Para reflexão

No Twitter, o @joaomiranda escreveu:

"Sabiam que, no 11 de Setembro, o voo 93 não foi usado como míssil porque a porta do cockpit não era blindada? (29 de Março)
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Segurança aérea chegou à fase em q nenhuma medida é melhoria de Pareto (2 de Abril)
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Ou se quiserem, estão a tentar fazer trading com ruído (2 de Abril)"

Lembrei-me logo deste postal "and then some":

""We rightfully add safety systems to things like planes and oil rigs, and hedge the bets of major banks, in an effort to encourage them to run safely yet ever-more efficiently. Each of these safety features, however, also increases the complexity of the whole. Add enough of them, and soon these otherwise beneficial features become potential sources of risk themselves, as the number of possible interactions — both anticipated and unanticipated — between various components becomes incomprehensibly large.
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This, in turn, amplifies uncertainty when things go wrong, making crises harder to correct ..."

E deste artigo "Why rules can’t solve everything" (um francês nunca escreveria isto, o ADN cultural impedi-lo-ia):

"Social work is difficult not because of the kinds of predictable situations that can be mitigated but because of the ones no one saw coming.
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But no amount of rules will prevent every case of child death.  Just like no amount of rules will eliminate every case of discrimination, every war, every instance of every bad thing that happens to humans.
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Rules look after complicated problems in which the cause and the effect are clear going forward.  But the problems we are seeing now are complex, meaning that the cause and the effect are only obvious in retrospect.  ...  Retrospective coherence contains a dangerous pitfall for decision makers: it fools you into believe that the causes of a particular event are knowable."