Por que é que?

A propósito de "Produtividade ainda é o maior problema em Portugal":

""A produtividade é o problema base" do País, garante José Gonzaga Rosa, na Conferência Portugal - Desafios para 2013 que ontem se realizou em Lisboa. "Produzimos a um custo de 19 euros por hora, o que equivale a 57% da média europeia", acrescenta."

É sempre a mesma coisa... outro exemplo:

"o aumento deve-se ao facto de o ritmo de aumento do desemprego estar a ser superior ao ritmo de quebra no PIB. "Ou seja, estamos a fazer um bocado menos, mas ainda com menos pessoas""

Olhem para a fórmula da produtividade:

A primeira citação preocupa-se com o denominador, com os custos.
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A segunda citação justifica o aumento da produtividade da seguinte forma: o valor gerado baixou, mas os custos baixaram ainda mais.
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Por que é que num mundo em mudança acelerada as conferências económicas continuam a pensar à moda antiga? Por que é que só pensam no denominador? Por que é que partem do princípio que se mantém a "qualidade" do que se produz? Essa é a via, a médio prazo, da redução dos salários e do emprego.
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Por que é que nunca abordam a perspectiva do aumento da produtividade via aumento do valor? Não necessariamente por causa de um aumento da frequência de produção, mas por causa da subida na escala do valor.

Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte VI)

"cada empresa deve ter a política salarial adequada aos seus resultados, cumprindo um segundo objectivo: nas actuais circunstâncias"
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Bem vindo ao clube parte II e parte III.
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Gostava de rever os últimos minutos da entrevista que António Costa e Gomes Ferreira fizeram a Manuela Ferreira Leite na SIC, sobretudo a última questão que António Costa colocou.
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Trecho retirado daqui "Os salários... dos outros"

Para reflexão

Tanta discussão em curso sobre o futuro do emprego, e do emprego de qualidade nos EUA, fazia bem uma reflexão do género por cá:

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"How to Make an American Job Before It's Too Late: Andy Grove"

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"America needs to make its bad jobs better"

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"Creating not just jobs, but good jobs"

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"Real Prosperity Doesn't Come From Stimulus — Or Austerity"

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"Attacking unemployment"

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"How To Kill The American Job"

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É importante não esquecer que o emprego é como o lucro, é algo que se deseja, mas se se quer que seja sustentável, não se pode olhar para ele como um objectivo directo a perseguir. Dessa forma faltará sempre a reacção em cadeia que separa o triângulo do tetraedro do fogo.

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O emprego (ou o lucro) tem de ser encarado como a consequência de outras acções e objectivos perseguidos a montante.

Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte V)

Continuado daqui: parte I, parte II, parte III e parte IV.

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Voltando ao livro "Job Creation and Destruction" de Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger e Scott Schuh:

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"Like most people, policymakers and bureaucrats evince a reluctance to acknowledge mistakes. Consequently, targeted policy programs tend to persist beyond the point of economic desirability, and they are likely to be managed in a way that obscures evidence of policy failure. (Moi ici: Qimonda, Aerosoles, ...) Once again, this political economy argument is not new, but it acquires added force in light of the dominant role of idiosyncratic determinants of business performance. To minimize job loss and business failure - thereby helping to preserve the image of a successful policy - the least successful businesses in targeted sectors often receive more generous subsidies or other forms of assistance."

Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte IV)

Continuado daqui, daqui e daqui.

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Voltando ao livro "Job Creation and Destruction" de Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger e Scott Schuh:

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"First, the great heterogeneity of plant-level job growth and productivity outcomes suggests that businesses probably exhibit sharply different responses to policy interventions, even within narrowly defined industries or other sectoral groupings. Because businesses are not easily classifiable into sectors with homogeneous behavior, policies that grant preferential treatment to identifiable groups of firms can be poor tools for encouraging or discouraging particular economic activities. For example, when an industry successfully lobbies for import protection in the name of protecting jobs, some firms may not use the resulting increase in cash flow to preserve jobs."

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"the large role played by idiosyncratic factors makes it more difficult to discern the impact of policy interventions on the performance of affected firms."

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"the idiosyncratic determinants of business performance exacerbate the cost and difficulty of evaluating targeted commercial policies. As a consequence, useless or harmful targeted policies are more likely to persist over time before recognition of their inefficay sets in."

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"Debates about targeted industrial policy often center on the government's capacity or lack of capacity to identify potential winners. (Moi ici: Pois, o Grande Planeador, o Grande Geometra que tudo sabe) In our view, an even more serious problem with targeted industrial policies involves the government's ability to respond appropriately to economic losers. By their nature, targeted policies engender political constituencies with a special interest in preserving the benefits of preferential tax, subsidy, or regulatory treatment. Once organized, these political constituencies continue to press for preferential treatment regardless of whether the targeted policy continues to promote greater economic efficiency. Thus, targeted policies encourage the formation of special interest groups that, in turn, undermine the application of economic efficiency criteria to future economic policy decisions. (Moi ici: Como diz o miúdo do filme "O Sexto Sentido", "All the time!!!" )

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This line of argument is not new, but it acquires greater force from the evidence of heterogeneity in plant-level employment and productivity outcomes. The large magnitude of job creation and destruction, including the important role of births and deaths, suggests that trial and error play a central role in economic growth and in the evolution of businesses and industries. Put differently, large-scale business failure and job destruction are normal, probably essential, elements of a successful market economy. But targeted policies impede the trial-and-error process by inhibiting business failure and job destruction when such outcomes are economically desirable. ... Market mechanisms for dealing with economic failure are likely to operate more efficiently and expeditiously than political mechanisms."

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Continua.

O choque chinês num país de moeda forte (parte VI)

Em linha com o segundo gráfico deste postal "O choque chinês num país de moeda forte (parte II)" (o título é sintomático e premonitório), em linha com este postal sobre o emprego e a produtividade (especial atenção ao quadrante C):

Este interessante artigo "Downsizing in German Chemical Manufacturing Industry during the 1990s. Why Small is Beautiful?" lança mais algumas pistas de reflexão sobre o jogo do gato e do rato e sobre como o choque chinês é enfrentável num país de moeda forte.

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"The 1990s have brought about severe competitive challenges and new rules of playing game in chemical industry. Freeman (1999) claims that the last decade was accompanied by great changes, with the massive restructuring as the key feature:
The days of the integrated chemical company were coming to an end, with companies abandoning noncore business segments in efforts to boost the creation of shareholder value. The reshaping of the industry had begun in the 1980s, but it was on a small scale compared to that in the 1990s.

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The German chemical industry have been doing tremendous job (Landau and Arora, 1999) and continues to do so in development of the global and national economies in terms of employment, investments and value added as reported by the President of the Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V. (Association of the German Chemical Industry). In past several years, the industry has been downsizing, “right sizing,” and producing new companies through small mergers, megamergers, and spin-offs. The new business reality gives every reason to believe there will be further consolidation and subsequent downsizing in the chemical industry (Millenium Special Report, 1999). This is also confirmed by the data for German chemical industry for 1992–2004 period, which tells us that the average size, defined as the number of employees of the firm, has decreased by about 47% (from 813 to 433).

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This seems counterintuitive to the general trend of merges and acquisitions (Weston et al., 1999), and to the literature, which documents that relatively larger firms have better propensity
to survive, and that economical/technological situation has put considerable pressure on smaller firms (Swift, 1999). Then the natural question arises: “Why small is beautiful?”

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The globalization has taken great pace during the 1990s and the “whales” of the traditional German manufacturing industries had to respond to changing environment in which production process could be transferred to nearby low-cost geographical locations. Audretsch and Elston (2006) claim that the dominant (largest) firms have reacted by substituting of technology and capital by labor as well as by locating the new plants outside Germany. In the chemical sector during 1991–1995 the domestic employment decreased by 80 thousands, while 14 thousands jobs were created by chemical firms outside Germany;

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"Baily et al. (1996) check the conventional faith that the rise in productivity and dowsizing are linked through some microeconomic mechanism.
Authors find, though, that both dowsizers and upsizers increase in productivity and the relationship is quite complex and not clearcut. In their other paper, Baily et al. (2001) try to resolve the debate on cyclical nature of the labor productivity over time. They claim that the productivity of long-term downsizers tends to be quite considerable, much larger than that of long-run upsizers." (Moi ici: A melhoria disruptiva é mais rentável que a melhoria incremental)

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These findings suggest that for German chemical manufacturing firms improving technical efficiency has not been the first priority during the 1990s. Instead, they have been paying special attention to establishment of an optimal scale, while technical efficiency has been supported on a certain level.
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Bathelt (2000) identifies three types of German chemical firms: (i) semiflexible integrated firms, mainly medium-large and large sized, with main features being high degree of vertical and/or horizontal integration and limited product and process flexibility; (ii) conventionally specialized firms, mostly small and medium sized, which are characterized by a low degree of product and process flexibility; and (iii) flexible specialized firms, which are mostly small and can only be found in the narrow chemical subindustry (pigments, dyes, paints, and varnishes). Except for the third type of firms, which tries to achieve economies of scope to adjust to market-segmentation tendencies, the first two care about economies of scale by various production activities and by producing relatively long-term homogeneous goods."

Relações de causa-efeito politicamente correctas mas que não existem

-Quem paga os salários?

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-As empresas!

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Se os mercados se estão a polarizar e se não existem respostas únicas...

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Se há maior dispersão de produtividade entre as empresas de um mesmo sector de actividade do que entre empresas de diferentes sectores de actividade (aqui e aqui) ...

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Se quem estuda a dispersão dos salários escreve:

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“Why are similar workers paid differently? Why do some jobs pay more than others? I have argued that wage dispersion of this kind reflects differences in employer productivity.
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Of course, the assertion that wage dispersion is the consequence of productivity dispersion begs another question. What is the explanation for productivity dispersion?"
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“Relative demand and productive efficiency of individual firms are continually shocked by events. The shocks are the consequence of changes in tastes, changes in regulations, and changes induced by globalization among others. Another important source of persistent productivity differences across firms is the process of adopting technical innovation. We know that the diffusion of new and more efficient methods is a slow, drawn-out affair. Experimentation is required to implement new methods. Many innovations are embodied in equipment and forms of human capital that are necessarily long-lived. Learning how and where to apply any new innovation takes time and may well be highly firms specific.
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Since old technologies are not immediately replaced by the new for all of these reasons, productive efficiency varies considerably across firms at any point in time."

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Trecho retirado de "Wage Dispersion" de Dale Mortensen.

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Sabendo que na última década aumentou a pressão competitiva, sabendo que as empresas fazem opções que as distribuem por cada um dos quadrantes:

O que seria de esperar?!?!

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"“Nós não estudámos até ao fim todas as consequências das medidas que sugerimos”"

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-Quem paga os salários?

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-As empresas!

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Então, não há nenhuma conspiração, é uma consequência da realidade competitiva:

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""Portugal tem um nível excessivamente elevado de desigualdades"":

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"O ministro da Economia, Vieira da Silva, admitiu hoje no parlamento que “é verdade que Portugal tem um nível excessivamente elevado de desigualdades”, acrescentando que só existe uma forma de as corrigir, investindo na qualificação das pessoas."

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A qualificação das pessoas não vai resolver nada... basta recordar as palavras de Galbraith em "Vamos brincar à caridadezinha" que relacionam formação e qualificação com produtividade ou emprego.

Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte III)

Continuado daqui e daqui.

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Quando os macro-economistas falam sobre o desempenho, sobre a produtividade de um sector de actividade, como o calçado, como o têxtil, como o mobiliário, falam de um bloco homogéneo, coerente, maciço... como se todas as empresas, imersas no mesmo ambiente competitivo, tivessem o mesmo comportamento
O segundo capítulo do livro "How We Compete - What Companies Around the World Are Doing to Make it in Today's Global Economy" de Suzanne Berger e o MIT Industrial Performance Center começa com esta citação:

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"When reports about the impact of globalization start from the macro picture of pressures toward a single world market, they usually predict that companies competing under the same constraints around the world will have to imitate the successful models. (Moi ici: ainda vamos voltar a esta estória dos modelos únicos) If that's the case, they would end up looking much the same, as they converged on a set of common organizational patterns and best practices.

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But that is not at all what we discovered in our interviews. On the contrary, because we started at the micro level - from experiences we have analyzed in hundreds of companies competing in the same markets - and traced out their evolution, we found great and lasting diversity." (Moi ici: o contacto com a realidade da micro-economia, com pessoas que arriscam, com pessoas que desenvolvem relações amorosas com clientes, produtos e fornecedores, com pessoas que têm uma fé num optimismo não documentado)
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Voltando ao livro "Job Creation and Destruction" de Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger e Scott Schuh, sobre a heterogeneidade de cada sector industrial encontramos:

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"The magnitude of within-sector heterogeneity implies that idiosyncratic factors dominate the determination of which plants create and destroy jobs, and which plants achieve rapid productivity growth or suffer productivity declines.

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One likely reason for heterogeneity in plant-level outcomes is the considerable uncertainty that surrounds the development, adoption, distribution, marketing, and regulation of new products and production techniques. Uncertainty about the demand for new produccts or the cost-effectiveness of alternative technologies encourages firms to experiment with different technologies, goods, and production facilities. Experimentation, in turn, generates differences in outcomes. Even when motives for experimentation are absent, uncertainty about future cost or demand conditions encourages firms to differentiate their choice of current products and technology so as to position themselves optimally for possible future circumstances.

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Another likely reason is that differences in entrepreneurial and managerial ability lead to differences in job and productivity growth rates among firms and plants. These differences include the ability to identify and develop new products, the ability to organize production activity, the ability to motivate workers, and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. There seems to be little doubt that these and other ability differences among managers generate much of the observed heterogeneity in plant-level outcomes.

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sources of heterogeneity among seemingly similar businesses underscore the remarkable complexity of economic growth and change. They underscore the continuous, large-scale job creation and destruction activity required to allocate resources toward their highest value uses. And they underscore the extremely limited degree to which the precise patterns of job creation and destruction can be explained in terms of business characteristics that are easily observable to economists and policymakers. Indeed, the current state of economic science provides little knowledge about the relative importance of various idiosyncratic factors or the precise reasons why they generate such tremendous heterogeneity in outcomes.

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(Moi ici: se o desempenho das empresas num sector depende, sobretudo, de factores idiossincráticos... então, o que pensar das leis voluntaristas para, supostamente, criar ou salvar empregos?)

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The predominant role of idiosyncratic factors in job creation and destruction, and our highly incomplete understanding of these factors, incline us toward a prudent stance regarding economic policy interventions intended to create more or better jobs. Absent an understanding of which factors drive employer decisions about job creation and destruction, policy interventions may impede the allocation of workers and other inputs to their highest value uses."

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E quando os políticos se auto-nomeiam, sem qualquer experiência profissional, em grandes augures, qual Vitorino no último Prós e Contras, capazes de ler o futuro e saber quais as experiências que têm futuro.

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Em comentário no twitter na altura escrevi com ironia "O Estado é que sabe qual o futuro"... alguém comentou "Prefiro estar na "mão" do Estado do que na de um privado, gostos"

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Os privados, individualmente, não têm mais capacidade do que o Estado para fazer escolhas. Só que no agregado, os privados têm uma larga vantagem sobre o Estado, como são muitos, têm mais hipóteses de alguns acertarem. É a velha citação de Hamel acerca da resiliência da Vida no planeta Terra:

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"Life is the most resilient thing on the planet. I has survived meteor showers, seismic upheavals, and radical climate shifts. And yet it does not plan, it does not forecast, and, except when manifested in human beings, it possesses no foresight. So what is the essential thing that life teaches us about resilience?

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Just this: Variety matters. Genetic variety, within and across species, is nature's insurance policy against the unexpected. A high degree of biological diversity ensures that no matter what particular future unfolds, there will be at least some organisms that are well-suited to the new circumstances."

Poema de Gary Hamel e Liisa Valikangas em "The quest for resilience", Harvard Business Review, Setembro de 2003

Continua.

Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões (parte II)

Continuado daqui.

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A filosofia por trás do caso do Lugar do Senhor dos Perdões está relacionada com a proposta de António Vitorino no Prós e Contras de ontem: o Estado é que sabe quais os sectores de futuro em que se deve apostar.

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Comecemos por um texto retirado do livro "Job Creation and Destruction" de Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger e Scott Schuh:

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"To be sure, it is widely understood that market economies reallocate employment and other factor inputs in response to the emergence of new products and new production techniques, changes in the scope and composition of international trade, changes in economic policies and patterns of government expenditure, and many other events. Sectors facing favorable changes in cost and demand conditions expand, whereas sectors facing unfavorable changes contract. In recent years, much has been made of employment shifts away from basic manufacturing industries (e.g., steel and autos) and toward advanced technology (e.g., computers) and service industries." (Moi ici: até aqui nada de novo)

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"Although these between-sector employment shifts are often important, our statistical portrait shows rather strikingly that they are dwarfed by the magnitude of within-sector shifts in employment across plants." (Moi ici: aqui é que a porca começa a torcer o rabo... não se pode olhar para um sector como uma realidade homogénea, como um bloco uniforme, como um todo coerente. E quando se diz que um sector está obsoleto... está-se a ver o bloco homogéneo)

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"Chapters 3 and 4 document large within-sector employment reallocation regardless of wether sectors are defined in terms of industry, region, plant age, plant or firm size, wage level, degree of product specialization, energy intensity, capital intensity, or degree of exposure to foreign competition. In short, employment growth outcomes exhibit enormous heterogeneity among plants and firms that operate in the same classifiable sectors.

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The heterogeneity of job growth outcomes within narrowly defined sectors parallels recent findings on plant-level productivity growth patterns... Hence, most of the variation in job and productivity growth rates across plants reflects within- rather than between-sector differences." (Moi ici: se a variação no emprego e na produtividade é maior dentro de um sector do que entre sectores ... então há algo aqui que merece ser investigado e percebido)

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Está-se já a ver o impacte de medidas homogéneas, de medidas gerais como as da anedota, para fazer face a estas heterogeneidades sectoriais.

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Continua

Emprego vs Produtividade (parte I)

Uma tentativa de relacionar produtividade e emprego...Uma tentativa de perceber o que se passa...
e o peixe que rema contra a corrente, e o peixe que segue com a corrente.