sexta-feira, abril 01, 2011
Crescimento, indicadores e arrogância
Aranha, este artigo "Starbucks’ quest for healthy growth: An interview with Howard Schultz" ajuda a explicar o sucedido em Itália com a Starbucks.
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Primeiro, uma saudável rejeição do crescimento como uma religião.
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"growth became a carcinogen at Starbucks
...
When you look at growth as a strategy, it becomes somewhat seductive, addictive. But growth should not be—and is not — a strategy; it’s a tactic. (Moi ici: Nunca esquecer "Volume is vanity, Profit is sanity") The primary lesson I’ve learned over the years is that growth and success can cover up a lot of mistakes."
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Também interessante, o exemplo de como o que se mede influencia o comportamento dos gestores:
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"there’s a fine line between trying to manage the company in the most appropriate fiduciary way—and at the same time providing analysts with 100 percent transparency, which they deserve.
...
An albatross around the neck of most retailers and restaurant companies is this metric that Wall Street created many, many years ago: the calculation of the growth of stores open for more than one year.
...
we had become linked internally to the comp-store sales number, and we started making decisions that were driving incremental revenue and perhaps were not consistent with the equity of the brand. I wanted to remove that albatross from the necks of the operators.
So I announced, one day when I came back, that we were going to stop reporting monthly comps."
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Cá está uma justificação para a dúvida do Aranha:
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"What we want to do as a company is put our feet in the shoes of our customers. What does that mean, especially in China? It means that not everything from Starbucks in China should be invented in Starbucks in Seattle. Now, the Chinese customer, like many customers around the world, does not want a watered-down Starbucks. But we want to be highly respectful of the cultural differences in every market, especially China, and appeal to the Chinese customer. So as an example, the food for the Chinese stores is predominantly designed for the Chinese palate.
Now, this is not a company that did these kinds of things in the past. We were fighting a war here between the people in Seattle who want a blueberry muffin and the people in China who say, “You know what, I think black sesame is probably an ingredient that they would rather have than blueberry.” And I would say that goes back to the hubris of the past, when we thought, we’re going to change behavior."
.
Primeiro, uma saudável rejeição do crescimento como uma religião.
.
"growth became a carcinogen at Starbucks
...
When you look at growth as a strategy, it becomes somewhat seductive, addictive. But growth should not be—and is not — a strategy; it’s a tactic. (Moi ici: Nunca esquecer "Volume is vanity, Profit is sanity") The primary lesson I’ve learned over the years is that growth and success can cover up a lot of mistakes."
.
Também interessante, o exemplo de como o que se mede influencia o comportamento dos gestores:
.
"there’s a fine line between trying to manage the company in the most appropriate fiduciary way—and at the same time providing analysts with 100 percent transparency, which they deserve.
...
An albatross around the neck of most retailers and restaurant companies is this metric that Wall Street created many, many years ago: the calculation of the growth of stores open for more than one year.
...
we had become linked internally to the comp-store sales number, and we started making decisions that were driving incremental revenue and perhaps were not consistent with the equity of the brand. I wanted to remove that albatross from the necks of the operators.
So I announced, one day when I came back, that we were going to stop reporting monthly comps."
.
Cá está uma justificação para a dúvida do Aranha:
.
"What we want to do as a company is put our feet in the shoes of our customers. What does that mean, especially in China? It means that not everything from Starbucks in China should be invented in Starbucks in Seattle. Now, the Chinese customer, like many customers around the world, does not want a watered-down Starbucks. But we want to be highly respectful of the cultural differences in every market, especially China, and appeal to the Chinese customer. So as an example, the food for the Chinese stores is predominantly designed for the Chinese palate.
Now, this is not a company that did these kinds of things in the past. We were fighting a war here between the people in Seattle who want a blueberry muffin and the people in China who say, “You know what, I think black sesame is probably an ingredient that they would rather have than blueberry.” And I would say that goes back to the hubris of the past, when we thought, we’re going to change behavior."
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