segunda-feira, março 30, 2020

Apparatchiks em todo o lado

A ISO 9001:2015 convida as organizações a determinarem os riscos e oportunidades e a actuarem com base nos mais relevantes. Por isso, o meu amigo @Peliteiro, experiente auditor ISO 9001 na área da saúde e, nos dias de hoje, verdadeiro combatente na primeira linha, lançou-me a questão:

Acerca da velocidade de aprendizagem e resposta deixem-me contar esta história:
Conheço empresário que depois de ver o estado em que um seu trabalhador ficou depois da feira de calçado em Milão, contactou a Protecção Civil da sua cidade a pedir para serem tomadas medidas. Começou por um contacto telefónico no dia 25 de Fevereiro. Responderam-lhe que tivesse juízo, que era um alarmista.

No dia 26 de Fevereiro enviou comunicação formal para Protecção Civil da sua cidade. Protecção Civil que reuniu a 6 de Março para concluir que não havia problema.

Entretanto, acabo de ler na primeira página do NYT de hoje:
"The alarm system was ready. Scarred by the SARS epidemic that erupted in 2002, China had created an infectious disease reporting system that officials said was world-class: fast, thorough and, just as important, immune from meddling.
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Hospitals could input patients’ details into a computer and instantly notify government health authorities in Beijing, where officers are trained to spot and smother contagious outbreaks before they spread.
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It didn’t work.
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After doctors in Wuhan began treating clusters of patients stricken with a mysterious pneumonia in December, the reporting was supposed to have been automatic. Instead, hospitals deferred to local health officials who, over a political aversion to sharing bad news, withheld information about cases from the national reporting system — keeping Beijing in the dark and delaying the response.
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The central health authorities first learned about the outbreak not from the reporting system but after unknown whistle-blowers leaked two internal documents online.
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Even after Beijing got involved, local officials set narrow criteria for confirming cases, leaving out information that could have provided clues that the virus was spreading among humans. Hospitals were ordered to count only patients with a known connection to the source of the outbreak, the seafood market. Doctors also had to have their cases confirmed by bureaucrats before they were reported to higher-ups.

Trecho retirado de "China Had a Fail-Safe Way to Track Contagions. Officials Failed to Use It."





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