"There are always limits to the effectiveness of any unbalanced growth model....After the global financial crisis, the Chinese government responded to the collapse in external demand for Chinese manufactures by ramping up domestic investment even further. Without a commensurate increase in profitable investment projects, however, the result was simply a sharp increase in the domestic debt burden....In China, the GDP growth rate is an input into the system. It is set early in the year as the GDP growth target for that year and represents the amount of growth needed to accommodate social and political objectives, among which of course is the desire to keep unemployment low....This creates powerful—and dangerous—incentives. China’s provincial and municipal governments control most of the credit creation within the banking system, and Chinese banks rarely have to write down loans for projects that cannot service the debt. The easiest way for officials to hit their targets is therefore to tell the state-run banks to lend to favored companies to invest in as much infrastructure, manufacturing, and real estate as necessary. Whether the investments are worthwhile is irrelevant. [Moi ici: Lembram-se dos arrepios?] All that matters is that the quantity of spending generates enough reported GDP to meet the central government’s objectives."
Trechos retirados de “Trade Wars Are Class Wars” de Matthew C. Klein.
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