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No entanto, não vejo o planeamento como um mandamento que não pode ser violado de maneira nenhuma. Um plano é uma ferramenta, é a nossa melhor tentativa para organizar os recursos necessários a concretizar um dado objectivo. A meio da concretização do plano, no entanto, podemos concluir que o melhor é reformular, é rever o plano.
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O grande risco de quem faz planos é o de se tornar prisioneiro deles.
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"Organizations create plans to prepare for the inevitable, preempt the undesirable, and control the controllable. Rational as all this may sound, planning has its shortcomings. Because planners plan in stable, predictable contexts, they are lulled into thinking that the world will unfold in the expected manner, a lapse that Henry Mintzberg calls “the fallacy of predetermination.” When people are in thrall of predetermination, there is simply no place for unexpected events that fall outside the realm of planning.
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Plans, in short, can do just the opposite of what is intended, creating mindlessness instead of mindful anticipation of the unexpected.
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Strong expectations influence what people see, what they choose to take for granted, what they choose to ignore, and the length of time it takes to recognize small problems that are growing. When people impose their expectations on ambiguous stimuli, they typically fill in the gaps, read between the lines, and complete the picture as best they can. Typically, this means that they complete the picture in ways that confirm what they expected to see. Slight deviations from the normal course of events are smoothed over and quickly lose their salience. It is only after a space shuttle explodes or illicit trading is exposed or vehicle tires come apart that people see a clear and ominous pattern in the weak signals they had previously dismissed.
By design, then, plans influence perception and reduce the number of things people notice. This occurs because people encode the world largely into the categories activated by the plan. Anything that is deemed “irrelevant” to the plan gets only cursory attention. And yet it is these very irrelevancies that are the seedbed of the unexpected events that make for unreliable functioning.
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… that plans presume that consistent high quality outcomes will be produced time after time if people repeat patterns of activity that have worked in the past. The problem with this logic is that routines can’t handle novel events."
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Plans, in short, can do just the opposite of what is intended, creating mindlessness instead of mindful anticipation of the unexpected.
…
Strong expectations influence what people see, what they choose to take for granted, what they choose to ignore, and the length of time it takes to recognize small problems that are growing. When people impose their expectations on ambiguous stimuli, they typically fill in the gaps, read between the lines, and complete the picture as best they can. Typically, this means that they complete the picture in ways that confirm what they expected to see. Slight deviations from the normal course of events are smoothed over and quickly lose their salience. It is only after a space shuttle explodes or illicit trading is exposed or vehicle tires come apart that people see a clear and ominous pattern in the weak signals they had previously dismissed.
By design, then, plans influence perception and reduce the number of things people notice. This occurs because people encode the world largely into the categories activated by the plan. Anything that is deemed “irrelevant” to the plan gets only cursory attention. And yet it is these very irrelevancies that are the seedbed of the unexpected events that make for unreliable functioning.
...
… that plans presume that consistent high quality outcomes will be produced time after time if people repeat patterns of activity that have worked in the past. The problem with this logic is that routines can’t handle novel events."
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Tendo isto em conta imaginem o que seria acreditar e aplicar o Grande Plano, a Grande Estratégia definida pelo Estado?
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Continua.
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Trecho retirado de "Managing the Unexpected" de Karl E. Weick e Kathleen M. Sutcliffe.
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