"It begins when the customer becomes aware of the possibility to evolve"

"a JTBD describes how a customer changes or wishes to change. With this in mind, we define a JTBD as follows:
A Job to be Done is the process a consumer goes through whenever she evolves herself through searching for, buying, and using a product.
It begins when the customer becomes aware of the possibility to evolve.
It continues as along as the desired progress is sought.
It ends when the consumer realizes new capabilities and behaves differently, or abandons the idea of evolving.
...
A consumer goes along his life as he’s come to know it. Then things change. He is presented with an opportunity for self-betterment — that is, make changes so he can grow. When or if he finds a product that helps him realize that growth opportunity, he can evolve to that better version of himself he had imagined."

Trechos retirados de "What is Customer Jobs? What is a Job to be Done (JTBD)?"

Uma coisa é uma coisa, outra coisa é outra coisa (parte V)

Parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

"That mismatch has engendered a kind of schizophrenia in the way computer companies view their supply chains. They cling to measures of physical efficiency such as plant capacity utilization and inventory turns because those measures are familiar from their mainframe days. Yet the marketplace keeps pulling them toward measures of responsiveness such as product availability.
.
There is a kind of schizophrenia in the way computer companies view their supply chains.
.
How does a company in the upper right-hand cell overcome its schizophrenia? Either by moving to the left on the matrix and making its products functional or by moving down the matrix and making its supply chain responsive. The correct direction depends on whether the product is sufficiently innovative to generate enough additional profit to cover the cost of making the supply chain responsive.
.
A sure sign that a company needs to move to the left is if it has a product line characterized by frequent introductions of new offerings, great variety, and low profit margins. Toothpaste is a good example. A few years ago, I was to give a presentation to a food industry group. I decided that a good way to demonstrate the dysfunctional level of variety that exists in many grocery categories would be to buy one of each type of toothpaste made by a particular manufacturer and present the collection to my audience. When I went to my local supermarket to buy my samples, I found that 28 varieties were available. A few months later, when I mentioned this discovery to a senior vice president of a competing manufacturer, he acknowledged that his company also had 28 types of toothpaste—one to match each of the rival’s offerings.
.
Does the world need 28 kinds of toothpaste from each manufacturer? Procter & Gamble, which has been simplifying many of its product lines and pricing, is coming to the conclusion that the answer is no. Toothpaste is a product category in which a move to the left—from innovative to functional—makes sense.[Moi ici: Um artigo escrito em 1997. Recordar a evolução para Mongo, cada vez mais gente fora da caixa. E para certas tribos isto é fundamental e não pactuam com a funcionalidade pura e simples]
.
In other cases when a company has an unresponsive supply chain for innovative products, the right solution is to make some of the products functional and to create a responsive supply chain for the remaining innovative products."

Seru (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

"The typical seru implementation process can be summarized as follows:
1. As customer demands fluctuate, assembly line inefficiencies become apparent and a strategic choice to emphasize responsiveness is made.
2. Assembly lines are dismantled and replaced with divisional seru systems through resource collocation and removal/replacement, cross-training, and autonomy.
3. Expensive dedicated equipment is replaced by inexpensive general-purpose equipment that can be duplicated and redeployed as needed by serus.
4. As cross-training progresses, divisional serus evolve into rotating serus and yatais.
5. As the seru system matures, cell configurability is developed so that exactly the cells required to meet demand can be rapidly formed, then dismantled once demand is met.
...
In the years leading up to 1992, production of most high- volume, low-value-added Japanese products was being shifted to low-cost countries because of the Japanese yen's sharp rise. Sony's products did not lend themselves to such offshoring, however, because they were characterized by high variety, low volume, and high value added, with frequent design updates and generational changes. Sony first attempted to respond to its high demand volatility by applying the Toyota Production System mixed-product method to its conveyor lines, but the demand volatility for Sony products substantially exceeded that of Toyota. Rapid changes in product technologies and configurations called for lines to be reconfigurable, whereas the Toyota Production System emphasized investments in expensive, synchronized, integrated production lines. Thus, Sony chose to design its production system to respond to demand volatility, rather than eliminate it as occurs under the Toyota Production System.
...
Conveyers were replaced by workbenches, and simple equipment and manual tools were used, so that serus could be constructed, modified, dismantled, and reconstructed quickly and frequently. Although divisional serus were considerably more flexible than assembly lines with respect to product variation and volume changes, the demand for some products was volatile enough to require even more flexibility, so some of the divisional serus were converted into rotating serus.
...
As product variants proliferate and product life-cycles shorten, needs for changeovers and transitions rise. In this case, assembly lines with highly specialized workers and equipment (and resulting costly and lengthy change- overs) are likely to struggle more and more to maintain acceptable levels of utilization (uptime). Given the need to meet these highly varying demands, seru systems actually produce swifter and more even flows than assembly lines, because they handle transitions more quickly and efficiently. The emphasis under seru that all tasks are completed in a single cell, all required resources are made available in the cell, and that everything not required is eliminated, has as its objective to support the swift and even flow of products."

Trechos retirados de "Lessons from seru production on manufacturing competitively in a high cost environment" publicado pelo Journal of Operations Management, 49-51 (2017) 67-76.

Continua.

Dúvida existencial

Ontem, ao trabalhar com uma empresa que fabrica moldes esquematizei uma sequência de actividades:

E subitamente fui invadido por uma dúvida existencial.

Primeiro elabora-se um projecto preliminar, depois um projecto final e depois fabrica-se e testa-se o molde.

Posso considerar que a fase do projecto termina com a aprovação do projecto final e o output é o projecto de um molde. Ou, posso considerar que a fase de projecto inclui a fabricação do molde e o output é um molde testado e validado pelo cliente em ensaios.

Com a segunda versão, as actividades de fabrico, no âmbito da secção 8.5 da ISO 9001:2015, também incluem as actividades de controlo de projecto, no âmbito da secção 8.3 da ISO 9001:2015.

Por exemplo, os ensaios do molde tanto funcionam como validação do projecto (cláusula 8.3.4 d) da ISO 9001:2015) como controlo da qualidade (cláusula 8.6 da ISO 9001:2015).

"As long as competitive advantage is temporary..."

"As long as competitive advantage is temporary, even the largest companies have to focus on serving customers in order to stay on top. But if the Blockbusters of the world are able to cement their status and no longer need to fear the Netflixes, customers, competitors, and society all stand to lose."

Como não recordar o comboio de empresas do regime que o choque revelado em 2011 tem contribuído para aniquilar.


Trecho retirado de "Making Sense of Our Very Competitive, Super Monopolistic Economy"

Uma coisa é uma coisa, outra coisa é outra coisa (parte IV)

Parte I, parte II e parte III.

"The rate of new-product introductions has skyrocketed in many industries, fueled both by an increase in the number of competitors and by the efforts of existing competitors to protect or increase profit margins. As a result, many companies have turned or tried to turn traditionally functional products into innovative products. But they have continued to focus on physical efficiency in the processes for supplying those products. This phenomenon explains why one finds so many broken supply chains—or unresponsive chains trying to supply innovative products—in industries such as automobiles, personal computers, and consumer packaged goods.
.
Functional products require an efficient process; innovative products, a responsive process."

Trecho retirado de "What Is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?"

Continua.

Plataformizar um produto

Um texto que pode lançar numa empresa uma discussão sobre como evoluir um produto/serviço para uma abordagem baseada numa plataforma multilateral: "Finding the Platform in Your Product":

"companies that weren’t born as platform businesses rarely realize that they can—at least partially—turn their products and services into an MSP (multisided platforms)"

Seru (parte II)

Parte I.

"we define a lean operations strategy as one that prioritizes minimization of use of resources through reducing variability and minimizing buffers, and a responsive operations strategy as one that prioritizes the ability to respond to demand volatility (product and quantity), which then requires buffering either with capacity or inventory.
...
Seru is a type of cellular manufacturing (CM).
...
When demand is highly volatile, however, the value of smoothing demand tends to be lower than the value of responsiveness. Similarly, streamlining the operation of an assembly line through use of the takt time is possible when what is produced does not change, but a rapidly changing product mix eliminates such productivity gains. These practices are combined with the tradition within Toyota Production System of freezing the production schedule eight weeks before production begins, which substantially reduces responsiveness. Assembly lines organized according to Toyota Production System practices can be highly efficient when demand volatility is low. As demand volatility increases, however, assembly lines lack the needed responsiveness and lose the stability that is the source of their outstanding efficiency. Seru thus begins with the transformation of assembly lines into cells. Seru cells resemble biological cellular organisms in that they can be easily constructed, modified, dismantled, and reconstructed, hence the name seru, a Japanese word for cellular organism. In contrast to the fixed cells described elsewhere in the literature, seru cells are defined by their configurability, which plays a key role in their responsiveness. These assembly cells - designed to permit orders to flow seamlessly through the factory - represent a choice to prioritize responsiveness over efficiency.
...
[Moi ici: O trecho que se segue é tremendo, quando eu falo de Mongo e muita gente fala de automação. Recordar: "Não acredito nestas relações simplistas" e "In principle, the production of virtually any component or assembly operation could be robotized and moved to high-wage countries—but only so long as demand is great enough, and design specifications stable enough, to justify huge scale and hundreds of millions, if not billions, in upfront investments."] When production is organized into a single assembly line, the cost of large-scale automation may be justified by efficiency gains. When demand volatility is high enough to warrant cellular manufacturing, large and costly automated equipment needs to be replaced by small, flexible, and relatively inexpensive equipment that can be duplicated as needed."

Trechos retirados de "Lessons from seru production on manufacturing competitively in a high cost environment" publicado pelo Journal of Operations Management, 49-51 (2017) 67-76.

Continua.

Curiosidade do dia

A propósito de "Mediadores: Portugal longe da bolha no mercado imobiliária"

Eheheh

Quando é preciso negar ...

Seru (parte I)

Em 2005 na revista Business Week encontrei um trecho que nunca mais esqueci e que citei neste postal de 2006, "Deixar de ser uma Arca de Noé":

"Canon is also looking to boost productivity. Already, the company has seen great gains from "cell assembly," where small teams build products from start to finish rather than each worker repeatedly performing a single task on a long assembly line. Canon now has no assembly lines; it ditched the last of its 20 kilometers of conveyor belts in 2002, when a line making ink-jet printers in Thailand was shut down."

Em 2010 no postal "Para quem se queixa da China... (parte IV)" escrevi:

""In the 21st century industry, all successful strategies rely on speed-to-market. Speed-to-market, in turn, can operate only where there exists trust, cooperation and collaboration between customer and supplier. To achieve this, we must change the very nature of our industry strategies." (Moi ici: e as fábricas conseguem guarnecer-se de talento para falarem como parceiros com as marcas e não como recebedoras de encomendas? E os fabricantes de máquinas conseguem agarrar a oportunidade de desenhar as máquinas que permitirão trabalhar com estas séries e frequências? E o lean aqui não será de muito uso, estamos a falar de uma nova organização da produção..."

Agora, passados estes anos todos:

"The past three decades have witnessed waves of offshoring by manufacturers in developed countries pursuing low-cost sources of production. Companies like Canon and Sony provide exceptions to the popular offshoring trend. Recognizing that their markets required responsiveness that extended supply chains could not provide, these companies pioneered a production system known as seru that has made it possible to manufacture competitively and profitably in Japan.
...
Producing locally has then strengthened their capacity to innovate. In ensuing years, hundreds of Japanese companies, especially electronics makers, have adopted seru, touting impressive benefits. The seru experience provides a useful lens for understanding how manufacturing can be competitive in a high-cost economy.
The seru production system is a type of cellular manufacturing that is distinguished first by the cells being configurable rather than fixed; and second by its use of cells for assembly, packaging, and testing rather than fabrication alone. Seru is defined by its prioritization of responsiveness over cost reduction in setting the firm's operations strategy.
...
Seru was developed to cope with high demand volatility and short product life cycles. Innovative manufacturing firms face the challenge of being flexible enough to handle significant process and environment variabilities, yet efficient enough to produce at a competitive cost. A considerable literature suggests that efficient production is best achieved through lean manufacturing, which typically seeks to reduce buffers and to eliminate demand volatility.
...
Interestingly, seru was explicitly developed as an alternative to the Toyota Production System (the precursor to lean). The developer of the seru concept - an expert in the Toyota Production System - concluded that implementing the Toyota Production System would not be appropriate in an innovative industry where the primary objective is to respond to demand volatility and fast product development cycles. Rather than adding agility to leanness ... seru begins with the objective of responsiveness: Seru's originators sought to achieve a smooth flow of a wide variety of products and volumes while using resources frugally."

Trechos retirados de "Lessons from seru production on manufacturing competitively in a high cost environment" publicado pelo Journal of Operations Management, 49-51 (2017) 67-76.

Continua.

Acerca do futuro do trabalho

Um estudo sobre o futuro do trabalho, que merece ser lido: "Shift: The Commission on Work, Workers, and Technology - Report of Findings".

Por exemplo:

"We took several trends as givens, so we could focus on the uncertainties on which the future of work depends. We identified four almost-inevitable forces:
1. An aging workforce;
2. The decline of “dynamism,” the movement of people
between jobs, firms, and places;
3. A societal shift to non-work income;
4. Growing geographic gaps.
By 2024, nearly one-quarter of the workforce is projected to be 55 or older — more than double the share in 1994.
...
Accepting these economic trends as givens, our members then considered the most important uncertainties about the future. After initially considering 16 variables, we selected these two as most important:
1. the structure of work — will there be more “tasks” (a catchall including contracting, projects, the “gig economy,” and the like) or will work remain concentrated in traditionally structured jobs?
2. the effect of automation — will technological changes result in more or less work to go around?"

"em ambientes cada vez mais complexos os gigantes falham"

Mongo é variedade, é diversidade, é explosão de tribos.

Ao mesmo tempo os gigantes criam organizações-cidade para lidar com os desafios de crescente complexidade:

"an increase in variety was associated with an increase in sourcing complexity, and that an increase in sourcing complexity was associated with worsened coordination performance.
...
This paper focused specifically on the tension between scale and scope economies to suggest that the pursuit of economies of scale generates production rigidity, while pursuing downstream synergies through cross-selling creates organizational interdependencies and complexity. We also empirically explored product line extension — the purest form of firm scope expansion — to demonstrate that complexity- induced coordination burden may, indeed, reduce economies of scope.
...
These results also extend recent attempts to conceptualize the locus and limitation of coordination in complex task systems. As complexity increases, these loci of coordination turn into organizational bottlenecks due to limits on their coordination capacity. Organizations face a tradeoff in designing these hubs, which might reduce complexity in the overall network but become a bottleneck themselves due to local congestion. This further illustrates the point that economies of scope “may decline not because of exogenous opportunity constraints but because of the rising costs of coordinating interdependencies”"

Por isto é que em ambientes cada vez mais complexos os gigantes falham. Ninguém quer ser tratado como plancton.



Trechos retirados de "Product Variety, Sourcing Complexity, and the Bottleneck of Coordination" publicado por Strat. Mgmt. J., 38: 1569–1587 (2017)

Uma coisa é uma coisa, outra coisa é outra coisa (parte III)

Parte I e parte II.

"Supply chains in many other industries suffer from an excess of some products and a shortage of others owing to an inability to predict demand. One department store chain that regularly had to resort to markdowns to clear unwanted merchandise found in exit interviews that one-quarter of its customers had left its stores empty-handed because the specific items they had wanted to buy were out of stock.
...
Before devising a supply chain, consider the nature of the demand for your products.
.
The first step in devising an effective supply-chain strategy is therefore to consider the nature of the demand for the products one’s company supplies.
...
if one classifies products on the basis of their demand patterns, they fall into one of two categories: they are either primarily functional or primarily innovative. And each category requires a distinctly different kind of supply chain. The root cause of the problems plaguing many supply chains is a mismatch between the type of product and the type of supply chain.
...
With their high profit margins and volatile demand, innovative products require a fundamentally different supply chain than stable, low-margin functional products do. To understand the difference, one should recognize that a supply chain performs two distinct types of functions: a physical function and a market mediation function. A supply chain’s physical function is readily apparent and includes converting raw materials into parts, components, and eventually finished goods, and transporting all of them from one point in the supply chain to the next. Less visible but equally important is market mediation, whose purpose is ensuring that the variety of products reaching the marketplace matches what consumers want to buy.
...
The predictable demand of functional products makes market mediation easy because a nearly perfect match between supply and demand can be achieved. Companies that make such products are thus free to focus almost exclusively on minimizing physical costs—a crucial goal, given the price sensitivity of most functional products.
...
That approach is exactly the wrong one for innovative products. The uncertain market reaction to innovation increases the risk of shortages or excess supplies. High profit margins and the importance of early sales in establishing market share for new products increase the cost of shortages. And short product life cycles increase the risk of obsolescence and the cost of excess supplies. Hence market mediation costs predominate for these products, and they, not physical costs, should be managers’ primary focus.
...
Although the distinctions between functional and innovative products and between physical efficiency and responsiveness to the market seem obvious once stated, I have found that many companies founder on this issue. That is probably because products that are physically the same can be either functional or innovative."

Trecho retirado de "What Is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?"

Continua.

Curiosidade do dia

Tudo dito.

Acerca do crescimento da produtividade

"Our standard mental model of productivity growth reflects the transition from agriculture to industry. We start with 100 farmers producing 100 units of food: technological progress enables 50 to produce the same amount, and the other 50 to move to factories that produce washing machines or cars or whatever. Overall productivity doubles, and can double again, as both agriculture and manufacturing become still more productive, with some workers then shifting to restaurants or health-care services. We assume an endlessly repeatable process."

Os 100 lavradores iniciais passam a 50, depois a 25, depois a 12.

Agora imaginem que numa nova iteração, um dos 12 decide sair desta guerra e opta por produzir uma menor quantidade sob o regime de agricultura biológica? Vai produzir menos quantidade mas vai vender a um preço superior e com muito menos concorrência. Como a quantidade produzida é muito menor e a estrutura indirecta a alimentar é muito menor a facturação é menor.

Desta forma a produtividade global dos 12 baixou, porque um já está noutro campeonato com outras regras.

Desta forma a distribuição de produtividades alarga-se

Trecho retirado de "Is Productivity Growth Becoming Irrelevant?"

Lean vs seru

Sabiam que o Toyota Production System parte do pressuposto que o planeamento da produção está congelado 8 semanas para a frente?

Acham que isso é realista para quem quer operar em Mongo?

Quantas empresas que trabalham com o lean conhecem esta condição?

Já ouviram falar no seru?

Como é que ao fim de tantos anos, num país como Portugal, continuo a ouvir falar no lean e nunca tinha ouvido falar no seru?

À atenção dos comentadores económicos de bancada

Um texto tão bom mas tão bom!!!

"Obvious...
We respond to Obvious problems by picking the appropriate Best Practicse. We have looked at all possible game and have figured out the best possible way. They are called Best, because there is always exactly one best response.
...
Complicated...
In complicated problems the relationship between cause and effect is predictable, but (very) hard to predict. Complicated problems are the domain of expert, who are better able to predict what is likely going to happen. Which is exactly what top chess players do. They need to predict what the likely moves of their opponents are going to be. Experts can simultaneously consider more possible options, but also reduce it to a smaller set of scenarios that require more analysis.
.
So the strategy becomes Sense – Analyse – Respond. And because it is impossible figure out if a move is the best move (except check-mate obviously) there are no best practices in the complicated domain.
...
Complex.
Complex problems are completely different again. What sets them apart is that the relationship between cause & effect is only obvious in hindsight. The gaming metaphor for complexity is poker. Unlike chess, which is a game about predicting, poker is game about learning. Learning what cards your opponents have and how they compare to yours. And the high level strategy for chess doesn’t work for poker.
...
Again, taking the poker example that probe can be in the form of betting. If you make a bet you force opponents to respond to it, by folding, calling or raising. This can give you information about their hand. But other probes can be calling out opponents, sensing can be just looking at their demeanours for example.
.
So the most important thing about Complexity is that there is no way to learn (and thus solving the problem) without doing. Just thinking about it isn’t going to solve it. In Complex problems our practices are always evolving based on what we learn. In poker, even if we would play a game with the exact players with the exact same cards would turn out differently, because we learned things not just about the game, but certainly about our opponents.
...
ChaosChaos happens when there is no relationship between cause and effect or they change very quickly. In this case there is no point in probing because any learning does not help us get better.
.
The gaming analogy here is children playing. Anyone who has ever played with kids know that the rules are continuously changing. And there is no point in trying to learn the rules before starting to play. You have to get in and play with them (Act), while making sure are having fun (Sense) and change accordingly if not (Respond).
.
But most often we end up in Chaos because of some crisis. When that happens we need to very quickly stabilise the situation and get back out of Chaos. This happens all the time in business, where we are frequently relying on hero leaders and task forces to get us out of trouble.
...
But the most important learning is that a whole lot of our circumstances are complex. And thus inherently unpredictable. And no amount of thinking is going to solve that."

Pensem nos comentadores económicos de bancada prontos para dar indicações aos empresários de agora, de Mongo, com as boas-práticas do século XX.

Pensem nos comentadores económicos de bancada crentes num governo todo poderoso com um Cybersyn poderoso capaz de tudo prever.

Trechos retirados de "Understanding Complexity"

Uma coisa é uma coisa, outra coisa é outra coisa (parte II)

Parte I.

"Decide whether your current supply chain is efficient or responsive. Your chain is efficient if you satisfy predictable demand efficiently at the lowest possible cost, turn over inventory frequently, and select suppliers based on cost and quality. It’s responsive if you invest aggressively in reducing lead time for delivery; use standard components for different product versions; and choose suppliers for their speed, flexibility, and quality.
...
Correct mismatches between your supply chain and product. If you’re using an efficient supply chain to sell innovative products, or a responsive supply chain to sell functional products, you’ve got a mismatch. You can correct it through several means:
.
Change your product.
...
Change your supply chain."

Trecho retirado de "What Is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?"

Continua.

Curiosidade do dia

É sempre possível descer mais baixo, é sempre possível arranjar mais um imposto para alimentar o monstro insaciável: "First statewide bicycle tax in nation leaves bike-crazy Oregon riders deflated"

Uma coisa é uma coisa, outra coisa é outra coisa

Um texto de 1997 mas que continua actual. Aliás, com o advento de Mongo julgo que é ainda mais actual. Também pode servir de base a uma reflexão sobre o que automatizar, num avanço para a Indústria 4.0:

"Are you frequently saddled with excess inventory? Do you suffer product shortages that have customers leaving stores in a huff? Do these supply chain headaches persist despite your investments in technologies such as automated warehousing and rapid logistics?
.
If so, you may be using the wrong supply chain for the type of product you sell. Suppose your offering is functional—it satisfies basic, unchanging needs and has a long life cycle, low margins, and stable demand. (Think paper towels or light bulbs.) In this case, you need an efficient supply chain—which minimizes production, transportation, and storage costs.
.
But what if your product is innovative—it has great variety, a short life cycle, high profit margins, and volatile demand? (A line of laptops with a range of novel features is one example.) For this offering, you require a responsive supply chain. Fast and flexible, it helps you manage uncertainty through strategies such as cutting lead times and establishing inventory or excess-capacity buffers."

BTW, na semana passada ao olhar para os indicadores de uma empresa que engloba tudo e não distingue os dois tipos de cadeia de valor percebi o dilema que sentem ao meter no mesmo âmbito de análise:

• nível de serviço (associado a tempo de resposta);
• nível de stock (associado a stock não movimentado há mais de x meses)

Trecho retirado de "What Is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?"

Continua.