quarta-feira, maio 21, 2014

As 3 partes de um BSC (parte II)

Parte I.
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Há dias o Paulo Peres mandou-me este recorte no Twitter:

É um excelente exemplo para introduzir, o capítulo 7 "New Approches to Developing Strategy" de "The Only Sustainable Edge":
"Business strategy as a distinct discipline emerged in the mid-1960s. At the time, it had some clear principles. Strategies were about positions and plans. The goal of strategy was to help a company identify attractive positions in relevant markets where a company could use sustainable competitive advantage to reap above-average profits for indefinite periods. Strategic analysis concentrated on understanding industry structures so that executives could target the most promising positions to occupy."
Nas décadas seguintes, com o aumento da incerteza resultante da intensificação da concorrência, a estratégia começou a ser vista de outra forma, onde se enquadra o recorte da foto:
"Given the difficulty in anticipating outcomes in complex and rapidly changing environments, these critics question whether it makes sense to try to understand evolving industry structures, especially when the very boundaries of these industries are being fundamentally reshaped. Since any advantage accruing to positions in these rapidly changing environments will probably erode quickly, perhaps executives should fixate on near-term movements designed to exploit market opportunities. In its more extreme forms, particularly prominent at the height of the dot-corn bubble, this school actually questions whether there is any need for strategy. When companies are sufficiently aggressive in operational initiatives, they can hustle themselves to profitability by staying one step ahead of operational copycats."
Esta postura foi muito bem apanhada por Roger Martin e comentada em "São as decisões dos humanos que ajudam a fazer a diferença (parte III)":
"When I ask business executives about their company's strategy — or about an apparent lack thereof — they often respond that they can't or won't do strategy because their operating environment is changing so much. There isn't enough certainty, they argue, to be able to do strategy effectively."
E volto ao capítulo 7
"Companies are beginning to realize that speed alone is not sufficient; they also need a sense of direction. Long-term position still matters, especially as we see the growing importance of global process networks and local business ecosystems. Without some sense of long-term position, movement rapidly degenerates into random motion.
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Options typically expand as change accelerates. Companies lacking a sense of direction usually fall into reactive approaches, pursuing too many options at the same time. The result is that resources are spread too thinly and performance impact diminishes because all the initiatives are under-resourced. In times of increasing uncertainty and rapid change, reactive approaches can become significant traps.
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Balancing the imperatives of speed and direction requires a different strategic approach focused on two very different time horizons. A long-term horizon of five to ten years creates a background for executive decision making, and a much shorter-term horizon of six to twelve months provides the foreground, where operational and organizational initiatives play out. Without the sense of background to put events and actions into context, the foreground of the six- to twelve-month horizon, where most line executives usually operate, begins to lose coherence. This coherence especially deteriorates in the business landscape that is evolving rapidly on a global scale and with the increasing need to coordinate across enterprises."

Foto inicial retirado do livro "Moments of Impact" de Chris Erthel.

Continua.

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