sexta-feira, abril 17, 2009
Animador hem! (parte III e em contagem)
O presidente disse "“Empresários e gestores submissos em relação ao poder político não são, geralmente, empresários e gestores com fibra competitiva e com espírito inovador. Preferem acantonar-se em áreas de negócio protegidas da concorrência, com resultado garantido”" e disse ainda "“muitos dos agentes que beneficiaram do status quo – e que tiveram um papel activo nesta crise financeira – continuam a ser capazes de condicionar as políticas públicas, quer pela sua dimensão económica quer pela sua proximidade ao poder político.”" (segundo o sítio do Público)
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O primeiro extracto é muito semelhante ao que aqui fomos escrevendo ao longo dos anos, basta pesquisar pelas palavras "carpetes" e "corredores do poder".
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O segundo extracto fez-me recordar trechos deste interessante artigo:
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"The downward spiral that follows is remarkably steep. Enormous companies teeter on the brink of default, and the local banks that have lent to them collapse. Yesterday’s “public-private partnerships” are relabeled “crony capitalism.” With credit unavailable, economic paralysis ensues, and conditions just get worse and worse. The government is forced to draw down its foreign-currency reserves to pay for imports, service debt, and cover private losses. But these reserves will eventually run out. If the country cannot right itself before that happens, it will default on its sovereign debt and become an economic pariah. The government, in its race to stop the bleeding, will typically need to wipe out some of the national champions—now hemorrhaging cash—and usually restructure a banking system that’s gone badly out of balance. It will, in other words, need to squeeze at least some of its oligarchs.
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Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis, the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government."
.
O primeiro extracto é muito semelhante ao que aqui fomos escrevendo ao longo dos anos, basta pesquisar pelas palavras "carpetes" e "corredores do poder".
.
O segundo extracto fez-me recordar trechos deste interessante artigo:
.
"The downward spiral that follows is remarkably steep. Enormous companies teeter on the brink of default, and the local banks that have lent to them collapse. Yesterday’s “public-private partnerships” are relabeled “crony capitalism.” With credit unavailable, economic paralysis ensues, and conditions just get worse and worse. The government is forced to draw down its foreign-currency reserves to pay for imports, service debt, and cover private losses. But these reserves will eventually run out. If the country cannot right itself before that happens, it will default on its sovereign debt and become an economic pariah. The government, in its race to stop the bleeding, will typically need to wipe out some of the national champions—now hemorrhaging cash—and usually restructure a banking system that’s gone badly out of balance. It will, in other words, need to squeeze at least some of its oligarchs.
.
Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis, the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government."
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