Não são parafusos, são pessoas

Um tema que os professores Guedes Miranda e Vitorino me deram a conhecer quando andava no 10º e 11º anos de escolaridade: o indeterminismo. A incapacidade de ter à priori toda a informação, mas mesmo que a tivéssemos teríamos de viver com o facto da mesma acção não gerar os mesmos efeitos ao longo do tempo. Einstein, da velha guarda, dizia que Deus não joga aos dados.

“War is an environment, he argued, in which getting simple things to happen is very difficult and getting difficult things to happen is impossible.
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The gap is described as the difference between what we know and what we can do, as the gulf between planning and execution
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It is important here to understand the nature of Clausewitz’s disagreement with von Bülow, and others of the school of scientific generalship. They too recognized that chance and uncertainty played a role in war. The difference was that they believed these factors could be eliminated by a more scientific approach to planning. Certainty of outcomes could be achieved by anyone who could gather and correctly process data about topological and geographical distances, march tables, supply needs, and the geometrical relationship between armies and their bases. They believed that in many cases this would render fighting unnecessary.
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Clausewitz disagreed on two counts. First, he believed that friction was as inherent to war as it is to mechanical engineering and could therefore never be eliminated but only mitigated. Secondly, he believed that studying march tables and the like was not a fruitful means of mitigation. In fact, he came to think that friction had to be worked with. It actually provided opportunities, and could be used by a general just as much as it could be used by an engineer. The first thing was to recognize its existence. The second thing was to understand its nature. That was and remains more difficult.
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The very business of getting an organization made up of individuals, no matter how disciplined, to pursue a collective goal produces friction just as surely as applying the brakes of a car. Because of the role of chance, actual outcomes are inherently unpredictable.
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There is a gap between the actions we planned and the actions actually taken.
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no one should develop a strategy without taking into account the effects of organizational friction. Yet we continue to be surprised and frustrated when it manifests itself. We tend to think everything has gone wrong when in fact everything has gone normally. The existence of friction is why armies need officers and businesses need managers. Anticipating and dealing with it form the core of managerial work. Recognizing that is liberating in itself.
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Not only is an army not a “well-oiled machine,” the machine generates resistance of its own, because the parts it is made of are human. Although Clausewitz’s metaphors are all taken from mechanics rather than biology, he clearly sees where the metaphor itself begins to break down. He is reaching toward the idea of the organization as an organism. While the scientific school sought to eliminate human factors to make the organization as machine-like as possible, Clausewitz sought to exploit them.”

Clausewitz não via o factor humano como um defeito.


Excerto de: Bungay, Stephen. “The Art of Action: Leadership that Closes the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results”