Quem é que tem a explicação mais clara, mais credível, mais plausível sobre qual a estratégia a seguir?

"In today’s corporation, the crown is not automatically conferred on anyone. There is no one king. The crown goes, or should go, to whoever has the clearest and most credible explanation of how and why his or her strategy will work.
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Complicating the situation, however, is that this criterion - although ideal - is hard to enshrine in a corporate charter. The rules of corporate governance treat all CEOs alike, and give board members power based on their positions, even though the quality of individuals’ judgment may vary enormously.
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That may be the real reason that companies are vulnerable: When all is said and done, the rules they follow have little effect on their success. Everything comes back to the judgment of a few people, and that depends - as it did and does at Penney and every other company - on the quality of the people in the leading roles."

E na sua empresa, quem é que tem a explicação mais clara, mais credível, mais plausível sobre qual a estratégia a seguir?
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Trecho retirado de "The Lesson of J.C. Penney: There Is No King"

Um julgamento impiedoso

"The narrative has generally been that Johnson was a brilliant strategist brought in to entirely overhaul the strategy of JCP and make it shine like the Apple Stores. But that focus on broad strategy did not work and Ullman was brought in to refocus on the basics — on execution. (Moi ici: Como se fosse possível ter sucesso com uma execução sem estratégia. Duh!)
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The narrative is unsurprising given that the overwhelming view of strategy is that anything that involves big shifts accompanied by a lot of hot air must, by definition, be "strategic." Johnson certainly provided big shifts and hot air aplenty. However, as I have argued elsewhere, strategy is, in fact, a coherent set of choices about where-to-play (WTP) and how-to-win (HTW) and, if that WTP&HTW is significantly different than the current one, a credible path for getting from the present to the targeted state. (Moi ici: Clientes-alvo & proposta de valor; mosaico de actividades estratégicas e iniciativas estratégicas)

Um julgamento impiedoso:

"Under Johnson, JCP had nothing even vaguely resembling a worthwhile strategy and its path to get to where it wished was comically disastrous. JCP had a plan for betterment and not winning — one of the most common mistakes in "strategy."
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But did JCP identify a set of shoppers with whom it could win (Moi ici: Como não nos cansamos de escrever aqui e de dizer nas empresas - Quem são os clientes-alvo? Por que é que são os alvos? O que procuram e valorizam?) — for whom JCP was their best alternative, to which they would look loyally for their shopping needs for some set of goods? Hardly.
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And the path to this futile betterment was one of the most comical that I have seen in a long time.
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JCP doesn't need someone who can "execute" successfully, get back to basics, or any such thing. Just as it needed two, five or ten years ago, JCP needs a strategy. It needs to decide where it is going to play — with what set of shoppers, in what range of merchandise, through what physical and digital spaces. And it needs to decide how is it going to provide a superior value proposition to competitive alternatives in that chosen space. This is a tough task. The department store business is a brutal one. This is not a business in which half-witted strategies can be profitable.
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(Moi ici: Este último parágrafo aplica-se a tantas empresas, infelizmente) But if JCP doesn't figure out an answer to these questions, it will revert entirely to the retailing drug — the "low-price strategy." This is actually a non-strategy. There is a real strategy called "low-cost," which can facilitate more attractive prices than competitors. But low prices unaccompanied by low costs is an approach to liquidation — which is where JCP will be if it doesn't start to think intelligently about strategy."

Trechos retirados de "Memo to JC Penney: Execution Is Not Strategy"

Acerca da batota

Ron Johnson acaba de ser despedido e é o bombo da festa no festival de críticas à sua gestão (por cá, a culpa seria do IVA ou da crise, ou do Gaspar), por isso, interessei-me logo por um artigo com um título "contrarian", "What Ron Johnson Got Right":

"Ron Johnson chose the wrong store - regarded by some as a retail backwater frequented by coupon clippers - to roll out his brazen strategy, and his execution was a disaster. But his concept was exactly right. Bricks-and-mortar retail was (and is) in a period of anxious soul-searching, and Penney itself was in deep trouble. The patient needed radical surgery. Johnson didn't have the time or temperament to dicker. When I interviewed him in 2011, just after he'd taken the reins at Penney, I asked whether it wasn't a risky proposition to completely reinvent the department store. "The opposite is what's risky," he told me. "Over the past 30 years, the department store has become less relevant... largely because of decisions the stores have made... They didn't think about the future so much as try to protect the past." The problem, he explained, wasn't the stores' size or location or marketing power or physical capabilities, "It's their lack of imagination — about the products they carry, their store environments, the way they engage customers, how they embrace the digital future." (Moi ici: Numa palavra, a falta de aposta na batota)
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That's not crazy talk. Johnson saw the problem clearly, he had an appropriate sense of urgency, he had a gut sense about how to get Penney out of its bind — and a belief"