Mergulhar no iceberg

Saltar do ram-ram habitual, fugir da superficialidade dos eventos desgarrados e mergulhar no iceberg

"Our actions are most likely to revert to what is habitual when we are in a state of fear or anxiety. Collective actions are no different. Even as conditions in the world change dramatically, most businesses, governments, schools, and other large organizations, driven by fear, continue to take the same kinds of institutional actions that they always have. This does not mean that no learning occurs. But it is a limited type of learning: learning how best to react to circumstances we see ourselves as having had no hand in creating. Reactive learning is governed by "downloading" habitual ways of thinking, of continuing to see the world within the familiar categories we're comfortable with. We discount interpretations and options for action that are different from those we know and trust.

All learning integrates thinking and doing. In reactive learning, thinking is governed by established mental models and doing is governed by established habits of action.
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 We act to defend our interests. In reactive learning, our actions are actually reenacted habits, and we invariably end up reinforcing pre-established mental models. Regardless of the outcome, we end up being "right." At best, we get better at what we have always done. We remain secure in the cocoon of our own worldview, isolated from the larger world.
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All learning integrates thinking and doing. All learning is about how we interact in the world and the types of capacities that develop from our interactions. What differs is the depth of the awareness and the consequent source of action.

Deeper levels of learning create increasing awareness of the larger whole—both as it is and as it is evolving—and actions that increasingly become part of creating alternative futures.
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If awareness never reaches beyond superficial events and current circumstances, actions will be reactions. If, on the other hand, we penetrate more deeply to see the larger wholes that generate "what is" and our own connection to this wholeness, the source and effectiveness of our actions can change dramatically."

Trechos retirados de "Presence: Exploring Profound Change in People, Organizations and Society" de  Betty Sue Flowers, C. Otto Scharmer, Joseph Jaworski e Peter M. Senge.

Mais do que eventos (parte II)

Parte I.

Imaginem a produção de uma linha de fabrico ao longo de um mês (com dois turnos).

A amarelo, o tipo de produto produzido naquele turno (há produtos mais fáceis de produzir do que outros, há produtos com falhas da fase de concepção que nunca foram corrigidos na fase de industrialização).

A verde, as avarias que ocorreram na linha.

A azul, os turnos em que a produção foi afectada pela falta de pessoal (pessoas que resolveram faltar sem aviso prévio e que, por isso, não puderam ser substituídas)

A laranja, os turnos em que a produção foi afectada por falta de matéria-prima (fornecedores e/ou subcontratados) atrasaram-se na entrega de material para produções previstas.

Muita gente tem tendência a olhar para cada um destes eventos como o assunto, como o desafio, como a preocupação. Eu, recordo Juran e concentro a atenção nos problemas crónicos:

Melhoria a sério só acontece quando atacamos os problemas crónicos. Não adianta olhar para cada um dos eventos isoladamente, não adianta culpabilizar um trabalhador porque faltou sem avisar, ou um subcontratado porque não cumpriu uma promessa. O que é que no meu sistema permite e até fomenta este tipo de comportamentos?

Lembrei-me agora de um tweet que vi esta manhã:

As escolas fazem concursos com valores ridiculamente baixos por refeição e depois ficam surpreendidos com os resultados

— Jorge Silva (@JSnotario) November 9, 2017

Mais do que eventos

"In his book Out of the Crisis, W. Edwards Deming wrote: “A fault in the interpretation of observations, seen everywhere, is to suppose that every event (defect, mistake, accident) is attributable to someone (usually the one nearest at hand), or is related to some special event. The fact is that most troubles with service and production lie in the system.”
“We shall speak of faults of the system as common causes of trouble, and faults from fleeting events as special causes,” he wrote. “Confusion between common causes and special causes leads to frustration of everyone, and leads to greater variability and higher costs, exactly contrary to what is needed. I should estimate that in my experience most troubles and most possibilities for improvement add up to proportions something like this: 94% belong to the system (responsibility of management), 6% special.”
Control charts offer the study of variation and its source over time."

Que bom voltar a encontrar este trecho do grande Deming. Vejo tão pouca gente fora da indústria automóvel a usar o poder das cartas de controlo...

Vejo tão pouca gente fora da indústria automóvel a olhar para lá da camada superficial dos eventos e a mergulhar nos comportamentos e no sistema.

Eu sou contra

"What Is Your Brand Against?":

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"If you really want to show the world what you believe in and stand for, how about telling us what you stand against?"

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Eu sou contra:

• A linguagem da treta e a consultoria da treta!!!
• As abordagens embaladas e prontas a usar da consultoria fast-food que crê que o mundo e as empresas têm todas de competir da mesma maneira!!!
• Uma visão do mundo onde só os grandes e poderosos ganham à custa da dimensão e do dinheiro!!!
• O sentimento de desesperança de que não há nada a fazer senão fechar as portas e deslocalizar!!!

Para reflectir sobre o que é uma missão

Ter uma missão a cumprir, sentir uma causa, é muito mais do que uma declaração de missão.
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Uma interessante reflexão sobre o tema neste artigo "Do You Have a Mission Statement, or Are You on a Mission?":
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"A person or organization on a mission is inspiring. A mission statement is an abstraction. Add to this disadvantage the fact that most mission-statement writing is an exercise in compromise and equivocation, and now you've really depressed people."
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"The point is, don't put mission statements first. Get on a mission, and the other things will follow. Including the mission statement."
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"Don't waste your advertising space on your mission statement. Use the space to tell people what you've accomplished, or what amazing thing your product will do — use it to show them what mission you're actually on.
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And if you notice that you or your organization spends an inordinate amount of time talking about how to talk about what it does, then maybe it isn't sure what it does — and some serious soul-searching is in order. Maybe "messaging" has become a distraction. Perhaps there's some daring goal out there with your name on it that you're avoiding for fear of failure. But better to fail — mission-statement-less — at some audacious mission, than to have your mission statement all in order while risking nothing."

Para rir ou para chorar?

"PSP ficou sem impressos para cobrar multas na hora" no DN de hoje.
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Este é um sintoma, este é um efeito.
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Quais as causas que estarão na base desta emanação?

FMEA e a rede de causas entrelaçadas

"Let’s imagine organizational problems as signs of trouble within large, interconnected systems of things, people, technology, conversation, and, other problems.

Unfortunately, much of the fabric connecting these diverse elements is hidden from plain sight. This is in part why we see so many problem-solving efforts focused narrowly on the first or loudest symptoms, without much interest in how the problems are connected to anything else.

Experience has taught us that hammering away at various parts of the whole problem system usually only makes things worse, wastes precious time and energy, and triggers cynicism when the mess gets worse despite the effort. What’s difficult about widening the scope of the inquiry is that it’s not at all clear at first glance, from a local perspective, how far the problem system sprawls."

Retirado do artigo "Problem-Solving as a Double-Loop Learning System" de Jeff Dooley.

Esta citação veio-me ontem à cabeça, em plena sessão de desenvolvimento de um FMEA numa organização. O esquema típico de desenvolvimento de um FMEA não pertencerá a um tempo já ultrapassado? Um tempo em que o mundo era visto como uma realidade linear e não uma floresta de causas inter relacionadas?

Identificamos um modo de falha. Listamos os impactes dessa falha. Listamos as causas dessa falha... mas como ilustrar a rede de causas entrelaçadas? Confesso as minhas dúvidas!