Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta fail forward fast. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta fail forward fast. Mostrar todas as mensagens
sábado, agosto 27, 2011
Impaciente com os lucros e paciente com o volume (parte II)
Continuado da parte I.
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Talvez o que se abordou na parte I seja uma explicação lisonjeira para esta notícia "Facebook ending Deals product after four-month test"
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"However, Facebook's decision not to pursue the business may mean the company thinks the approach lacks merit."
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Talvez o que se abordou na parte I seja uma explicação lisonjeira para esta notícia "Facebook ending Deals product after four-month test"
.
"However, Facebook's decision not to pursue the business may mean the company thinks the approach lacks merit."
quarta-feira, dezembro 08, 2010
sexta-feira, dezembro 14, 2007
"Managing for Breakthroughs in Productivity" parte II
Nem de propósito, o artigo "Managing for Breakthroughs in Productivity" de Allan Scherr, sobre o qual começamos a escrever ontem, refere:
"Successful organizations often give high priority to the minimization of risk and maximization of predictability. This is done to encourage what is seen as the source of past successes and to discourage what is seen as the cause of past failures. This priority is inappropriate, however, if unprecedented, extraordinary results are sought. Nevertheless, the management systems established in most large organizations have an implicit and largely unexamined bias against creating the kind of projects described in this article."
Hoje, descubro no artigo "Is It Real? Can We Win? Is It Worth Doing?: Managing Risk and Reward in an Innovation Portfolio" de George S. Day, na revista Harvard Business Review deste mês.
"Minor innovations make up 85% to 90% of companies’ development portfolios, on average, but they rarely generate the growth companies seek. At a time when companies should be taking bigger—but smart—innovation risks, their bias is in the other direction. From 1990 to 2004 the percentage of major innovations in development portfolios dropped from 20.4 to 11.5—even as the number of growth initiatives rose. The result is internal traffic jams of safe, incremental innovations that delay all projects, stress organizations, and fail to achieve revenue goals."
...
"According to one study, only 14% of new-product launches were substantial innovations, but they accounted for 61% of all profit from innovations among the companies examined.
The aversion to Big I projects stems from a belief that they are too risky and their rewards (if any) will accrue too far in the future. Certainly the probability of failure rises sharply when a company ventures beyond incremental initiatives within familiar markets. But avoiding risky projects altogether can strangle growth."
...
Ontem, almocei com o gerente de uma empresa que já está "infectado"!!!
A uma empresa com contabilidade analítica, e com gente, internamente, que analisa os números, bastou um ano.
Bastou um ano, para ficarem "viciados"!!!
O lançamento de um novo produto, num mercado tradicional (Oh meu Deus, e como é tradicional!), permitiu ganhos de rentabilidade invejáveis.
"Para o próximo ano, queremos mais do mesmo. Temos de colocar no mercado mais produtos novos!!!"
Alguém sabe quais são as características de um produto novo bem sucedido?
Só o mercado!
Assim, há que arriscar. Ou como diz Tom Peters:
""The whole damn purpose is to test stuff, try stuff," Peters said.
"And whether you're shooting pool, playing golf or playing violin, the only way you learn is if you're screwing up.
My major argument in the world of business is there's too much planning and too much talking, and not enough doing. The only way you grow, for God's sake, is go out and do it, and then correct quick."
So Peters endorses failure, calling it "not only normal but good," so long as that failure is achieved by trying something "with incredible vigor" and not through laziness." Se enquadrarmos bem as coisas, nós, humanos, somos o resultado de mais de 2 milhões de anos de falhas... corrigo, somos o resultado de 4,5 bilhões de anos de falhas, de falhas espectaculares. After all: "The only way you grow, for God's sake, is go out and do it, and then correct quick."
Mas haviam de ter visto o brilho dos olhos do gerente, quando dizia que apesar de terem aumentado os custos com pessoal, o peso dos custos com o pessoal diluíu-se, face ao aumento das margens.
"Successful organizations often give high priority to the minimization of risk and maximization of predictability. This is done to encourage what is seen as the source of past successes and to discourage what is seen as the cause of past failures. This priority is inappropriate, however, if unprecedented, extraordinary results are sought. Nevertheless, the management systems established in most large organizations have an implicit and largely unexamined bias against creating the kind of projects described in this article."
Hoje, descubro no artigo "Is It Real? Can We Win? Is It Worth Doing?: Managing Risk and Reward in an Innovation Portfolio" de George S. Day, na revista Harvard Business Review deste mês.
"Minor innovations make up 85% to 90% of companies’ development portfolios, on average, but they rarely generate the growth companies seek. At a time when companies should be taking bigger—but smart—innovation risks, their bias is in the other direction. From 1990 to 2004 the percentage of major innovations in development portfolios dropped from 20.4 to 11.5—even as the number of growth initiatives rose. The result is internal traffic jams of safe, incremental innovations that delay all projects, stress organizations, and fail to achieve revenue goals."
...
"According to one study, only 14% of new-product launches were substantial innovations, but they accounted for 61% of all profit from innovations among the companies examined.
The aversion to Big I projects stems from a belief that they are too risky and their rewards (if any) will accrue too far in the future. Certainly the probability of failure rises sharply when a company ventures beyond incremental initiatives within familiar markets. But avoiding risky projects altogether can strangle growth."
...
Ontem, almocei com o gerente de uma empresa que já está "infectado"!!!
A uma empresa com contabilidade analítica, e com gente, internamente, que analisa os números, bastou um ano.
Bastou um ano, para ficarem "viciados"!!!
O lançamento de um novo produto, num mercado tradicional (Oh meu Deus, e como é tradicional!), permitiu ganhos de rentabilidade invejáveis.
"Para o próximo ano, queremos mais do mesmo. Temos de colocar no mercado mais produtos novos!!!"
Alguém sabe quais são as características de um produto novo bem sucedido?
Só o mercado!
Assim, há que arriscar. Ou como diz Tom Peters:
""The whole damn purpose is to test stuff, try stuff," Peters said.
"And whether you're shooting pool, playing golf or playing violin, the only way you learn is if you're screwing up.
My major argument in the world of business is there's too much planning and too much talking, and not enough doing. The only way you grow, for God's sake, is go out and do it, and then correct quick."
So Peters endorses failure, calling it "not only normal but good," so long as that failure is achieved by trying something "with incredible vigor" and not through laziness." Se enquadrarmos bem as coisas, nós, humanos, somos o resultado de mais de 2 milhões de anos de falhas... corrigo, somos o resultado de 4,5 bilhões de anos de falhas, de falhas espectaculares. After all: "The only way you grow, for God's sake, is go out and do it, and then correct quick."
Mas haviam de ter visto o brilho dos olhos do gerente, quando dizia que apesar de terem aumentado os custos com pessoal, o peso dos custos com o pessoal diluíu-se, face ao aumento das margens.
quinta-feira, agosto 16, 2007
Fail forward fast...
""The whole damn purpose is to test stuff, try stuff," Peters said. "And whether you're shooting pool, playing golf or playing violin, the only way you learn is if you're screwing up.
My major argument in the world of business is there's too much planning and too much talking, and not enough doing.
The only way you grow, for God's sake, is go out and do it, and then correct quick."
So Peters endorses failure, calling it "not only normal but good," so long as that failure is achieved by trying something "with incredible vigor" and not through laziness. "
Fail forward fast... Tom Peters.
My major argument in the world of business is there's too much planning and too much talking, and not enough doing.
The only way you grow, for God's sake, is go out and do it, and then correct quick."
So Peters endorses failure, calling it "not only normal but good," so long as that failure is achieved by trying something "with incredible vigor" and not through laziness. "
Fail forward fast... Tom Peters.
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