Joaquim Aguiar no último Think Tank.
"É um partido distributivo.Portanto, toda a sua estruturação mental é para distribuir.Nesse sentido, para percebermos qual é a diferença do ponto de vista de condução de uma sociedade, é diferença entre um padrinho e um pai. O padrinho distribui brinquedos e ofertas porque não tem obrigação de educar a criança. Um pai tem a obrigação de educar a criança para que quando ela for adulta não esteja dependente da miséria, e portanto tem de a treinar com hábitos de trabalho, de competição, de comparação com o que outros fazem. Neste sentido o padrinho é aquele que protege os mais desfavorecidos, mas o pai é aquele que prepara os competitivos.Por que é muito importante esta diferença? Porque na moeda única o que se comparam são competitividades não são capacidades reivindicativas nem potencial distributivo. Com a mesma moeda os melhores vão ganhar as melhores actividades e, portanto vão ser mais ricos do que os piores. E isso não tem nada a ver com a distribuição ou justiça social tem a ver com uma regra elementar, se a métrica de comparação é igual a todos, então quem é melhor vai revelar-se rapidamente. E tão rapidamente que nem sequer é um problema de ideologia, é um problema de eficácia.Ora, o que se percebeu com esta crise no Serviço Nacional de Saúde é que um mecanismo distributivo típico dos padrinhos atinge o limite. E portanto, revelou a sua incapacidade de regeneração para que, pela via competitiva, pudesse melhorar em qualidade e eficiência de serviços. E portanto, reduzimos essa atividade uma atividade de funcionários públicos, mas os funcionários públicos têm o grande problema de não conseguirem inventar um novo estado. Por que só conseguem trabalhar no estado que os recrutou."
Entretanto, ontem via Twitter tive conhecimento deste artigo, "Persistence Despite Revolutions"
Interesting with the late Alessina https://t.co/edWn8Owt55
— Antonio Nogueira Leite (@al_antdp) September 3, 2022
Alguns trechos:
"general pattern across China: despite extraordinary repression, the descendants of the prerevolution elite are significantly and substantially better off today than those from the non-elite households....We first document that after the Communist and Cultural Revolutions, the parents generation of the pre-revolution elite enjoyed no more tangible advantages in wealth and formal educational attainment than their non-elite peers. In the immediate aftermath of the Communist Revolution, the pre-revolution elite, who used to own six times more land per household than the rest of the population, no longer owned more land than the poor peasants. The county-level Gini coefficient in land ownership decreased from 0.5 before the revolution to under 0.1 right afterwards. The Cultural Revolution also effectively leveled the educational advantage of the former elite houseolds. If anything, the parents generation of the pre-revolution elite received less formal education than their non-elite peers, as individuals with elite background were discriminated against in their access to formal education throughout the Cultural Revolution.However, the immediate and immense impact of the revolutions felt by the parents generation is no longer present among the third, children generation. The patterns of inequality that characterized the grandparents generation re-emerges. By 2010, individuals whose grandparents were part of the pre-revolution elite earned a 16 percent higher income each year, have completed more than 11 percent additional years of schooling, and hold more prestigious and demanding jobs than those from the non-elite households. In other words, while the revolutions explicitly aimed to reverse the rankings of socioeconomic status between the elite and non-elite households, they did not manage to do so beyond one generation....What explains the resurgence of the pre-revolution elite among the children generation? In particular, could the resurgence be accounted for by the greater physical capital, human capital, or social capital that may have been transmitted among the pre-revolution elite? We begin by ruling out a number of potential explanations for rebound. The revolutions' effective effort to shut down land inheritance - the most important asset in rural areas - and access to secondary and higher education as observed among the parents generation indicates that physical capital and human capital acquired through formal channels of schooling cannot play a key role in driving the rebound....Moreover, the pre-revolution elite exhibit systematically different values and attitudes today: in particular, they are more likely to consider effort as important to success, and such differences in expressed work ethics is evident even among adolescents who have not completed formal schooling or participated in the labor market. These values and titudes are reflected in their behavior: the pre-revolution elite work longer hours during workdays and spend less time on leisure during weekends. These patterns are much stronger for those among the children generation who co-live with their parents, and absent for those whose parents have passed away prematurely, consistent with the ideas that vertical transmissions of values (and human capital in general) require time spent together across generations."
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