"Os gestores públicos são melhores que os gestores privados?Na média são iguais, no entanto não têm limites na capacidade de gastar e têm de satisfazer mais partes interessadas."
O que os torna mais perigosos.
Depois, dava o exemplo de uma entidade pública e de como a necessidade de agradar a todas as partes produzia um aborto muito caro para os contribuintes.
Entretanto, ao continuar a leitura de "The Crux - How Leaders Become Strategists" de Richard P. Rumelt encontro um exemplo no sector privado. Primeiro, Rumelt conta que aquilo que se aprende nas universidades para avaliar projectos não é o que se usa na vida real, porque na vida real há mentira, sonegação de informação e fé fanática.
"in the real world, the largest risk in long-term investments is that the people proposing the investment are incompetent or lying.
...
[Moi ici: Rumelt conta a estória de Bradley, o CEO de uma organização] “Professor Rumelt,” Bradley said, “you do not understand strategic planning. Strategic planning is a battle for corporate resources. It is a battle I intend to win.”
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The problem Bradley presents occurs whenever knowledge, resources, and decision rights are not colocated in the same individual. Once you have to ask someone else how to allocate your resources, there is a potential problem. And when you have to ask someone else to advise you on allocating a third person’s resources, things get even stickier. [Moi ici: As SCUTs vieram-me à cabeça] Consequently, the quality of strategy work is limited by the amount of honesty and integrity in the system.
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“In this case, the company was so large that the very senior executives would not comprehend the various strategies and projects that vied for favor and funding.
A system that lacks integrity will fail to utilize all of the knowledge and competence in the system and will act myopically. Bradley had an incentive to lie because it was not his money at risk. If the project did not work out, he would be first to know, and he would be the first out, blaming those left behind for fouling things up. If it did work out, he had much to gain. Winning such a commitment of corporate resources would be a feather in his cap and almost certainly lead to more power and pay within the company or elsewhere.
Although the board committee members were not knowledgeable about the technology involved, they were not stupid. [Moi ici: E quem defende o dinheiro dos contribuintes quando os projectos são escolhidos e financiados pelos governos de turno?] They were aware of the existence of behavior like Bradley’s, and they knew that misrepresentations are most likely to be about the more distant future. They would, consequently, discount promises about more distant profits, forcing the company to behave myopically. Insisting on a four-year payback was, perhaps, a sensible response to a system that has actors like Bradley making proposals to a distant uninformed committee."
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