Para reflexão

No Twitter, o @joaomiranda escreveu:

"Sabiam que, no 11 de Setembro, o voo 93 não foi usado como míssil porque a porta do cockpit não era blindada? (29 de Março)
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Segurança aérea chegou à fase em q nenhuma medida é melhoria de Pareto (2 de Abril)
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Ou se quiserem, estão a tentar fazer trading com ruído (2 de Abril)"

Lembrei-me logo deste postal "and then some":

""We rightfully add safety systems to things like planes and oil rigs, and hedge the bets of major banks, in an effort to encourage them to run safely yet ever-more efficiently. Each of these safety features, however, also increases the complexity of the whole. Add enough of them, and soon these otherwise beneficial features become potential sources of risk themselves, as the number of possible interactions — both anticipated and unanticipated — between various components becomes incomprehensibly large.
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This, in turn, amplifies uncertainty when things go wrong, making crises harder to correct ..."

E deste artigo "Why rules can’t solve everything" (um francês nunca escreveria isto, o ADN cultural impedi-lo-ia):

"Social work is difficult not because of the kinds of predictable situations that can be mitigated but because of the ones no one saw coming.
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But no amount of rules will prevent every case of child death.  Just like no amount of rules will eliminate every case of discrimination, every war, every instance of every bad thing that happens to humans.
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Rules look after complicated problems in which the cause and the effect are clear going forward.  But the problems we are seeing now are complex, meaning that the cause and the effect are only obvious in retrospect.  ...  Retrospective coherence contains a dangerous pitfall for decision makers: it fools you into believe that the causes of a particular event are knowable."

and then some

"We rightfully add safety systems to things like planes and oil rigs, and hedge the bets of major banks, in an effort to encourage them to run safely yet ever-more efficiently. Each of these safety features, however, also increases the complexity of the whole. Add enough of them, and soon these otherwise beneficial features become potential sources of risk themselves, as the number of possible interactions — both anticipated and unanticipated — between various components becomes incomprehensibly large.
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This, in turn, amplifies uncertainty when things go wrong, making crises harder to correct: Is that flashing alert signaling a genuine emergency? Is it a false alarm? Or is it the result of some complex interaction nobody has ever seen before? Imagine facing a dozen such alerts simultaneously, and having to decide what's true and false about all of them at the same time. Imagine further that, if you choose incorrectly, you will push the system into an unrecoverable catastrophe. Now, give yourself just a few seconds to make the right choice. How much should you be blamed if you make the wrong one?"

Vem-me logo à mente "Eliminar o pivot - esse é o objectivo" e "Diagnosing “vulnerable system syndrome”: an essential prerequisite to effective risk management"
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E, no fundo, é também o que se passa com as sociedades que se tornaram demasiado complexas para este nível do jogo e estão maduras para o reset e o recomeço num nível seguinte... Recordar Tainter:

"Tainter’s thesis is that when society’s elite members add one layer of bureaucracy or demand one tribute too many, they end up extracting all the value from their environment it is possible to extract and then some.
The ‘and them some’ is what causes the trouble. Complex societies collapse because, when some stress comes, those societies have become too inflexible to respond. In retrospect, this can seem mystifying. Why didn’t these societies just re-tool in less complex ways? The answer Tainter gives is the simplest one: When societies fail to respond to reduced circumstances through orderly downsizing, it isn’t because they don’t want to, it’s because they can’t.
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In such systems, there is no way to make things a little bit simpler – the whole edifice becomes a huge, interlocking system not readily amenable to change."

Trecho inicial retirado de "Want to Build Resilience? Kill the Complexity"

Uma leitura mais actual do que nunca

"The Collapse of Complex Societies" de Joseph A. Tainter.

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Um resumo por Clay Shirky aqui:

"The answer he arrived at was that they hadn’t collapsed despite their cultural sophistication, they’d collapsed because of it. Subject to violent compression, Tainter’s story goes like this: a group of people, through a combination of social organization and environmental luck, finds itself with a surplus of resources. Managing this surplus makes society more complex—agriculture rewards mathematical skill, granaries require new forms of construction, and so on.
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Early on, the marginal value of this complexity is positive—each additional bit of complexity more than pays for itself in improved output—but over time, the law of diminishing returns reduces the marginal value, until it disappears completely. At this point, any additional complexity is pure cost.
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Tainter’s thesis is that when society’s elite members add one layer of bureaucracy or demand one tribute too many, they end up extracting all the value from their environment it is possible to extract and then some.
.
The ‘and them some’ is what causes the trouble. Complex societies collapse because, when some stress comes, those societies have become too inflexible to respond. In retrospect, this can seem mystifying. Why didn’t these societies just re-tool in less complex ways? The answer Tainter gives is the simplest one: When societies fail to respond to reduced circumstances through orderly downsizing, it isn’t because they don’t want to, it’s because they can’t.
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In such systems, there is no way to make things a little bit simpler – the whole edifice becomes a huge, interlocking system not readily amenable to change."

Outro resumo aqui:

"Yet a society experiencing declining marginal returns is investing even more heavily in a strategy that is yielding proportionately less. Excess productive capacity will at some point be used up, and accumulated surpluses allocated to current operating needs. There is, then, little or no surplus with which to counter major adversities. Unexpected stress surges must be dealt with out of the current operating budget, often ineffectually, and always to the detriment of the system as a whole. Even if the stress is successfully met, the society is weakened in the process, and made even more vulnerable to the next crisis. Once a complex society develops the vulnerabilities of declining marginal returns, collapse may merely require sufficient passage of time to render probable the occurrence of an insurmountable calamity.
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Secondly, declining marginal returns make complexity a less attractive problem-solving strategy. When marginal returns decline, the advantages to complexity become ultimately no greater (for society as a whole) than those for less costly social forms. The marginal cost of evolution to a higher level of complexity, or of remaining at the present level, is high compared to the alternative of disintegration.
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Under such conditions, the option to decompose (that is, to sever the ties that link localized groups to a regional entity) become attractive to certain components of a complex society. As marginal returns deteriorate, tax rates rise with less and less return to the local level. Irrigation systems go untended, bridges and roads are not kept up, and the frontier is not adequately defended. Many of the social units that comprise a complex society perceive increased advantage to a strategy of independence, and begin to pursue their own immediate goals rather than long-term goals of the hierarchy. Behavioral interdependence gives way to behavioral independence, requiring the hierarchy to allocating still more of a shrinking resource base to legitimation and/or control."

Outro ponto de vista interessante:

"Collapse, in Tainter's view, only looks like collapse because we privilege the institutions of complexity: collapse is a sensible economic decision on the part of the people in the society, to refactor complexity into simple units, and do away with the cost of the managerial organisation. If building of monuments - capacitors of work capacity, essentially - stops, everyone is a little bit richer (though: no more pyramids)."

Medidas fascistas, inconstitucionais, ataque aos direitos adquiridos, exploração capitalista

Aconselho a leitura deste artigo da Bloomberg "Swiss Exporters Mull Euro Wages to Blunt Franc".
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Apreciar a flexibilidade da sociedade civil suíça. Empresas, sindicatos, trabalhadores, n alternativas individuais... não uma resposta simples, rápida, homogénea e... errada.
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Melhor, muito melhor esta receita do que as que se usam por cá que passam por mais tributos, mais jugo, mais impostos...
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"when society’s elite members add one layer of bureaucracy or demand one tribute too many, they end up extracting all the value from their environment it is possible to extract and then some.
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The ‘and them some’ is what causes the trouble. Complex societies collapse because, when some stress comes, those societies have become too inflexible to respond."
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Há um título de Agatha Christie que é qualquer coisa como "Death comes as the end" que me vem recorrentemente à mente na versão "A bancarrota surge como a consequência mais natural..."

Acordar as moscas que estão a dormir (parte XXXV)

O jornal i chama a atenção para o que aí virá "Os números assustam":
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"É esta tendência que permite dizer: em Setembro, depois das eleições, seja quem for que as ganhe vai aumentar impostos. Se não o fizer, e terminar o mandato com um défice mais baixo do que aquele que encontrou, entrará para a história como um caso único da política portuguesa."
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Já tenho comigo um dos livros que espero ler durante o mês de Agosto "The Collapse of Complex Societies" de Joseph Tainter:
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"Societies are complex entities; he understands that. And, hence, their collapse must be related to complexity. Here is an excerpt of Tainter's way of thinking. It is a transcription of a interview that Tainter gave in the film "Blind Spot" (2008)

In ancient societies that I studied, for example the Roman Empire, the great problem that they faced was when they would have to incur very high costs just to maintain the status quo. Invest very high amounts in solving problems that don't yield a net positive return, but instead simply allowed them to maintain what they already got. This decreases the net benefit of being a complex society.

So, you see that Tainter has one thing very clear: complexity gives a benefit, but it is also a cost. This cost is related to energy, as he makes clear in his book. And in emphasizing complexity, Tainter gives us a good definition of what we intend for collapse. Very often people have been discussing the collapse of ancient societies without specifying what they meant for "collapse". For a while, there has been a school of thought that maintained that the Roman Empire had never really "collapsed". It had simply transformed itself into something else. But if you take collapse defined as "a rapid reduction of complexity" then you have a good definition and that's surely what happened to the Roman Empire."

O constante aumento de impostos "O que importa é mostrar o ritmo alucinante desse crescimento acumulado: 27% todos os anos. E como se não bastasse, este murro no estômago é precedido de outro: os impostos cresceram ainda mais rápido do que a despesa - financiando cada tostão a mais gasto pelos nossos governantes." obriga a um aumento progressivo da complexidade que fica cada vez mais cara e que traz cada vez mais menos valor acrescentado... até que se torna num peso insuportável e os geradores de riqueza colapsam e com eles, por arrasto, como consequência da falta de dinheiro, o edifício social implode.