"Ron Johnson chose the wrong store - regarded by some as a retail backwater frequented by coupon clippers - to roll out his brazen strategy, and his execution was a disaster. But his concept was exactly right. Bricks-and-mortar retail was (and is) in a period of anxious soul-searching, and Penney itself was in deep trouble. The patient needed radical surgery. Johnson didn't have the time or temperament to dicker. When I interviewed him in 2011, just after he'd taken the reins at Penney, I asked whether it wasn't a risky proposition to completely reinvent the department store. "The opposite is what's risky," he told me. "Over the past 30 years, the department store has become less relevant... largely because of decisions the stores have made... They didn't think about the future so much as try to protect the past." The problem, he explained, wasn't the stores' size or location or marketing power or physical capabilities, "It's their lack of imagination — about the products they carry, their store environments, the way they engage customers, how they embrace the digital future." (Moi ici: Numa palavra, a falta de aposta na batota)
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That's not crazy talk. Johnson saw the problem clearly, he had an appropriate sense of urgency, he had a gut sense about how to get Penney out of its bind — and a belief"
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta ron johnson. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta ron johnson. Mostrar todas as mensagens
sexta-feira, abril 12, 2013
Acerca da batota
Ron Johnson acaba de ser despedido e é o bombo da festa no festival de críticas à sua gestão (por cá, a culpa seria do IVA ou da crise, ou do Gaspar), por isso, interessei-me logo por um artigo com um título "contrarian", "What Ron Johnson Got Right":
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