas vezes a afirmação, para mim "infantil":

"É preciso que o governo defina uma estratégia para o país!"

Como se a realidade fosse objectiva e igual para todos...
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O paradigma B evolui um pouco:

"Paradigm B is more realistic because it seems to bring “real people” back in.
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presumes flexible and imaginative people are needed to provide creative inputs—for understanding is invariably incomplete and may not be rigorously logical. But it does not identify them or make them central to the analysis. OK, we discover our data is incorrect and our predictions do not turn out as expected. Likewise we are often ignorant of some of the necessary facts about the entities and their relationships until after we have acted. We get surprised. Then we muddle through.
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Paradigm B does not hang on rigorous plans; just plans that are as-good-as-practicably-possible. It allows gaps, to be addressed later by competent and imaginative people. Many things will not be taken into consideration and the hope is that it will all work out well in the end. It is muddling through. Successful business people are those who make “good calls” in such situations, successfully judging which facts to take into account and which to ignore, and who guess well when there are no facts to be found."

A mudança do paradigma A para o paradigma B é pressionada pela falta de conhecimento objectivo completo. A realidade é tramada! O que é verdade hoje, amanhã é mentira! O que tomamos por Juno, afinal não passava de uma nuvem. As lacunas no conhecimento têm de ser preenchidas pelo julgamento do estratega com base na sua experiência. Assim, em vez do plano perfeito, aspira-se ao plano tão bom quanto possível.
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Quanto ao paradigma C:

"Paradigm C moves away from the scientific methods as normally defined. It does not assume our socioeconomic world is comprised of objective facts about things and logical causal relations between them. Rather the strategist’s universe consists of ideas that lead people to do things, especially to produce and consume.
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In Paradigm C the strategy’s core is a production/consumption idea, the entrepreneur’s idea.
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In Paradigm C tangible things, especially “resources,” matter strategically because they “carry” or “fasten” our expectations and desires.
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Paradigms C and B both spin on strategic judgment. But in Paradigm C the judgment needed is not about what is missing from what is known or knowable about a real situation
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Judgment is no longer subordinated to the logical plan. Rather the reverse. The strategy hinges on what people might be persuaded to think, how their expectations might be changed, and so induced to behave in a new way imagined by the entrepreneur."

E chegamos ao paradigma D:

"This is like Paradigm C in that it presumes the strategist’s world is made up of malleable people with changeable expectations rather than an unchangeable reality. But it goes beyond Paradigm C towards the logical limit that embraces the changeability of the entrepreneur her/himself in addition to the changeability of her/his world. Paradigms A, B, and C presume a stable entrepreneur with a chosen goal. In Paradigm A this goal drives the plan; in Paradigm B the plan + some judgments. In Paradigm C it is translated into an apparatus to persuade some other people to behave in a way that subordinates them to the entrepreneur’s goal." 

O que o paradigma A não prevê, não contempla é a surpresa, seja ela positiva ou negativa.

"Strategic work precipitates activity that goes beyond the possibilities theorized. Seeking surprise is part of the way we are, our restlessness and desire to inquire into and change (improve) the human condition. We are strategic animals and strive to learn more."

Shift happens!

No Público pode ler-se:

"Estado deve desenvolver uma acção empenhada na detecção e divulgação de mercados potencialmente interessantes e de vantagens comparativas dos recursos portugueses em relação a previsíveis concorrentes."

Lembrei-me logo do Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões.
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Em "O regresso ao Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões":

"The takeaway is to stop thinking about whether the industry you are in is "good" or "bad" — recognizing that as the wrong question — and to focus instead on what you can do to win where you are." 

Em "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte II)":

"A filosofia por trás do caso do Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões está relacionada com a proposta de António Vitorino no Prós e Contras de ontem: o Estado é que sabe quais os sectores de futuro em que se deve apostar." 

Em "Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte III)":

"The magnitude of within-sector heterogeneity implies that idiosyncratic factors dominate the determination of which plants create and destroy jobs, and which plants achieve rapid productivity growth or suffer productivity declines."

Lembrei-me logo de um vídeo que vi no sábado passado, em que Gary Hamel ao minuto 25 afirma que a melhor alternativa para os líderes é experimentarem, testarem (o nosso, fuçarem) e aprenderem com os erros, para melhorarem a abordagem seguinte:

"Organizations loose their relevance when there is more experimentation outside than inside"

E, por fim, lembrei-me logo do que comecei a ler em "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender:

"Strategy’s meanings are always “situated” reflections of the knowledge absences the strategist chooses to grapple with in the pursuit of profit. “What are we going to do now?” is the key question, and time matters. In our capitalist system these choices are incredibly varied, and strategic work is a corollary of this freedom of choice.
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So this chapter moves towards a notion of strategic work as the practice of managerial judgment, choice, and persuasion rather than observation, computation, and instruction...
Any definition that ignores the particularities and difficulties of the context in which the goal is pursued is useless “one-handed clapping.” Because particulars are crucial to the nature of strategic work, no general definition can work. Second, not every distinction helps. Sometimes market segmentation will matter, sometimes not. Likewise technological evolution will sometimes matter and sometimes not. Strategic work begins with finding the specific distinctions that are appropriate to help us wrap our arms around the particular collision of intention, context, and difficulty that is the firm.
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Merely being in a context does not mean you need a strategy; you may have no intention of changing your situation. Intention is not simply about reaching for a goal, it is also about purposively or intendedly moving away from your current position and towards another particular situation. Thus intention and strategy are bound up with the specific changes we want to make in specific situations. The essence of the managers’ strategic work lies in the difficulties that stand in the way of satisfying their desire to make these changes. Paradoxically we have to know who we are—strategically speaking—before we can delineate the context of our goal seeking. Socrates was absolutely right on this—know thyself! Strategy is as much about choosing who we are as about choosing a goal or the context in which to pursue it. Again, strategy lies at the intersection of the actor’s chosen identity, her/his intention, and the difficulties s/he faces in a specific context."

Quem define o que é um mercado potencialmente interessante? Quem define quais são as vantagens comparativas dos recursos portugueses?
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Vamos escolher um burocrata para tomar essas decisões?
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Não! Que horror"
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Vamos escolher um académico? Recordar Daniel Bessa e o calçado.
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Vamos escolher um jornalista? Recordar André Macedo e o calçado e o têxtil.
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Vamos escolher um empresário? Recordar Paulo Vaz da ATP e o têxtil.
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Vamos escolher um governante? Recordar Pinho e a Qimonda.
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Vamos escolher um político? Recordar ...
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Todos falharam as previsões! São burros? Não! A realidade é que está em permanente dança e o que é verdade hoje amanhã é mentira. A única coisa que interessa em economia é o trecho de poesia que li em Setembro de 2004 na revista HBR:

"Life is the most resilient thing on the planet. I has survived meteor showers, seismic upheavals, and radical climate shifts. And yet it does not plan, it does not forecast, and, except when manifested in human beings, it possesses no foresight. So what is the essential thing that life teaches us about resilience?
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Just this: Variety matters. Genetic variety, within and across species, is nature's insurance policy against the unexpected. A high degree of biological diversity ensures that no matter what particular future unfolds, there will be at least some organisms that are well-suited to the new circumstances."

Como se diz em inglês, "Shift happens!" e só a diversidade de opiniões e apostas cria a antifragilidade do todo e, mesmo as escolhas que parecem absurdas para uns, podem ser a solução para outros.
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E volto ao texto do Público:

"Contudo, produzir e vender para o exterior em quantidades significativas, exige um forte empurrão por parte do poder político, particularmente do Ministério da Agricultura." 

Luxleaks em versão portuguesa?
E basta produzir? E conhecer os canais de distribuição? Seremos competitivos, nestas quantidades significativas, com as entregas aéreas diárias do Quénia? E o que fazer depois do final da Primavera até ao Inverno seguinte? Por que é que quem já está no terreno e com sucesso, não segue essa via?

Acerca da estratégia

Comecei a ler "Business Strategy - Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise" de  J.-C. Spender.
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O primeiro capítulo, "Introduction to Strategic Work, Language, and Value", é muito bom. Vê-se logo que é escrito por um praticante, só um praticante pode escrever assim:

"strategic work and how it goes well beyond rational decision-making and goal-oriented planning.
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So strategic work is less computable, more difficult, and more humanely dimensioned than rational decision-making - one of the reasons strategy professors, researchers, and students are so tempted to retreat into abstractions, away from the factual and moral complexities of day-to-day business. They keep the lived world at arm’s length, presuming it is computable and rationally structured according to their theories. The real world that managers inhabit is not a classroom - and therein lies what is so complex and difficult about strategic work. Theory is logical, it powers rational decision-making and while theory is often relevant to evaluating action it is never sufficient to managers’ practical needs. Strategic work, being in the lived world, reaches beyond computation and engages the messy and unavoidably compromising business of living."