"A ANA considera ainda que a CTI foi "otimista" em relação à projeção de tráfego, tendo previsto 66 a 108 milhões de passageiros em 2050, quando "entidades internacionais altamente credenciadas", preveem entre 40 a 52 milhões de passageiros em 2050.Adicionalmente, também considera "otimistas" os cronogramas de construção e contesta o entendimento da CTI de que a opção Montijo levaria seis anos a ser construída."
Entretanto no Twitter descobri outra:
A linha de alta velocidade Madrid - Barcelona tem 6M de passageiros. Num país com quatro vezes mais população que o nosso. Cada vez mais me convenço que não temos grande talento para estes estudos. pic.twitter.com/Qvb4GDdQan
— Moita de Deus (@Deus_outro) January 30, 2024
Como não recordar leituras já feitas...
- em 2012 (como o tempo voa) O problema não é étnico... talvez genético, citação de "Thinking, Fast and Slow" de Daniel Kahneman:
"A 2005 study examined rail projects undertaken worldwide between 1969 and 1998. In more than 90% of the cases, the number of passengers projected to use the system was overestimated. Even though these passenger shortfalls were widely publicized, forecasts did not improve over those thirty years; on average, planners overestimated how many people would use the new rail projects by 106%, and the average cost overrun was 45%. As more evidence accumulated, the experts did not become more reliant on it"
- em 2023 li "How Big Things Get Done" de Bent Flyvbjerg e Dan Gardner. Os autores escrevem sobre a "Planning fallacy" e sobre a "The commitment fallacy":
"Research documents that the planning fallacy is pervasive, but we need only look at ourselves and the people around us to know that. You expect to get downtown on a Saturday night within twenty minutes, but it takes forty minutes instead and now you're latejust like last time and the time before that. You think you'll have your toddler asleep after fifteen minutes of bedtime stories, but it takes half an hour —as usual. You're sure you will submit your term paper a few days early this time, but you end up pulling an all-nighter and make the deadline with a minute to spare —as always.
These aren't intentional miscalculations. Much of the voluminous research on the subject involves people who are not trying to win a contract, get financing for a project, or ...
For us to be so consistently wrong, we must consistently ignore experience. And we do, for various reasons. When we think of the future, the past may simply not come to mind and we may not think to dig it up because it's the present and future we are interested in. If it does surface, we may think "This time is different" and dismiss it (an option that's always available because, in a sense, every moment in life is unique).
...
Purposes and goals are not carefully considered. Alternatives are not explored. Difficulties and risks are not investigated. Solutions are not found. Instead, shallow analysis is followed by quick lock-in to a decision that sweeps aside all the other forms the project could take. "Lock-in," as scholars refer to it, is the notion that although there may be alternatives, most people and organizations behave as if they have no choice but to push on, even past the point where they put themselves at more cost or risk than they would have accepted at the start. This is followed by action. And usually, sometime after that, by trouble; for instance, in the guise of the "break-fix cycle" mentioned in chapter 1.
I call such premature lock-in the "commitment fallacy." It is a behavioral bias on a par with the other biases identified by behavioral science.
...
One is what I call "strategic misrepresentation," the tendency to deliberately and systematically distort or misstate information for strategic purposes. If you want to win a contract or get a project approved, superficial planning is handy because it glosses over major challenges, which keeps the estimated cost and time down, which wins contracts and gets projects approved. But as certain as the law of gravity, challenges ignored during planning will eventually boomerang back as delays and cost overruns during delivery. By then the project will be too far along to turn back. Getting to that point of no return is the real goal of strategic misrepresentation. It is politics, resulting in failure by design.
...
But as projects get bigger and decisions more consequential, the influence of money and power grows. Powerful individuals and organizations make the decisions, the number of stakeholders increases, they lobby for their specific interests, and the name of the game is politics. And the balance shifts from psychology to strategic misrepresentation."
