Acerca da avaliação de pessoas

"it must be a strengths-based system. Current systems are explicitly remedial, built on the belief that to help people get better you must measure them against a series of competency bars, point out where they fall short, and then challenge them to jump higher.
...
it must be a system focused on the future. Our current systems are fixated on feedback about the past.
...
On another level, though, better performance management dispenses with all this because future-focused coaching is demonstrably a better use of time than past-focused feedback. To accelerate my performance tomorrow, don’t try to grade my personality with feedback from all sides—it will always be hard to give, hard to receive, and net a disproportionately small performance return. Instead, coach me on the few specific work-related activities that I could usefully add to my strengths repertoire tomorrow. Or tell me what skills I should go acquire next week. Or advise me which specific contacts I should seek out next month. None of these will necessarily be easy for me to do, but at least they will be something that I can do. They are in the future. In the new performance system, this is where most of our time and creativity will be focused."

Ao ler isto, lembrei-me logo da carta que Zender pede aos seus alunos no início do semestre. Recordar "to place themselves in the future, looking back, and to report on"

Trecho retirado de "What if Performance Management Focused on Strengths?"

Para quem se queixa da China...

David Birnbaum apresenta a seguinte equação para definir o que é o custo:
.

COST = EXPECTED RETAIL PRICE - PROFIT

.
Depois, define três modelos de compra no mundo do têxtil:

• Factory Direct;
• Private Label; 
• Brand Name Importer.

Para cada um dos modelos constrói uma folha de custos que abrange as três fases: pré-produção; produção; e pós-produção.

.

"Note that the three models differ only in the intermediary costs - the retailer's import office add-on, the private label importer markup, and the brans name importer markup."

...

"One point is abundantly clear: CM (custos de produção) is 3% - 6% of full retail price. This is truly a trivial item and certainly not worth the effort we have all been making for the past half century or so to reduce it. In truth, even FOB with its 12% - 18% of full retail price is not that important." (Moi ici: Please go back and re-read this phrase two times or more)

.

"What is now abundantly clear is that the two most important components of the full retail price are the intermediary costs and the markdowns... But by far the largest component of full retail price is markdowns. ... We live in a world where the markdown is greater than the total FOB and usually greater than the DDP (Delivery Duty Paid). Reducing markdowns must be at the center of any future buying or supplying strategy.

.

If intermediary costs and markdowns are so important, why isn't anyone in the industry making an effort to reduce them?"

.

De onde vêm os markdowns?
.
Tempos de ciclo gigantes e morosos como se conta aqui, geram lentidão e incapacidade de resposta.
.
Isto devia deixar muita gente a pensar.
.
Trecho retirado do livro livro de David Birnbaum "Crisis in the 21st Century Garment Industry and Breakthrough Unified Strategies".

O tempo de feedback associado a um plano (parte II)

Continuado daqui.

.

Agora imaginemos que o Grande Planeador desenha um plano espectacular e avança-se para a sua implementação.

.

Donella H. Meadows no seu livro "Thinking in Systems - A Primer" chama a atenção para um factor que permite actuar sobre os sistemas, o tempo de feedback.

.

"Delays in feedback loops are critical determinants of system behavior.
They are common causes of oscillations. If you’re trying to adjust a stock (your store inventory) to meet your goal, but you receive only delayed information about what the state of the stock is, you will overshoot and undershoot your goal. The same is true if your information is timely, but your response isn’t.
…
A system just can’t respond to short-term changes when it has long-term delays. That’s why a massive central-planning system, such as the Soviet Union or General Motors, necessarily functions poorly.
...
A delay in a feedback process is critical relative to rates of change in the stocks that the feedback loop is trying to control. Delays that are too short cause overreaction, “chasing your tail,” oscillations amplified by the jumpiness of the response. Delays that are too long cause damped, sustained, or exploding oscillations, depending on how much too long. Overlong delays in a system with a threshold, a danger point, a range past which irreversible damage can occur, cause overshoot and collapse."

.

Seria bonito...

O tempo de feedback associado a um plano (plano I)

Sou um aficionado do planeamento... sou mesmo um fanático do planeamento.

.

No entanto, não vejo o planeamento como um mandamento que não pode ser violado de maneira nenhuma. Um plano é uma ferramenta, é a nossa melhor tentativa para organizar os recursos necessários a concretizar um dado objectivo. A meio da concretização do plano, no entanto, podemos concluir que o melhor é reformular, é rever o plano.

.

O grande risco de quem faz planos é o de se tornar prisioneiro deles.

.

"Organizations create plans to prepare for the inevitable, preempt the undesirable, and control the controllable. Rational as all this may sound, planning has its shortcomings. Because planners plan in stable, predictable contexts, they are lulled into thinking that the world will unfold in the expected manner, a lapse that Henry Mintzberg calls “the fallacy of predetermination.” When people are in thrall of predetermination, there is simply no place for unexpected events that fall outside the realm of planning.
.
Plans, in short, can do just the opposite of what is intended, creating mindlessness instead of mindful anticipation of the unexpected.
…
Strong expectations influence what people see, what they choose to take for granted, what they choose to ignore, and the length of time it takes to recognize small problems that are growing. When people impose their expectations on ambiguous stimuli, they typically fill in the gaps, read between the lines, and complete the picture as best they can. Typically, this means that they complete the picture in ways that confirm what they expected to see. Slight deviations from the normal course of events are smoothed over and quickly lose their salience. It is only after a space shuttle explodes or illicit trading is exposed or vehicle tires come apart that people see a clear and ominous pattern in the weak signals they had previously dismissed.
By design, then, plans influence perception and reduce the number of things people notice. This occurs because people encode the world largely into the categories activated by the plan. Anything that is deemed “irrelevant” to the plan gets only cursory attention. And yet it is these very irrelevancies that are the seedbed of the unexpected events that make for unreliable functioning.
...
… that plans presume that consistent high quality outcomes will be produced time after time if people repeat patterns of activity that have worked in the past. The problem with this logic is that routines can’t handle novel events."

.

Tendo isto em conta imaginem o que seria acreditar e aplicar o Grande Plano, a Grande Estratégia definida pelo Estado?

.

Continua.

.

Trecho retirado de "Managing the Unexpected" de Karl E. Weick e Kathleen M. Sutcliffe.