quinta-feira, dezembro 30, 2010
E que tal ter um governo que governasse como se o futuro contasse
Lê-se "Estado português deverá realizar 15 novas emissões de dívida nos primeiros três meses do próximo ano", tempera-se com "Inflação acelera na Alemanha e coloca novo dilema à política monetária do BCE" e vêm à mente sentimentos que se podem concretizar neste título:
.
"The Economics of Enough: How to Run a Country as If the Future Matters"
.
Quando se discutem as diferentes formas de governância das empresas. é comum argumentar que o gestor profissional pode ter uma actuação nefasta para o futuro sustentado da empresa ao procurar maximizar o desempenho, a imagem da empresa, durante a sua permanência no poder, à custa do desempenho no longo-prazo, altura em que já não estará na empresa. Ou seja, luzes e glamour hoje, escondem a construção e o reforço das condições que ditarão a falência futura da empresa.
.
Nem de propósito estes trechos sobre as empresas familiares:
.
"It’s not just in Brazil that family-controlled firms deftly handled the crisis. According to several new studies, those companies actually outperformed their publicly held counterparts both going into the downturn and during it, and have in many cases emerged better positioned as the global economy lifts itself off the floor. They were less saddled by debt and kept more cash on hand. They scored better financing when credit markets froze, and they maintained higher investments in research and development all through the downturn. Another reason that families outperformed, according to the reports: as publicly listed companies saw revenues and earnings collapse, pressure from shareholders and analysts to show good quarterly results often made these companies act rashly, desperately slashing costs, cutting staff, and severing ties with vendors. (Moi ici: Por momentos imaginem um governo como uma empresa cotada na bolsa e, os credores como os accionistas que não querem perder o seu dinheiro... em que se traduz a austeridade?)
...
Family firms were often able to take a longer-term, more strategic approach (Moi ici: Acham que Cravinho está preocupado com o flop das SCUTs? Acham que Sócrates ou PSL estarão preocupados com o pagamento daquelas 15 emissões lá em cima dentro de 5/10 anos?) and kept stronger relations with their customers, says Harvard Business School professor Belén Villalonga, who has just completed a study comparing the performance of 4,000 family and public firms in the U.S. and Europe. Between 2006 and 2009, she says, family-controlled firms both gained market share—increasing sales 2 percent faster than nonfamily firms—and outperformed their public peers by 6 percent on company market value.
...
In the second half of the 20th century, business schools turned against the idea of bloodlines controlling balance sheets. Family companies were considered poorly managed, slow to innovate, and prone to rivalries and infighting. Often they were subject to the whims of a powerful patriarch. Many declined or went out of business in the second or third generation. To this day, family businesses have a negative connotation, especially in the U.S., even though some 60 percent of all publicly traded firms (including 40 percent of the Fortune 500) have the founding family exercising either control or significant influence."
.
Trechos retirados de "In Hard Times, Family Firms Do Better"
.
"The Economics of Enough: How to Run a Country as If the Future Matters"
.
Quando se discutem as diferentes formas de governância das empresas. é comum argumentar que o gestor profissional pode ter uma actuação nefasta para o futuro sustentado da empresa ao procurar maximizar o desempenho, a imagem da empresa, durante a sua permanência no poder, à custa do desempenho no longo-prazo, altura em que já não estará na empresa. Ou seja, luzes e glamour hoje, escondem a construção e o reforço das condições que ditarão a falência futura da empresa.
.
Nem de propósito estes trechos sobre as empresas familiares:
.
"It’s not just in Brazil that family-controlled firms deftly handled the crisis. According to several new studies, those companies actually outperformed their publicly held counterparts both going into the downturn and during it, and have in many cases emerged better positioned as the global economy lifts itself off the floor. They were less saddled by debt and kept more cash on hand. They scored better financing when credit markets froze, and they maintained higher investments in research and development all through the downturn. Another reason that families outperformed, according to the reports: as publicly listed companies saw revenues and earnings collapse, pressure from shareholders and analysts to show good quarterly results often made these companies act rashly, desperately slashing costs, cutting staff, and severing ties with vendors. (Moi ici: Por momentos imaginem um governo como uma empresa cotada na bolsa e, os credores como os accionistas que não querem perder o seu dinheiro... em que se traduz a austeridade?)
...
Family firms were often able to take a longer-term, more strategic approach (Moi ici: Acham que Cravinho está preocupado com o flop das SCUTs? Acham que Sócrates ou PSL estarão preocupados com o pagamento daquelas 15 emissões lá em cima dentro de 5/10 anos?) and kept stronger relations with their customers, says Harvard Business School professor Belén Villalonga, who has just completed a study comparing the performance of 4,000 family and public firms in the U.S. and Europe. Between 2006 and 2009, she says, family-controlled firms both gained market share—increasing sales 2 percent faster than nonfamily firms—and outperformed their public peers by 6 percent on company market value.
...
In the second half of the 20th century, business schools turned against the idea of bloodlines controlling balance sheets. Family companies were considered poorly managed, slow to innovate, and prone to rivalries and infighting. Often they were subject to the whims of a powerful patriarch. Many declined or went out of business in the second or third generation. To this day, family businesses have a negative connotation, especially in the U.S., even though some 60 percent of all publicly traded firms (including 40 percent of the Fortune 500) have the founding family exercising either control or significant influence."
.
Trechos retirados de "In Hard Times, Family Firms Do Better"
Subscrever:
Enviar feedback (Atom)
1 comentário:
É claro que este modelo está falido. Os Estados, nomeadamente o Português, têm andado a empurrar a dívida com a barriga. Fazem hoje para pagar amanhã, quando eles já não estiverem a governar. É a tal lógica do curto prazo, que apenas se preocupa em mostrar resultados (ganhar eleições) no curto prazo. Não existe, e com este modelo, não existirá uma estratégia séria de longo prazo.
Muitos empréstimos já são efectuados para pagar despesas correntes, o que contradiz uma das regras mais básicas de gestão.
Enviar um comentário