"Polaroid comes to my mind here ... They were so blinded by their inventive tradition and the money they made on their original breakthrough of “instant” self-developing film that they didn’t realize the growing threat posed by digital imaging.
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If we turn the clock back to 1990, Polaroid’s biggest asset was a global user-base that bought the company’s cameras but also - and more importantly - bought its film. On paper, Polaroid looked agile, with about $3 billion in revenues. Internally, however, the company was at odds with the vision of its founder and inventor, Dr. Edwin Land. Instead of developing the inventive and innovative thinking that brought so much success in the first place, Polaroid used much of its capital to defend itself against copycat technologies. The company refused to explore digital imaging, even as new start-ups out of MIT sprang up along Route 128 and on Kendall Square, offering a glimpse of the digital future. What killed Polaroid was its patent-centric mindset and its firm focus on the past, rather than the future. When the technology it defended so hard against competitors became obsolete, the company became obsolete.
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But what if Polaroid had opened up instead of hunkering down? Just imagine if the designers among its loyal global user-base had collaborated on an open-source “image system” based on, but not limited by, the company’s previous success. First of all, there would have been a different mindset within the company. Polaroid’s brand and product experience was about instant images, not necessarily about cameras and instant film. An opensource strategy would have kept Polaroid on the path of “instant imaging” because, as the technology developed, the choices would have become more varied and flexible."
Trecho retirado de "A fine line" de Hartmut Esslinger.
